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Introduction 
 
This dissertation analyzes broadcast media coverage of a specific type of large-
scale shooting event: mass shootings that take place on American military installations. 
Specifically, this project examines the ways in which both events and shooters are framed 
in mainstream American broadcast media, analyzing media coverage through the lens of 
two pivotal shifts in public understanding of similar tragedies that took place around the 
turn of the 21st century—the 1999 Columbine shooting (which almost singlehandedly 
coined the phrase “mass shooting” and produced enduring tropes in media coverage), and 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, which permanently and drastically refigured the image of 
“terror” in the American imagination.  
This dissertation examines three case studies (one taking place before Columbine 
and September 11; two taking place after)—the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting, the 2009 
Camp Liberty shooting, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting. While the Fort Bragg shooting 
resulted in fewer fatalities than the Camp Liberty and Fort Hood shootings (and failed to 
meet the somewhat arbitrary benchmark of four fatalities that some consider a 
prerequisite to the term “mass shooting,” at least in the legal sense) it was analogous to 
the other two shootings in many ways. All three resulted in the death or serious injury of 
dozens of people, all three were committed by men of similar age and rank who had 
served in the military for a similar amount of time, and the factors leading up to all three 
shootings (clear preexisting signs of mental illness, the repeated involvement of 
commanding officers and the intercession of other soldiers prior to the shooting, the 
growing alienation of each shooter from other soldiers in his unit) were closely 
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analogous. Additionally, all three shootings took place in venues or spaces on base that 
were considered “weapons-free” zones—an exercise training field, a medical stress 
clinic, and a soldier readiness center, respectively.  
This research is important because of the timely and high profile nature of these 
kinds of tragic events. Mass shootings are an almost uniquely American problem, and the 
question of what constitutes terror—what it looks like, who is responsible for it, and how 
to best combat it—are pressing and visible issues for our time. This research is also 
important because the construction of concepts like “terror” and “mass shootings” in the 
mainstream media are often far more influential than technical, scholarly or policy-level 
definitions of these terms—as cultural theorist Stuart Hall noted, mass media do not 
simply reflect our lived realities; to a large degree, they construct them.1 Consequently, 
while this dissertation charts the historical evolution (and trends in media coverage) of 
concepts like “terror” and “mass shootings” in chapters two and three, it is far more 
focused on the way these mainstream broadcast media construct, selectively invoke, 
contextualize and explain these terms. In other words, examining the ways in which news 
media construct large-scale tragedies, in light of two interrelated shifts in public 
discourse stemming from two visible and large-scale events around the turn of the 
century (September 11 and Columbine), is as important or even more important than 
examining official or policy definitions or constructions of these types of events, because 
most Americans do not experience these kinds of events firsthand. Rather, they interact 
with, relate to, and understand these events solely through the prism of news media.  
                                                
1 S. Hall, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: 
Macmillan, 1978). 
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 This analysis is strongly informed by a cultural studies framework that recognizes 
the meaning-making potential of mass media, as well as the role of mass media in 
shaping and reinforcing existing dominant power dynamics.2 Decades of scholarship 
have reinforced the primacy of television news in terms of its considerable power to 
reinforce certain attitudes or behaviors3, and I chose to focus specifically on broadcast 
news for this reason. In my approach, I also draw upon Carey’s ritual model of 
communication, which views communication, in alignment with the social constructionist 
paradigm, as a “symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and 
transformed.”4 
 This dissertation asserts four key and interrelated points: (A) the primacy and 
importance of considering the two drastic shifts in public discourse at the turn of the 21st 
century that are described in this dissertation (the 1999 Columbine shooting and the 2001 
September 11 attacks) to contextualize any current analysis of large-scale acts of public 
violence; (B) the evidence that points to two basic causal elements behind the vast 
majority of mass shooting events: severe, preexisting mental illness on the part of 
shooters (who are often informed by long-standing ubiquitous masculine cultural scripts 
                                                
2 Ibid.; R. Williams, The Sociology of Culture (New York: Schocken, 1982). 
3 E.g., T. Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and 
Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); T. Dixon and 
D. Linz, “Race and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local Television News,” 
Communication Research 27 (2000): 547-573; T. Dixon, “Crime News and Racialized 
Beliefs: Understanding the Relationship Between Local News Viewing and Perceptions 
of African Americans and Crime,” Journal of Communication 58 (2008), 106-125; B. 
Frymer, “The Media Spectacle of Columbine: Alienated Youth as an Object of Fear,” 
American Behavioral Scientist 52, no. 10 (2009): 1387-1404; D. Freedman and D. 
Thussu, eds., Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives (Washington, DC: Sage, 2012). 
4 J. Carey, Communication as Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
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gleaned from mass media surrounding violence and mass shootings) and easy (often 
legal) access to high-powered weaponry; (C) the specific American focus on gun rights 
(and a fatalism on the part of media regarding future gun control measures) that 
disproportionately distorts discourse about mass shootings, and finally (D) the fascinating 
role that identity—especially nationality, race and religion—play in producing media 
coverage that frames nearly identical events in vastly different ways.   
 
Research questions 
This dissertation aims to discover the differential nuances in framing between 
coverage of these three events. My research questions are as follows: 
1. What narratives do broadcast media produce to contextualize and explain these 
attacks?  
2. How are the culprits described? Are their motivations portrayed as internal or 
external? How are their identities framed in coverage? 
3. When is “terror” as a descriptor triggered as an explanation or contextual cue for 
the event? When is mental illness invoked? 
4. How do the two major key shifting points in public discourse surrounding mass 
tragedies outlined above (the emergence of and consolidation of the mass 
shooting framework that arose after Columbine, and the emergence of and 
consolidation of the post-September 11 terror framework in coverage of mass 
death events) influence coverage and/or inflect each other?  
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 Methods 
With the help of a Kriss Research Support Grant, I obtained the entire population 
of video footage for broadcast coverage of the three events highlighted as case studies in 
this project (the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting, the 2009 Camp Liberty shooting, and the 2009 
Fort Hood shooting) in the following six outlets: Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC News, 
NBC and CBS.  Each segment was cross-checked using Lexis Nexis. I downloaded 
written transcripts for each segment from Lexis Nexis to aid in my analysis (and for 
terminological precision), and over the course of multiple viewings of the material, I 
made changes and corrections as necessary to the written transcripts. For additional 
context, I also used Lexis Nexis to download the entire population of print coverage for 
each shooting event in three leading national newspapers (The New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and USA Today) using carefully chosen keywords. Often, broadcast 
coverage and print coverage reflected or reinforced one another—as in the case of a 
particularly prominent and widely reprinted feature article about the Fort Bragg shooting, 
which was prominently featured on-screen in some broadcast coverage.5  
My methodological approach is rooted in a critical and cultural view that 
recognizes the primacy and meaning-making potential of mainstream news media, as 
well as the role of mass media in shaping and reifying power relationships in society.6 
Mainstream media both construct and reflect hegemonic ideals and cultural frames, 
                                                
5 T. Richissi, “Nobody Listened When Soldier Warned of His Violent Intentions,” News 
and Observer (Raleigh, NC), March 9, 1997. 
6 R. Williams, The Sociology of Culture (New York: Schocken, 1982); S. Hall, Policing 
the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978). 
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setting a clear agenda for audiences who consume media.7 This approach also recognizes 
that any project that examines discursive practices surrounding issues like this must be 
rooted in the long historical context that preceded current coverage8, so the first two 
chapters of this dissertation are devoted to reviewing the literature on (and the history of) 
both terrorism as a historical global concept and the relatively new concept of “mass 
shootings”—as well as the history of media coverage of these two concepts.   
This project is also rooted strongly in the literature on framing, most notably 
defined by Entman in 1993 as “essentially involv[ing] selection and salience. To frame is 
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described.”9 Framing theory is a key framework of this analysis, both because of the 
ability of mainstream media entities to delineate the scope and nature of the perceived 
realities of their audiences10, and because, in crisis situations in particular, the frames that 
                                                
7 M. McCombs and D. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-187; S. Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, 
Media, Language, ed. S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, and P. Willis (London: Hutchinson, 
1980), 128-138; R. Entman and A. Rojecki, The Black Image in the White Mind: Media 
and Race in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
8 M. Omi and H. Winant, “Racial Formation,” in Race Critical Theories, ed. P. Essad and 
D. Goldberg (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 123-145. 
9 R. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of 
Communication 43 (1993): 51-58. 
10 Z. Papacharissi and M. Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of 
Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers,” International 
Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 1 (2008): 52-74; G. Fairhurst and R. Sarr, The Art of 
Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership (Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1996); T. 
Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the 
New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); M. McCombs and S. Ghanem, 
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mass media apply are instrumental in helping audiences identify the main causes for 
problems or tragedies, make moral or ethical judgments, and identify appropriate 
responses.11 
In analyzing the texts, I employed a critical and comparative approach, evaluating 
both the imagery on-screen and the word choices used in coverage. I performed a multi-
step critical discourse analysis over multiple viewings of each text (with accompanying 
transcripts). First, word choices in the texts were detailed and tallied. Because of this 
project’s focus on the emergence of and shifting definitions of the terms “mass shooting” 
and “terror” around the turn of the 21st century, I am particularly interested in how, and 
how often, these terms—or similar/adjacent terms—were used in coverage. Second, in 
second and third viewings of the material, I took careful and comparative notes on the 
visual content (guided by an approach rooted in semiotic analysis) that accompanied each 
segment, both in terms of denotation (literal description of visuals) and connotation 
(associations that were evoked by visuals): on-screen headlines, icons used to “brand” 
each event for a given channel (often accompanied by a specific name for the event given 
by each outlet), lighting choices, in-studio vs. phone interviews with key sources, photos 
choices, and video clips that were chosen to accompany each story.  
                                                                                                                                            
“The Convergence of Agenda Setting and Framing,” in Framing Public Life: 
Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World, ed. S. Reese, O. 
Gandy, Jr., and A. Grant (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2001), 67–81. 
11 Z. Papacharissi and M. Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of 
Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers,” International 
Journal of Press/Politics 13, no. 1 (2008): 52-74; S. Reese and B. Buckalew, “The 
Militarism of Local Television: The Routine Framing of the Persian Gulf War,” Critical 
Studies In Mass Communication 12, no. 1 (1995): 40-59; Journalism After September 11, 
ed. B. Zelizer and S. Allen (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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In my application of critical discourse analysis, I looked for consistent emergent 
themes and frames along the lines delineated by Fairclough and Wodak, who identify the 
main tenets of critical discourse analysis as primarily investigating the following 
categories:  social relations, the discursive nature of power relations (and accordingly, 
how these power relationships are produced and maintained by texts), the ways in which 
discourse can help build and create core tenets of society and culture,  the ideological 
work of discourse, the historical nature of discourse, the mediated link between text and 
society, the interpretive and explanatory nature of discourse analysis, and the role of 
discourse as a form of social action.12 Accordingly, this project considers the social and 
power relationships that are produced and maintained in these texts, highlights the 
productive nature of the discourses present therein, and provides a historical context in 
which these discourses take place.  
Using an approach that relied on emergent coding allowed me to include 
unforeseen or unanticipated frames and themes in coverage. It also helped me to critically 
examine coverage comparatively across events and across media outlets. For visual 
imagery on-screen, my approach was informed most strongly by Barthes’ vision of 
semiotic analysis described in his classic essay, “The Rhetoric of the Text.” This view of 
images holds that within each text (in this case, within each broadcast segment), there are 
two kinds of messages at work—both denoted messages/images (the literal message, 
without signification) and connoted messages (the symbolism inherent in each message—
                                                
12 N. Fairclough and R. Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in Discourse Studies: A 
Multidisciplinary Introduction, vol. 2, ed. T. Van Dijk (London: Sage, 1997), 258-284. 
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what each message signifies for the viewer).13 This approach is an effective one for 
examining visual imagery, and has often been used in analyzing advertising and public 
relations messaging.14 A similar intentionality went into the creation of these broadcast 
media texts, and examining visuals for signified connotations as well as literal 
descriptions helped provide an additional dimension of nuance and context to the word 
choices and terms used by newscasters and sources in these texts. I also considered 
elements that seemed to be notably absent in coverage—sources that were conspicuously 
omitted or ignored, for example, or certain paths of salient journalistic investigation that 
were not pursued.  
 
 Chapters 
 In Chapter 2, I discuss the history and global usage of the term “terror” or 
“terrorism,” charting its evolution over four “waves” of historical meaning. I review the 
scholarly literature on terrorism, and compile a list of American and international policy 
definitions for the term. Finally, I chart the ways in which terror has historically been 
framed by the mass media, and the enormous cultural and political shift that took place 
after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001—attacks that permanently shifted 
American discourse on “terror,” and the image of terror in the American imagination. 
                                                
13 R. Barthes, “Rhetoric of the Image,” Responsibility of Forms (January 1985): 21-40. 
14 E.g., M. Moffitt, “Critical Theoretical Considerations of Public Relations Messaging 
Around the Globe: Tools for Creating and Evaluating Campaign Messages,” Journal of 
Promotion Management 17, no. 1 (2011): 21-41; P. Lyth, “‘Think of her as your Mother’: 
Airline Advertising and the Stewardess in America, 1930-1980," Journal of Transport 
History 30, no. 1 (2009): 1-21. 
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 Chapter 3 takes up a similar category of tragic and high profile events: mass 
shootings. In Chapter 3, I present policy definitions of mass shootings in the United 
States, and chart the global history of this particular phenomenon, with a special focus on 
cultural and political elements (such as gun legislation) that contextualize these events. I 
also highlight the ways in which Columbine—a mass shooting that took place just before 
the turn of the century—garnered enormous and unprecedented coverage, produced 
enduring tropes regarding coverage of these events, and solidified the term “mass 
shooting” in U.S. media and the American imagination.  
In Chapter 4, I outline the events of the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting. I describe the 
primary frames that emerged in broadcast media coverage of the event—most notably, a 
strong focus on nationalism and patriotism (coupled with a vision of the shooter as “one 
of the military’s own”), investigative inquiry of the shooter’s weaponry, and a strong 
frame of mental illness as the primary causal factor in the shooting. I compare media 
coverage of the shooting to the facts that we now know about the event—omissions, 
inclusions and other choices made by broadcast newsmakers, and finally discuss where 
this shooting and its coverage fits into broader cultural narratives of the mid-1990s about 
issues like gun control, masculinity, patriotism and nationality.  
In Chapter 5, I outline the events of the 2009 mass shooting at Camp Liberty, a 
former American military installation in Iraq. I contextualize the event in the cultural, 
social and political context of the period, and compare media coverage of the shooting—
frames, omissions, inclusions, primary sources—to the facts of the event. I describe the 
primary frames that emerged in broadcast coverage of the shooting—most notably, 
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hyper-masculine and hyper-patriotic cultural scripts, a variant on mental illness that 
frames the shooter’s motivations as being rooted primarily in “combat stress,” and the 
near-total absence of any investigative inquiry regarding military policy or weaponry. 
Finally, I consider where the coverage of this shooting fits into cultural scripts and norms 
of the period, and how this coverage reflects cultural norms of the Iraq War period.  
In Chapter 6, I outline the events of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, discussing the 
social, political and cultural climate that preceded this shooting—the most deadly mass 
shooting to date to take place on an American military base.  I describe the frames that 
emerged in broadcast media coverage of the shooting—most notably, the primacy and 
infallibility of the American military institution (as well as its role as a stand-in for the 
American people), the predominant frame of the event as an act of anti-American 
“terror,” and the presence of old Orientalist tropes that securely placed the Fort Hood 
shooter in an “othered” category, excluding him from a shared vision of American (and 
military) identity. Finally, I discuss the role this coverage played in upholding norms and 
cultural scripts of the Iraq War period in the first decade of the 21st century. 
In the conclusion, Chapter 7, I discuss my findings, aligning my discussion of the 
ways in which these three case studies were framed along a few axes: (1) the effect 
September 11 had on the coverage of the 2009 shootings vs. the 1995 Fort Bragg 
shooting, (2) the effect Nidal Hasan’s identity had on coverage of the Fort Hood 
shooting, and (3) the role the “theater of war” played in coverage of the Camp Liberty 
shooting—a shooting that took place in an active war zone. I reflect upon how framing 
decisions, word choice and sourcing affected the prism through which broadcast media 
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presented these attacks, and how journalists might move forward to more appropriately 
cover these shootings in the future.  
  13 
Chapter 1: Terrorism and Mass Media: The History of a Slippery Term  
 
In the echo chamber of American news media, the idea of a “war on terror” has 
taken on a distinct vocabulary,15 as well as a unique set of symbols and associations. But 
despite the omnipresence of the “war on terror,” and the reality that many people have an 
unspoken sense of what constitutes “terror,”16 terrorism is a term that has always been 
notoriously difficult to define. 17 While this imprecision and subjectivity keep a 
commonly accepted universal definition of terrorism out of reach, an exploration of the 
evolution of historical terrorism, a delineation of the continuum of common 
understandings of terror’s meaning—and more importantly for the purposes of this study, 
what news media mean when they use the word—is crucial to approaching how large-
scale tragic events are contextualized, framed and understood.  
 
Governmental and policy definitions 
                                                
15 F. Halliday, Shocked and Awed: A Dictionary of the War on Terror (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2011). 
16 As Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the United Nations, put it in an 
address after September 11, “Let us be wise and focused about this: terrorism is terrorism 
. . . What looks, smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism”: A. Schmid, “Terrorism: The 
Definitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 36, no 2/3 
(2004): 103-147.  
17 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); A. 
Schmid and A. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2005); A. Schmid, “Terrorism: The Definitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 36, no. 2/3 (2004): 103-147; D. Freedman and D. Thussu, 
eds., Media & Terrorism: Global Perspectives (Washington, DC: Sage, 2012); W. 
Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1987). 
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 As a political term, “terrorism” carries enormous weight. Billions of dollars have 
been spent worldwide combating the spread of this particular type of violence, and two 
wars have been waged in the last two decades in the pursuit of its defeat.18  
 American public policy definitions of “terrorism” have narrowed in recent years, 
cleaving more closely to a single definition based on Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 
2656f(d)(2): “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant groups by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents.”1920  
 Specifically, the CIA defines terrorism as follows:  
• The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.  
• The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving the territory 
or the citizens of more than one country.  
• The term “terrorist group” means any group that practices, or has 
significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.21 
 
Before 2005, the FBI defined terrorism (per the Code of Federal Regulations) as 
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
                                                
18 Notably, however, there is little consensus about how a war on a nebulous and abstract 
entity like “terror” might be clearly and emphatically “won.”  
19 Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, U.S. Code 22 (2010), § 2656f(d). 
20 Interestingly, previous versions of this section included a final clause to the definition 
of terrorism: “usually intended to influence an audience,” which has since disappeared. It 
is also important to note that the insertion of the term “subnational groups” eliminates 
state-sponsored terrorism from this definition.  
21 “Terrorism FAQs,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-faqs.html (accessed April 19, 2013).  
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political or social objectives”22 After 2005, however, the FBI adopted the 2656f(d)(2) 
terminology, a definition that is also shared by the National Counterterrorism Center.  
Before 2010, the Department of Defense defined terrorism as:  
the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals 
or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives. 23 
 
In 2010, however, the DOD definition changed slightly to define terror more 
specifically in terms of political goals, defining it as:  
the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce 
governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or 
other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually 
political.24 
 
On an international level, the United Nations has made several attempts to come 
up with a commonly accepted global definition of “terrorism,” but its attempts have been 
mired in disagreements among member states. In 1996, the U.N. defined terrorism as: 
[C]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes [that] are in 
any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them.25 
 
In 2004, the U.N. Security Council broadened its definition (and clarified the 
U.N.’s stance on terror) in Resolution 1566, noting that terrorism comprises: 
                                                
22 General Functions, Code of Federal Regulations, title 28, section 0.85.  
23 U.S. Departments of the Army & Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity 
Conflict (FM 100-20), 1990. 
24 “Terrorism,” Defense Technical Information Center: Joint Electronic Library, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/t/7591.html (accessed November 24, 
2010).  
25 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, December 17, 1996. 
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criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state 
of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope 
of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.26 
 
For years, however, a proposed U.N. treaty intended to broadly criminalize 
international terrorism, the Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism, 
has been deadlocked—partially because of the inability of member states to achieve 
consensus about how to define terrorism27, echoing Yassir Arafat’s 1974 argument before 
the United Nations General Assembly on the deeply subjective and inherently socio-
political distinctions between “terrorists” and “revolutionaries.”28 
 
Scholarship on terrorism 
Among influential scholars of terrorism and terrorism policy, there is a similar 
dearth of consensus about how to define terror. Some prominent experts have offered 
their own definitions, drawing upon decades of scholarship that identify various elements 
that have historically represented terror, while others reject the idea of ever identifying a 
common or comprehensive definition. In 1987, for example, Walter Laqueur wrote that 
                                                
26 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566, Terrorism, October 8, 2004.  
27 Muslim Public Affairs Council, A Review of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: American 
Muslim Critique and Recommendations (Washington, DC: 2003). 
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attempting to ever define terrorism was a futile act, and that any attempt to do so was not 
academically worthwhile, although terrorism itself is still an object worthy of study—
even despite the reality that it may never be grounded in widely agreed-upon theory2930. 
Twenty years later, in 2007, Merari echoed these sentiments, writing that achieving 
consensus on a single definition of terrorism is not crucial to the study of terror as a 
phenomenon, except for linguists. However, Merari went on to stress the importance of 
making strides toward at least loosely differentiating terrorism from other forms of 
violence, writing that “as long as the term ‘terrorism’ simply denoted a violent behavior 
that is deplorable in the eyes of the user of the term, its utility is in propaganda rather 
than in research.”31 
In 1975, Brian Jenkins defined terrorism according to the nature of the act of 
violence itself, an approach that was common in the ’70s: 
The most simple definition of international terrorism comprises acts of terrorism 
that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad 
to strike their targets, select victims or targets because of their connections to a 
foreign state … attack airliners on international flights or force airliners to fly to 
another country … terrorism may also be defined as acts of violence or campaigns 
of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedures of international 
diplomacy and war.32 
 
                                                
29 W. Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1987). 
30 See also P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2nd edition (New York: Wiley, 
1986), 96. 
31 A. Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” in The History of Terrorism: From 
Antiquity to Al-Qaeda, ed. G. Chaliand and A. Blin (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007), 13. 
32 B. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in International 
Terrorism and World Security, ed. D. Carlton and C. Schaerf (London: Croom Helm, 
1975), 13-34. 
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 Jenkins also emphasized the role that publicity played in terms of the fundamental 
aims of terrorist actors, writing that terrorists “want a lot of people watching and a lot of 
people listening and not a lot of people dead.”33 
 Paul Wilkinson, another prolific scholar of terrorism who published a great deal 
in the 1970s and ‘80s, emphasized at length the differences between what he termed 
“guerilla” violence and terrorism, a distinction that was also echoed by Laqueur. 34 In a 
definition that reflected the most high-profile terrorist events of his time, in 1978 
Wilkinson wrote that:  
In essence, terrorism is a weapon of coercive intimidation, typically involving the 
taking of hostages and the threat of the gun and the bomb, to coerce governments 
to submit to terrorist demands. Characteristic objectives of terrorist groups are 
publicity, both national and international, the release of fellow terrorists from 
gaol, and large ransoms. Possible longer-term objectives include: introducing a 
general climate of collapse and fear; weakening and dividing governments and 
communities; and provoking the authorities into an over-reaction which would 
alienate popular support and enable the terrorist movement to pose as the 
defenders of the people.35 
 
In much of his published work on the subject, Wilkinson emphasized this use of 
“provocative” strategies among specifically political terrorists to push governments 
toward failure, arguing that the only response to terrorism by liberal democracies 
necessitates firm law and order measures to keep terrorists in check. 36 
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 In the early 1980s, there was a distinct shift in terrorism scholarship. In an echo of 
the earlier Red Scares, international terrorism (ostensibly orchestrated by the Soviets) 
began to be regarded as being globally interconnected and intended to upend the cultural 
hegemony of the West—the beginning of a turn toward scholarship that regarded 
terrorism as a vast global conspiracy aimed at unseating or destabilizing Western 
powers.37 By the mid 1980s, however, the role of state-sponsored “terror” perpetrated by 
nations in the Middle East, rather than the Soviets (Libya, Syria, Iran and Iraq) 
superseded conspiracy theories regarding Soviet complicity in international terror, and 
terrorism became associated with a type of warfare in which weaker or rogue states could 
confront larger, more powerful rivals.38 
In 1984, Rapoport embarked upon the first comparative study of religious terror 
groups, what Rapoport termed “holy” or “sacred” terror. Before the French Revolution, 
Rapoport argued, religious motivations (among the three traditions he considered: 
Hinduism, Islam and Judaism) provided the only justification for what we now think of as 
“terrorism,” writing presciently that the lessons gleaned from historical examples of 
religious terrorism should inform scholarship on modern-day religious terrorism, 
especially in regard to current terrorists’ motivations.39 In later work, Rapoport went on 
to identify three “waves” of terrorism, with the first two waves taking place before the 
1960s, the third (the era when the idea of “international terrorism” first gained a foothold) 
                                                
37 E.g., C. Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981); R. Cline and Y. Alexander, Terrorism: 
The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984). 
38 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
39 D. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” 
American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 658-677. 
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spanning the late ‘60s to the mid-‘80s, and an additional fourth wave, characterized 
predominantly by a religious dimension to terror, extending into the present.40 
In his influential 1998 book, Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman identifies terrorism 
as a fundamentally political concept, arguing that this facet—terror’s unavoidably 
political nature—is a key characteristic that is absolutely paramount to understanding its 
aims. Hoffman writes: 
Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is 
fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the 
pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve 
political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of 
violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim.41  
 
Building upon the most common policy definitions of his time, Hoffman 
identifies five elements that set terrorism apart from other forms of violence: its political 
nature, the threat or action of violence, the intention of far-reaching psychological effects 
beyond the immediate victims/targets, the execution of said violence (or threat) by an 
organization with an identifiable structure, and the subnational or non-state nature of the 
entity carrying out the act.42 Consequently, Hoffman succinctly defines terrorism as “the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence and 
in pursuit of political change.”43 
In 2005, in an updated version of their original (1984) germinal and magisterial 
survey of terrorism research, Schmid and Jongman identified 109 separate definitions of 
                                                
40 D. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism,” Current 
History 100, no. 650 (2001): 419-424. 
41 B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 14-15. 
42 Ibid., 43. 
43 Ibid. 
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terrorism (drawn from policy, governmental and academic sources), comparing and 
contrasting the elements from these definitions. 44 Specifically, the 22 most common 
elements (occurring with the greatest frequency in the definitions of terrorism Schmid 
and Jongman surveyed), were: 
Element Frequency 
1. Violence, force 83.5% 
2. Political 65% 
3. Fear, terror emphasized 51% 
4. Threat 47% 
5. (Psych.) effects of (anticipated) 
reactions 41.5% 
6. Victim-target differentiation 37.5% 
7. Purposive, planned, systemic, 
organized action 32% 
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5% 
9. Extranormality, in breach of 
accepted rules, without humanitarian 
constraints 
30% 
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of 
compliance 28% 
11. Publicity aspect 21.5% 
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, 
random character; indiscrimination 21% 
13. Civilians, noncombatants, 
neutrals, outsiders as victims 17.5% 
14. Intimidation 17% 
15. Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5% 
16. Group, movement, organization 
as perpetrator 14% 
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17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration 
to others 13.5% 
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, 
unexpectedness of occurrence of 
violence 
9% 
19. Clandestine, covert nature 9% 
20. Repetitiveness, serial or 
campaign character of violence 7% 
21. Criminal 6% 
22. Demands made on third parties 4% 
Table 1: Common elements of terrorism definitions 
In contrast to the approach articulated by terrorism scholars like Walter Laqueur 
and Ariel Merari, Schmid and Jongman argue that definitional precision is crucial to the 
study of terrorism. With the above common elements in mind, the authors came up with 
their own all-inclusive definition of terrorism that incorporated all of the most frequent 
elements from the definitions they surveyed: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action employed by 
(semi-)clandestine individual, group or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of the 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative 
or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main target are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or 
a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda 
is primarily sought.45 
Another thing Schmid and Jongman’s Political Terrorism survey does very well 
is delineate the different quadrants of typologies of terrorism definitions—powerfully 
underlining both the lack of consensus among scholars of terrorism and the ways in 
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which articulated definitions of terrorism often subtly serve the specific interests and 
concerns of the people, governments or organizations doing the defining. A few common 
typological quadrants that Schmid and Jongman identify, for example, are actor-based vs. 
victim-based definitions, cause-based, motivation-based, demand-based, target-based, 
means-based or political orientation-based classifications.46 
 
Global history of terrorism 
 Although this study focuses primarily on terrorism since 1968—the beginning of 
the period Rapoport considers the advent of the third and fourth waves of global 
terrorism,47 and the year in which most scholars argue that modern terrorism emerged48, 
it is important to note the deep historical roots to many of the key elements of modern 
terrorism. Many of the words associated with terrorism, for example, trace their 
etymology to specific ancient historical terrorist groups, such as assassin (a radical 
Muslim Shi’a sect that fought to repel Christian Crusaders beginning in the 11th century), 
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thug (a seventh-century Hindu sect that murdered traveling civilians on holy days for 
sacrificial offerings), or zealot (a Jewish sect operating from AD 66-73 that fought 
against the Roman Empire in early acts of public terror designed to garner attention). 
Historically, the term “terror” as it appears in its present usage is generally traced 
back to the “Reign of Terror” during the French Revolution in the eighteenth century, 
referring to the widespread fear that accompanied public executions.49 In 1794, 
revolutionary leader Robespierre famously declared that “terror is nothing but justice, 
prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.”50 Unlike many 
current applications of the term, however, the idea of “terrorism” during this early period 
referred more to an instrument of governance wielded by the revolutionary state – it was 
a “top-down” form of terrorism that viewed terror as a state tool, rather than an anti-
government or revolutionary activity. This early conception of terror, however, did have 
two important things in common with its modern-day variant—namely, that the regime 
de la terreur was neither random nor indiscriminate, and that its goal, its very 
justification, reflected the idea of the creation of a new and better society in place of a 
fundamentally corrupt and undemocratic political system.51 
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In the 19th century, most scholars identify the Narodnaya Volya (“People’s Will” 
or “People’s Freedom”), a group of Russian constitutionalists who opposed tsarist rule, as 
the first true terrorist organization52, putting into practice the ideas of Carlo Pisacane, an 
Italian republican extremist who popularized the idea of “propaganda by deed”53 (the idea 
that violence was sometimes necessary to draw needed attention to a just cause), a 
philosophy that informed terrorist ideologies for years to come. This led to the anarchist 
movement of the late 19th century, a period of time characterized by international terrorist 
conferences, assassinations of heads of state, and the dissemination of the first DIY or 
“how-to” manuals for violence and mayhem.54 This movement, during which “terrorism” 
retained its revolutionary connotations, lasted until the eve of the First World War. Most 
of the members of these anarchist groups were young, disaffected nationalists (such as, 
for example, the Young Bosnians, or “Mlada Bosna,” a group comprised of young 
Bosnian Serbs, most of whom were students) who rose up against their ruling classes and 
governments. It was a member of Mlada Bosna, Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated 
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and thereby set into motion the events 
that led to the First World War.55 
By 1920, in the United States, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, two Italian 
immigrant anarchists accused of killing a paymaster and his assistant in broad daylight, 
epitomized the widespread fear of “terror” spread by revolutionary or anarchist groups. 
The American press whipped citizens into a frenzy over the case, pushing for the 
convictions of the two men. It soon became clear that the two men had become victims of 
a miscarriage of justice—but by then it was too late. They were executed in 1927.56 
Once the hysteria over the Russian Revolution and anarchism started to die down, 
especially in the West—by the 1930s—the meaning of terrorism shifted again. 
Accompanying the simultaneous rise of totalitarian governments, especially in Europe 
and Asia (the Nazis in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, Franco in Spain, Stalin in Russia) the 
meaning of the term was used more often to refer to the practices of mass repression 
employed by these states, rather than subnational or revolutionary violence or movements 
directed at states themselves.  
In the 1960s, several radical (often student-led) groups (such as the Black 
Panthers, Students for a Democratic Society and its offshoot, the Weather Underground 
Organization) began to organize in the United States. Although the tactics of many of 
these groups fall under the umbrella of what now might be considered terrorism—
bombings, shootings and arson—a ProQuest search of newspaper headlines before the 
late 1960s suggests that only handful of newspapers referred to the actions of the Weather 
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Underground, for example, as "terror," and most of the characterizations of these radical 
groups as being "terror" groups (or as “terrorists”) appeared much later, well into the '70s. 
“Terror” seems to have been a label that the press applied after the fact, once the 
symbolism and cultural heft of the post-1968 "international terrorism" era had begun to 
influence the way media organizations thought about these groups.  
 
Post-1968, pre-September 11: the advent of modern “international 
terrorism” 
The period of time between 1968 and the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, 
saw many marked shifts in both the practice and study of terrorism. For the first time, 
because of the advent of satellite technology, and because of shifts in the tactics of high-
profile terrorist organizations, terrorism was seen as a truly global phenomenon, crossing 
state lines and geographic borders. “International terrorism,” as a conceptual term, first 
emerged during this period.57  
This particular era of terrorism was marked by a few common elements: (A) the 
internationalization of terror; (B) the prevalence of airline hijacking as a method 
preferred by terrorists—in the 1970s, there were more than 100 hijackings each year, 
leading to the early portion of this period sometimes being called the “hijacking era;” (C) 
the centrality of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a germinal and much-
copied organization; and (D) the widespread idea among scholars of terrorism that 
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terrorist acts were concerned more with (and fueled primarily by a desire for) visibility 
and media coverage than they were with inflicting violence upon their actual victims—
this emerging body of theory recognized and emphasized the growing influence of truly 
“mass” media.58  
One event in particular in 1968, the July 22 hijacking of the Israeli El Al flight 
from Rome to Tel Aviv by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (a subset of 
the PLO), is widely seen as being particularly influential in terms of ushering in a new 
era of international terror. Although it was not the first hijacking of a commercial 
airline—groups had previously hijacked flights to reroute planes or land in restricted 
areas, such as Cuba, mainly to get around travel restrictions, rather than reach a global 
audience with specific demands—it was the first hijacking that was explicitly carried out 
for political ideological ends59, and in such a way that the circumstances were designed to 
force communication with the terrorists and to draw attention to their cause. 60  
In 1972, the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by the PLO’S 
Black September Organization (BSO) represented another high-profile example during 
this period of terrorism’s power to, as Hoffman put it, “rocket a cause from obscurity to 
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renown,”61 resulting in an interesting paradox. Although the attack was a failure on many 
fronts—not only did the BSO fail to achieve their principal demand, that several hundred 
Palestinian prisoners be freed from Israeli prisons, but the widespread global media 
coverage of the event led to nearly unanimous international condemnation of the attack, 
tarnishing the Palestinian cause. Only in terms of sheer publicity could the attack be 
considered a success. As Abu Iyad, a senior PLO official, put it, although the attack 
failed to achieve its ostensible demands, it the BSO did succeed in forcing the world to 
take notice of Palestinian issues, and the Palestinian people had “imposed their presence 
on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them.”62 And in a communiqué 
published just after the attack in Beirut, the BSO wrote that “[t]he choice of the 
Olympics, from a purely propagandistic view-point, was 100 percent successful. It was 
like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners 
of the earth.”63 
 During this time period, the emphasis on international terrorism—terrorism that 
superseded all national borders—was exemplified most powerfully by the global success 
and prominence of the PLO, which became a sort of meta-terrorist organization, training 
would-be radicals who hailed from nations all over the world in the key tactics of 
effective terror. By the early 1980s, terrorism began to be viewed as a calculated means 
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to specifically destabilize the West, with a focus particularly on the Soviets as 
masterminds behind global trails of terror organizations.  
However, as old Cold War rivalries cooled, and a number of key political changes 
took place—such as the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989, coupled with events like 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran a decade earlier—the focus among policymakers and 
scholars of terrorism began to shift to a new wave of terrorism (what Rapoport calls the 
“fourth wave” of terrorism) that emphasized the rise in prominence of explicitly religious 
terrorist groups.64 Rather than a specific political or revolutionary ethos, religion itself 
was seen as the predominant characteristic of this “wave” of terrorism. Beginning in the 
late ‘80s and extending into the 21st century, terrorism carried out by religious extremists 
rose in prominence. Religious groups behind this wave of terrorism were many and 
varied: the Hindu/Buddhist Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan, which perpetrated the 1995 
sarin gas attack in Tokyo, the Christian Identity movement in the United States (whose 
most famous adherent, Timothy McVeigh, was responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing), Jewish terrorists, such as Baruch Goldstein, the Brooklyn man behind the 
1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre, and the al-Qaeda trained Muslim terrorists behind 
the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.  
If the PLO was the meta-organization that exemplified the first part of this 
period—the “third wave” of terrorism—then al-Qaeda, the organization behind an 
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increasing number of anti-American terrorist attacks in the waning years of the 20th 
century, was shaping up to be the meta-organization that characterized the fourth era.  
 
Post-September 11: the current era 
 The global effect of September 11 in terms of the drastic shift it wrought in 
popular understandings of “terrorism” cannot be overstated. The 2001 attacks, which 
resulted (directly) in the deaths of nearly 3,000 in the United States and (indirectly) in the 
deaths of at least hundreds of thousands in the subsequent Iraq and Afghan wars, 
dramatically reorganized the way that Americans thought about terrorism, terrorists and 
risk. Al-Qaeda, the growing global militant Islamic terrorist organization responsible for 
previous attacks on American embassies and the World Trade Center in 1993, rocketed to 
global notoriety overnight. And Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi al-Qaeda leader 
who claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks, became its instantly 
recognizable mouthpiece and representative.  
 Although many in recent years have noted that al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the base”) is 
far more disparate, heterogeneous and diffuse than was commonly imagined in the first 
months and years after September 11,65 the prominence of al-Qaeda as a seemingly 
central global purveyor of anti-Western terror profoundly and swiftly affected American 
domestic and foreign policy. The passage of legislation like the first PATRIOT ACT, 
signed into law in October 2001, emphasized the ostensible global and imminent threat of 
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centralized Islamic organizations like al-Qaeda, granting the United States government 
previously unheard-of latitude at home and abroad in its global fight in the “War on 
Terror.”66  
 Notably, the post-September 11 period, and the new realities, associations and 
symbols that accompanied it, turned one important historical assumption about terrorism 
on its head. For decades, there had been widespread acceptance of the observation made 
famous by Brian Jenkins in 1975, that terrorists “want a lot of people watching and not a 
lot of people dead.” But as Hoffman observed in 2002, on September 11 “bin Laden 
wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on terrorists and terrorism and, by 
doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict.” 67  
This shift was closely related to the changing motivations behind terrorist actors 
and organizations. In his discussion of the history of extremist ideologies, Philippe 
Migaux argues that the mujahedeen movement— the movement out of which 
organizations like al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
arose —is the most extreme and marginal form of contemporary terrorism because, 
unlike its politically motivated and revolutionary predecessors, it has no interest in 
negotiation. Rather than using terror as a tool to use in the pursuit of political or social 
ends, terrorism is seen by its practitioners as an end in itself.  In the view of these 
extremists, Migaux writes, “violence is no longer merely a weapon; it is, ultimately, the 
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only objective.”68 Indeed, ISIL, which currently controls an area larger than the United 
Kingdom, openly espouses an apocalyptic vision of its role as the leaders of a “final 
caliphate” that involves—even demands—the wholesale slaughter of its enemies.69 
In keeping with the forceful American response (the so-called “War on Terror”) 
that characterized the backlash to the September 11 attacks, this period of terrorism in the 
West has been marked by a far more authoritarian, militaristic response to terrorism and 
the threat of terrorism than nearly any era that came before it. The sweeping changes 
brought about by the PATRIOT ACT were only the tip of the spear in terms of the 
dramatic shift in how the ostensible threat of terrorism came to be conceptualized and 
addressed in the public sphere. Rather than having a discrete and identifiable enemy, as in 
years past, the new “enemy” envisioned by the “War on Terror” was highly 
individualized (rather than state-centric), focused on “rogue states,” evil individuals, and 
insurgencies.70 As the American government focused increasingly on combating the 
nebulous and ambiguous enemy of “terror,” it relied increasingly on widespread and all-
encompassing surveillance71, as well as preventative measures that included the arbitrary 
detainment of hundreds of Muslim immigrants on ostensible visa violations immediately 
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following September 1172, secret arrests, indefinite and continued detainment of so-called 
“enemy combatants,” and numerous other human rights abuses.73 By 2013, when double 
bombings shook the Boston Marathon, local, state and national authorities forcibly shut 
down the entire city in their hunt for the culprits.74 Terrorism during this period has come 
to represent a fascinating paradox—it is an extremely low-probability event75, but state 
responses to terrorism (and the threat of terrorism) reflect and produce a social and 
political environment of continual hyper-alertness regarding terror. 
During this post-September 11 period, another important shift also took place in 
terms of the ostensible aims of terrorists and terrorist organizations. In the period 
preceding September 11, the popular consensus was generally that terrorist groups 
intended their attacks to be “seen” and consumed by a terrorized audience—either to 
bolster awareness of their political goals or in the pursuit of specific demands. This 
changed, however, during the “fourth wave” of terrorism, and particularly after 
September 11. Rather than the terrorized public as a whole, the September 11 terrorists’ 
real audience was the population of their homelands and their regions of operation—and 
in the case of ISIL, this population reflects the growing number of individuals living 
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under the rule of ISIL militants in Iraq and Syria.76 For ISIL, the terror inflicted upon 
victims is designed both to force audiences to choose sides in what these extremists are 
hoping will ultimately turn into a final, apocalyptic global war between Islam and forces 
of secularism (primarily in the global West) and to cement their power and authority over 
a growing geographic region that includes large portions of Iraq and Syria.  
Another new development that characterized the post-September 11 period was 
the rise in so-called “cyber terrorism.” Referring to the use of computer networks or 
internet tools shut down critical infrastructures and intimidate or coerce governments or 
civilian populations,77 cyber terrorism was used as early as the late 1990s, when in 1997 
the Tamil Tigers remotely shut down the servers of the Sri Lankan embassies in Seoul, 
Washington, D.C., and Ottawa.78 By the end of the 20th century, nearly all established 
terrorist organizations had a presence online, and today, every terrorist organization has 
some online presence or footprint, using the internet as a convenient space in which to 
proselytize to followers, communicate with adherents, and coordinate, plan and even 
carry out attacks using computer networks.79 
 
 International and domestic terrorist groups today 
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 Currently, the State Department recognizes 49 official foreign terrorist 
organizations, including multiple offshoots of al-Qaeda (al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).80 Although the 
U.S. government does not generate a comparable list of domestic groups that are 
considered official terrorist organizations (thereby criminalizing association with or 
support for these groups in the same way that support for or association with official 
foreign terror groups are criminalized) it does clearly define what it considers domestic 
terrorism.  
Specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act defines acts of domestic terrorism as those 
which: “(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws 
of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.” 81 
Some organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, do compile more 
inclusive lists of hate groups and American domestic terror organizations, but the lack of 
consistent governmental identification of domestic groups is a problem for both 
policymakers and scholars of terrorism. One useful tool for keeping track of domestic 
terror incidents is the Global Terrorism Database, a subset of the National Consortium for 
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the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), itself a branch of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. The Global Terrorism Database compiles data on 
over 100,000 terrorist attacks, going back to 1970, in countries all over the world, 
including the United States. Criteria for inclusion in the database are as follows: (1) the 
act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal, (2) there 
must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a 
larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims, and (3) the action must be 
outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.82 
 
Media coverage of terrorism before September 11 
 The very nature of terrorism—a tactic that almost always involves reaching an 
audience beyond those directly victimized—necessitates a two-way relationship with 
mass media.83 As Paul Wilkinson wrote in 2001,  
When one says “terrorism” in a democratic society, one also says ‘media.’ For 
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terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon 
communicating a threat to a wider society. This, in essence, is why terrorism and 
the media enjoy a symbiotic relationship.84 
 
Indeed, part of what sets “terrorism” apart from other forms of traditional warfare 
lies in its unorthodox, symbiotic relationship with mass media. Most definitions hold that 
the propagandistic aims of terrorist acts of violence are central to identify an act as 
terrorism. Thus, modern terrorism is inextricably and symbiotically linked to the mass 
media, which are not external actors to terror, passively relaying information, but are 
increasingly seen as active agents in the conceptualization of terror events themselves, 
meaning they are credited not only with the power to define terrorism, but constitutive 
power. Terrorism simply cannot be separated neatly from the ways in which it is “made 
to mean” by media.85  
Beginning in the late 1960s—coinciding with the dawn of what we now think of 
as the “modern era” of international terrorism—scholars of terrorism began focusing 
increasingly on the ways in which terrorist organizations used new forms of 
instantaneous mass media (most notably, television) to garner unprecedented attention 
from the press—although, even before the age of television, many states regarded 
terrorism as an essentially publicity-seeking strategy.86 Terrorism theory of the 1970s, 
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especially, increasingly highlighted the role of mass media in the decision-making 
processes of terrorist organizations. As Brian Jenkins wrote in 1975: 
Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the 
electronic media and the international press. Taking and holding hostages 
increases the drama. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. 
Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is 
a theater.87 
 
Building upon the “terrorism as theater” mode of thought, in 1985 British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher (whose tenure was marked by a number of disputes between 
broadcasters and government, often over the subject of televised terrorism) famously 
described mass media-provided publicity as the” oxygen” on which terrorists and terrorist 
groups depend, arguing that democratic nations must find ways to “starve” terrorists from 
attaining it.88  
But the reality is that both news media and terrorist organizations have a mutual 
interest in disseminating dramatic images.89 Terrorists (which Walter Laqueur referred to 
in 1977 as the “super entertainers of our time”)90 offer media irresistibly dramatic and 
newsworthy bait that news media cannot resist, leading to a sort of unfortunate 
symbiosis.91  
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In a 1994 study examining over 6,000 incidents of international terrorism 
spanning the late 1960s to the early 1990s, Weimann & Winn found a significant increase 
in terrorist acts that specifically applied media-oriented considerations to their attacks—
such as choice of victims, timing, or explicit plans for contact with the media.92 Notably, 
however, many scholars have found that not all terrorist attacks garner the same amount 
of coverage in the Western press. In a 2006 study, Chermak & Gruenewald examined 21 
years of media coverage of terror attacks, from 1980 to September 10, 2001. They found 
that the characteristics that most often indicated which attacks were covered during this 
pre-September 11 period included (1) incidents with high numbers of casualties, (2) 
incidents that were linked to domestic, rather than international, terrorist groups (a focus 
that would shift dramatically after September 11), (3) incidents targeting airlines, and (4) 
incidents involving hijackings, the tactic that broadly characterized the “third wave” of 
terrorism, during which much of this period fell. Specific forms of terrorism—such as, 
most frequently, state terrorism—were also often excluded from coverage in favor of 
subnational or insurgent terrorism.93 
Beyond these inconsistencies and selectivity in terms of which terror attacks 
garner coverage, many scholars also criticized mass media for perceived problems in 
terrorism coverage—problems that most often included the sensationalism and over-
simplification of terrorist attacks—or the argument that mass media inevitably privilege 
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(and therefore possibly glamorize) terrorist activities.94 This research largely concluded 
that mass media in the post-1968 and pre-September 11 era disproportionately 
emphasized the most dramatic and violent terrorist incidents, downplaying or wholly 
ignoring historical, social and cultural contexts and explanations for terrorism—a type of 
news coverage that came to be known as “infotainment.”95 In 1994, Crenlinsten argued 
that one of the indirect effects of this kind of coverage of terrorism was dangerous for 
public discourse, because 
images substitute for ideas, and personality for experience. Short, simple 
messages supplant long, complex ones, and drama takes the place of exposition. 
Hence, quick, dramatic solutions are preferred to questioning, argument, and 
compromise, all of which lead to doubt and uncertainty. 96 
 
 
Media coverage of terrorism after September 11 
 The events of September 11 served as the ultimate example of  “terrorism as 
theater”—what Weimann called “the most powerful and violent performance of the 
modern theater of terror,”97 a perfectly choreographed production aimed at American and 
international audiences. But it soon became clear that the “terrorism as theater” metaphor, 
which had prevailed before September 11, was no longer adequate to characterize the 
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current era of terrorism. Terrorism in the post-September 11 world went far beyond 
“theater.” It could be more aptly described as terror as instantaneous spectacle, available 
for consumption immediately, worldwide.98  
The September 11 attacks marked the first time that the U.S. found itself subject 
to large-scale terror within its own borders, a threat that dramatically shaped the ways 
American news media covered not only the event itself, but everything from domestic 
policy discussions to international affairs. The post-September 11 American cultural 
landscape was marked by saturation media coverage of the attacks—in the first few days, 
many TV stations even skipped commercials to carry continuous, uninterrupted 
coverage—as media practitioners scrambled to explain how and why they happened. This 
round-the-clock coverage dramatically refigured the ways in which American news 
media and audiences thought about “terror” – what terror looks like, who terrorists are, 
and how terror fits within the confines of American nationalism and identity. During 
these first waves of saturation reporting on the attack, news media connected their 
coverage to cultural imaginations of the self, community, the nation, and the global 
environment.99  
At this pivotal point in American history, news practitioners found themselves at 
a crossroads. As the United States swiftly launched retaliatory military campaigns in 
Afghanistan—initially ostensibly aimed at routing terrorist training camps and defeating 
al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden—news media had an obligation to present the American 
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public with complete, nuanced, and critical coverage. Instead, many news media took an 
uncritical approach, couching their analysis in narrow terms of hyper-patriotism that 
closely parroted government talking points (and that exploited preexisting Islamophobic 
stereotypes), while under-reporting both broad protest movements and counter arguments 
made by policymakers opposing war.100  
News coverage—especially televised coverage—of the events of September 11 
quickly degenerated in the weeks following the attacks, as networks rolled out 
sensationalist bottom-of-the-screen banner logos announcing “America At War,” or 
“America Under Attack.”101 Following a 15-year period in the 1980s and ‘90s during 
which American journalism had been most commonly characterized by frivolity, self-
absorption and ironic distance from society, the press became “re-nationalized,” drawing 
journalists back within the body politic.102 Terrorism coverage after September 11 
broadly fed into dominant state discourses surrounding fear, terrorism and 
victimization—for example, in the years following the September 11 attacks, the terms 
“crime,” “victim” and “fear” were heavily present in news reports about terrorism, 
constructing public discourse that reflected symbolic relationships about order, danger 
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and threat that were exploited by those in power in ways that they could not be before 
September 11 (most notably, in terms of ubiquitous domestic surveillance and extralegal 
detention). In many ways, this post-September 11 landscape of discourse about terror was 
more complex, more polarized, and less nuanced than it had been before.103 
In coverage that echoed centuries of what Edward Said described as “Orientalist” 
thought,104 news media in the weeks and months following September 11 also 
consistently produced coverage that reproduced reductive and binary stereotypes and 
Arabs and Muslims, creating what Vultee called a “uniquely menacing” image of 
Islam.105 In 2003, Padgett and Allen argued that during the Cold War and pre-September 
11 period, the convenient crisis “other” was the Soviet Empire. But after September 11, 
mass media reverted to a new “Evil Empire” model, a good/evil dichotomy. In this 
coverage, the new “Evil Empire” was Islam—a view that equated an attack on the Twin 
Towers and the Pentagon with an attack on Western free markets and democracy and 
vilified a homogeneous Muslim “other” in simplistic terms. 106 
Islamophobia has characterized much coverage of terrorism (and issues even 
peripherally related to terror or terrorism) in the years since 2001. Many news accounts 
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have displayed a marked reduction of Muslim subjects to simple binaries to offset the 
heroic leadership of an American-led West, in a return by media to tropes of Islam and 
Muslims that cast these players in a simplified light. Media discourse reproducing 
simplified pre-existing anti-Muslim anxieties may also be related economic factors—
often, the identification of a simplified Muslim enemy may serve as a proxy for Western 
societies’ anxieties over the instability of the neo-liberal system, while legitimizing the 
destruction of the social fabric of the Middle East via the threat of “terror.”107 
It is impossible to overstate the effect that the events of September 11 had in 
terms of contextualizing the way that audiences think about large-scale tragedies. The 
shifting trends in terrorism (tactics, identities, and ostensible goals), as well as massive 
shifts in news media, which are increasingly globalized, concentrated, polarized and 
instantaneous, have led us to an uncertain present. In the years since September 11, there 
are specific set of elements and signifiers that trigger what we now think of as 
“terrorism”—a far different set than there were before the attacks. Certain mass 
shootings, for example, such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, or the 2012 Sikh temple 
shooting in Wisconsin, are described widely as acts of terrorism, while others are not. 
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And certain elements of perpetrators’ identities are preferentially included (or excluded) 
as a matter of routine news reporting on such events. In this sense, the moment of 
September 11 was a key turning point, a pivotal moment in history that must inform any 
analysis of media coverage of large-scale tragedies.  
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Chapter 2: Mass Shootings in the United States: Media and the Effect of Columbine  
 
 
 The September 11 attacks, and the shifting landscape of the iconography of terror 
that accompanied them, represent one major factor that continues to inform the way 
Americans think about large-scale tragedies. A second factor that substantially affects the 
way we view these tragedies is the almost uniquely American problem of what we now 
call “mass shootings.”  
 There have been at least 70 mass shootings in the United States in the past 30 years, 
33 of which have occurred since 2006.108 Although media coverage of these types of 
events has intensified in recent years, these phenomena are not new—as early as 1966, a 
University of Texas engineering student opened fire on students from a tower on campus, 
indiscriminately killing 17 people. 
The problem of mass shootings, however, has taken on a different cultural quality in 
the last 20 years, marked by intensified concerns over terror incidents and colossal 
changes to the American media landscape. The increased use and spread of social media, 
enhanced media coverage of mass shootings and a 24-hour news cycle all contribute to 
this phenomenon.109 Mass shootings in the twenty-first century have become more salient 
in mass media account as a specific type of recurring social problem that require 
explanation. The changes to news media that have accompanied the new millennium, 
                                                
108 M. Follman, G. Aronsen, and D. Pan, “A Guide to Mass Shootings in America,” 
Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map.  
109 J. Knoll, “Mass Shootings: Research and Lessons,” Psychiatric Times 30, no. 2 
(2013): 6. 
  48 
however—the rapid rise of the digital age, round-the-clock news, and new media of all 
kinds—have often served to complicate the public discourse about these events.  
Trends accompanying these changes in media formed the backbone of much of the 
criticism of media coverage of the 1999 shooting at Columbine, the first “mass shooting” 
that triggered that particular, now-pervasive label. Concerns about sensationalism, violent 
media, round-the-clock news coverage and the potential for “copycat” shootings have 
intensified in the 21st century, with Columbine in particular serving as a crystallizing 
moment for those issues. It is crucial to examine news coverage of these kinds of events 
in light of all the recent changes that have taken place in the context of news media in the 
years following the key turning point of Columbine. The Columbine shooting created a 
new prism through which to view gun deaths, immediately followed by the focus on 
“terror” that accompanied September 11.  
 
Columbine 
 
 The 1999 shooting at Columbine High School, which resulted in the deaths of 15 
people,110 including the two perpetrators (high school students Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold), received more media coverage than any American mass shooting before or 
since. The Columbine shooting was the first to be covered live on cable television, and 
many of the tropes and themes that accompanied coverage of the shooting have had 
powerful “sticking power,” substantially shaping the way later shootings are framed and 
understood. Consequently, the Columbine shooting is widely considered a foundational 
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event that played a pivotal role in influencing the framing of subsequent mass 
shootings—it was, in many ways, an analog to the paradigm shift that accompanied news 
coverage of the first Gulf War. The exhaustive, cyclical, round-the-clock news coverage 
that followed the shooting (indeed, the Columbine shooting was one of the top three most 
closely watched news stories of the 1990s) represented a permanent change in public 
discourse about mass shootings, capturing Americans’ attention in a unique way,111 and 
many of the stories and frames that were deployed to explain and describe the attack 
resurfaced in coverage of later shootings. Columbine also precipitated the most intense 
period of legislative activity on school violence of that year—or of any prior session of 
Congress. Thirty-five percent of all bills introduced in 1999 dealing with school violence 
were introduced in April and May (the month of the shooting and the month immediately 
following it); no more than 9 percent of such bills were introduced in any other month of 
that legislative session.112 In many ways, Columbine marked a watershed in the coverage 
(and wider public discussion) of these kinds of tragedies.113 
 Indeed, before Columbine, “mass shootings” as we think of them today did not 
exist. To be sure, there were events that we would now think of as mass shootings, 
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attacks during which a gunman or gunmen opened fire seemingly at random in 
workplaces, schools, religious institutions or other venues. But ProQuest and Lexis Nexis 
searches of American newspapers for the term “mass shooting” finds that before 
Columbine, the term was only used to refer to cases of state terrorism (all overseas), or to 
historical events (involving, most often, the Nazis or Stalinist Russia). After Columbine, 
the term spiked in popularity, and its use in American newspapers has skyrocketed in the 
last decade, grouping a particular genre of shooting event under the umbrella of this term. 
A similar search for references to “rampage shootings,” which is sometimes uses 
synonymously to refer to mass shootings, found a handful of references to gun 
“rampages” as early as the 1980s, but no references to “rampage shootings” as a 
descriptive term for this specific kind of incident until the early 1990s; the term only 
gained traction and wider usage beginning in 1998-99. Interestingly, many post-
Columbine media accounts used the terms “rampage shooting” or “mass shooting” to 
retroactively describe earlier incidents from decades past (often to contextualize more 
current shootings).  The term “mass shooting” is also much more prevalent in media 
accounts than “rampage shooting,” with references to “rampage shootings” occurring 
only about a quarter as often as references to “mass shootings.” 
 In addition to its link to the emergence of the term “mass shooting,” Columbine 
contributed to the ways in which Americans think about these kinds of events in other 
ways. Specifically, many of the tropes and explanatory elements that arose in the days 
and months immediately following the Columbine shooting have been recycled by—or 
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reflected in—media coverage of later shootings.114 Early coverage of the shooting linked 
it to the ominous-sounding “Trench Coat Mafia,” to bullying, to the Goth youth 
subculture, and to a hatred of Christians, jocks and minorities by Klebold and Harris, 
depicting the shooters as disaffected youth, pushed to the brink by relentless mistreatment 
at the hands of more popular students, fueled by violent music and video games.  
Nearly all of these explanations were wrong. These elements existed at Columbine—
there was a so-called “Trench Coat Mafia,” and incidents of bullying—but none of it had 
any connection to the shooting. The shooters were not Goths, they were not particularly 
picked-upon, and there was no connection to minorities, Christians, Marilyn Manson, or 
Hitler’s birthday.115 But these frames that emerged in coverage of Columbine—of 
disaffected youth, violent popular culture, and the idea of the so-called “juvenile super-
predator”—strongly influenced the framing of all subsequent shooting events that seemed 
to fit the same contextual mold.  
The themes in media coverage that emerged in the aftermath of the Columbine 
shooting sparked concerns about youth and violence, about the media’s role in 
heightening the risk of “copycat shootings,” and about the dangerous cultural forces that 
produced the killers. Columbine served to crystallize these concerns in ways that were 
unprecedented, and almost singlehandedly created several new frames for talking about 
mass shooting events.  
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Defining mass shootings  
Broadly speaking, the term “mass shooting” refers to an event in which multiple 
people become victims of gun violence in a single incident. But clear policy definitions 
of mass shootings are even harder to come by than definitions of terrorism. In one of the 
few clear-cut definitions set forth by law enforcement, a 2008 FBI crime classification 
report differentiates a “mass murder” from a “spree murder” based on the temporal 
separation between murders: 
Generally, mass murder was described as a number of murders (four or more) 
occurring during the same incident, with no distinctive time period between the 
murders. These events typically involved a single location, where the killer 
murdered a number of victims in an ongoing incident (e.g. the 1984 San Ysidro 
McDonalds incident in San Diego, California; the 1991 Luby’s Restaurant 
massacre in Killeen, Texas; and the 2007 Virginia Tech murders in Blacksburg, 
Virginia).116 
Accordingly, three elements of what are commonly considered “mass shootings” 
include (1) the exclusion of crimes that are extensions of previous incidents or feuds, 
such as gang violence, as well as robberies—the event must be somewhat indiscriminate 
in terms of the targeting of victims; (2) the attack must take place in a fairly public or 
open place, in a single incident (as opposed to multiple incidents over time); and (3) the 
killer(s), in accordance with FBI guidelines, must take the lives of at least four people.117  
Notably, expanding these criteria even slightly—including cases that involved 
robberies or family members, or including cases with even one or two fewer fatalities, but 
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a similar number of injuries—would increase the number of mass shootings 
exponentially. According to the FBI, for example, in its statistics on the years from the 
years 1976 to 2010, reflecting all mass shootings in which at least four victims were 
killed, there have been, on average, about 20 mass shootings per year in the United 
States.118 
In her thorough study of rampage school shootings, Katherine Newman noted that 
rampage shootings almost always involve five  “necessary but not sufficient conditions”: 
(1) the shooter(s)’ perception of himself (shooters are almost always white males) as 
extremely marginal in the social worlds that matter to him; (2) the shooter(s) must suffer 
from psychosocial problems (mental illness, severe depression, or abuse, for example) 
that magnify the impact of marginality; (3) “cultural scripts”—prescriptions for behavior, 
often gleaned from news or entertainment media—must be available to lead the way 
toward an armed attack; (4) a failure of surveillance systems that are intended to identify 
troubled individuals before their problems become extreme; and finally (5) gun 
availability.  
The focus on psychological problems is key—most rampage or mass shooters 
suffer from (often untreated) severe depression, paranoia, obsession or other forms of 
mental illness.119 
 
American mass shootings 
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 Depending on which of the above criteria for defining mass shooting one adopts, 
there have been anywhere between two to 20 mass shootings per year, on average 
(although most estimates, especially those relying on FBI statistics, lean toward the 
considerably higher end of this scale120), in the United States over the last 30 years. These 
shootings are almost solely committed by men—only one mass shooting in the past 30 
years was committed by a woman.121 
Columbine represented one particularly high-profile shooting. Among other high-
profile American shootings that decade in particular were two shootings in 1991 (one in 
Killeen, Texas, and one at the University of Iowa). In 1998, a shooting at a middle school 
in Jonesboro, Arkansas, attracted considerable media attention, largely because of the 
ages of the perpetrators (11 and 13). Other notable and high-profile mass shootings in the 
years following Columbine included the Wedgewood Baptist Church shooting (1999), 
the Red Lake Reservation shooting in Minnesota (2005), the Lancaster County Amish 
school shooting (2006), the Virginia Tech college campus shooting (2007), the Fort Hood 
shooting (2009), the 2011 Arizona shooting targeting a Congressional event in Tucson, 
the Aurora theater shooting in Colorado (2012), the Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting 
(2012) the horrific 2012 shooting at an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut that 
left 20 children and six adults dead. In 2013 and 2014, high-profile shootings at the Navy 
Yard in Washington, D.C. (2013) and Isla Vista, California (2014) also made headlines.  
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 Of the conservative estimate of 70 mass shootings in the United States in the past 
30 years, the majority were committed using semiautomatic handguns, followed distantly 
by rifles, revolvers and shotguns. Of all the weapons used in these shootings, about one 
third would have been outlawed by the failed proposed assault weapons ban of 2013.122 
The vast majority of mass shooters also obtained their weapons legally—nearly 80 
percent.123 Although assault weapons were used in a relative minority of cases (28 
percent), shootings that involved assault weapons were considerably deadlier than those 
that did not--with an average of 8.3 deaths, compared with 5.4 deaths on average for the 
rest.124 
 The United States is not the only country in which high-profile mass shootings 
have occurred. Shootings in European countries—most recently Germany, Switzerland, 
and Norway—have also captured global media attention in the past decade. However, 
despite arguments by anti-gun-control apologists that European countries have similar 
rates of gun violence (and in particular, mass shootings) as the U.S.,125 the objective 
reality is the United States, with its massive arsenal of weapons—an estimated 300 
million, the highest rate of per capita gun ownership in the world—has exponentially 
higher rates of almost every kind of gun violence (about 20 times the average for all other 
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developed countries), from suicides to mass shootings, than any other developed 
nation126—and indeed, many American cities alone, such as Detroit, Baltimore, and 
Washington, D.C., have gun-homicide rates comparable to some of the most violent 
nations in the world.127 
  Interestingly, especially in the wake of the 2012 Newtown shooting, which left 20 
small children dead and spurred a flurry of legislative activity aimed at enacting 
common-sense gun regulations128, there is an established precedent to examine in two 
other large, developed English-speaking nations.  
In 1996, shootings a month apart in Dunblane, Scotland, and Port Arthur, 
Tasmania (Australia), prompted immediate and sweeping sets of gun reforms in those 
countries, including buyback programs, increased background checks, and new bans on 
previously legal weapons. In comparison to the dozens of mass shootings that have taken 
place in the U.S. in the years since 1996, there has been only one mass shooting in the 
U.K. during that period (in 2010), and zero in Australia. Research following the gun 
buyback program in Australia found an 80 percent drop in firearm suicide rates, and a 59 
percent drop in gun-related homicides in Australia in the years between 1995 and 
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2006.129 And in the U.K., despite a small surge in gun-related offenses around the year 
2000, every year since has seen successive drops in the rates of gun crimes.130 
 Despite the clear success of these gun control measures in the U.K. and Australia, 
however, it is generally considered unlikely that similar changes could be implemented 
successfully in the United States, because of a combination of factors including the 
Second Amendment (and the United States’ unique gun culture131), as well as a powerful 
gun lobby that has so far managed to block almost all efforts to tighten firearms policy at 
both the state and federal levels, even pushing successfully to enact a law in 1996 that 
banned Centers for Disease Control funding for any research that “advocated or promoted 
gun control,” a law vague enough that the CDC shied away from research on gun 
violence altogether until President Obama signed an executive order allowing the CDC to 
study gun violence again in January, 2013.132  
 In terms of the overall trend of American mass shootings, there is some 
disagreement among those who study the phenomenon about whether they are on the rise 
or not. The Mother Jones investigation, for example, which used a very narrow set of 
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criteria to identify mass shootings (excluding almost all cases with multiple shooters, for 
example, and excluding armed robbery, gang-related violence, and domestic violence, 
which the FBI reports do not exclude) concluded that mass shootings in America are on 
the rise—and specifically, that 2012 was the deadliest year to date in terms of the total 
number of victims of these shootings, with over 140 victims.  
 Criminologist James Alan Fox, on the other hand, who uses broader criteria to 
identify mass shootings (and who therefore recognizes far more events as mass 
shootings), argues that in terms of sheer frequency, the number of mass shootings in the 
United States remained fairly consistent from the mid-1970s to 2010, with a few notable 
spikes in events or fatalities (due to what he argues is random variability), but a 
predictable average of about 20 shootings per year. 133 
  
Media coverage of mass shootings 
 In the years since Columbine, media coverage of mass shootings has generally 
cleaved to a fairly standard and predictable routine (although there are some venue-
specific variations—school shootings typically generate a somewhat different kind of 
coverage than religious or workplace shootings, for example). The focus of media 
discourse has shifted somewhat in recent years, particularly around the issues of political 
civility, gun control and mental illness, but much criticism of media coverage of these 
tragedies remains consistent.  
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 One common—and deeply problematic—focus among news media in the 
aftermath of mass shootings is the in-depth exploration of why a shooter “snapped.” 
Inherent in this coverage is the assumption that some circumstance or slight or series of 
incidents caused the shooter to experience a sort of mental break, entering a state of mind 
in which he was briefly unable to tell right from wrong. In coverage of the Virginia Tech 
shooting, for example, mass media commentators focused on the shooter’s unsuccessful 
experiences with romantic relationships and his classmates on campus. Coverage of the 
Columbine and Red Lake shootings emphasized the shooters’ social alienation and 
alluded to incidents of bullying. Romantic rejection, a sense of alienation, and bullying 
are three very common elements that often come up when exploring what caused mass 
shooters to commit their crimes. But as Katherine Newman notes in “Rampage: The 
Social Roots of School Shootings,” these proximate events do not help us to understand 
these kinds of shootings: 
They may be the straw that broke the camel’s back, but at most they help explain 
when a shooting happens rather than why.  Events that seem to be precipitators 
usually turn out on closer inspection not to be.”134  
Indeed, most mass shootings are planned carefully and well in advance. When 
news media devote considerable airtime or inches to exploring the minor inconveniences 
or perceived slights that ostensibly pushed a mass shooter to “snap,” they both 
oversimplify and mischaracterize the events themselves and miss the real, and more 
troubling, “why” that underlies most of these kinds of tragedies: untreated severe mental 
illness combined with easy access to high-powered weaponry.  
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Given that nearly 80 percent of American mass shooters in the past 30 years 
obtained the weapons they used legally, one might expect to see the issue of gun policy in 
the United States take on a more prominent role in terms of framing the explanatory 
factors behind these tragedies. In coverage of Columbine, in fact, many print media did 
focus on the issue of gun control, but this focus was largely driven by policymakers, 
framed as a showdown between President Clinton and his political opponents, and was 
nearly matched by a parallel media focus on the ostensible dangers of youth popular 
culture. 135 In the years since Columbine, although media coverage outside the U.S. 
devoted considerable time and space to permissive American gun laws in conjunction 
with mass shootings136, American media interest in gun control and gun accessibility as 
an explanatory variable waned considerably, with media accounts focusing more 
prominently on alternate interpretive schema, such as cultural alienation (in the 2009 
Binghamton, New York shootings, for example), social and romantic rejection (in the 
2007 Virginia Tech shootings) and most bafflingly, a climate of political incivility in the 
U.S. (in the 2011 Tucson, Arizona shooting)137. American media did not devote 
considerable airtime or space to the issue of gun accessibility as a primary explanatory 
variable until the massacre in Newtown, Connecticut, when the senseless murder of over 
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20 elementary-aged children by a shooter who lived in a “house full of guns”138 prompted 
President Obama, in a speech given two days later in Newtown, to say:  
We can’t accept events like this as routine. … Are we really prepared to say that 
we’re powerless in the face of such carnage? That the politics are too hard? Are 
we prepared to say that such violence visited on our children year after year after 
year is somehow the price of our freedom?”139  
In the months that followed, however, every effort to enact even minor changes to 
federal gun laws (including talk of a revival of the assault weapons ban and more 
stringent background checks) failed. In a shared American moment of grief that mirrored 
the tragic carnage of Dunblane and Port Arthur, pressure from the gun lobby (including 
the widespread and inaccurate assertion that the background checks bill would mandate 
universal gun registration) ensured that when it came to federal American gun policy, 
even the murder of 20 small children by an AR-15-style rifle was not enough to prompt 
meaningful change. 
 
 The effect of Columbine 
Media coverage of the Columbine shooting focused extensively on the shooters’ 
alleged bullying at the high school, positioning Harris and Klebold (who were incorrectly 
identified as members of the ominous-sounding “Trench Coat Mafia”) as victims of a 
toxic peer culture who carried out the shooting as a means of revenge against jocks and 
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minorities.140 Most coverage also focused on their alleged consumption of dangerous or 
violent popular culture—the music of Marilyn Manson, Goth culture, and violent video 
games, as well as their preoccupation with Hitler and the Nazis.141 Although it soon 
became clear that these explanations were not only inadequate, but wildly inaccurate, 
these frames persisted in coverage of mass shootings for years afterward—terms like 
“juvenile super-predator” and “alienated youth” gained currency142, and many news 
frames surrounding the shooters’ motivations were recycled in coverage of later 
shootings, even those that did not take place in school settings.143  
 Columbine coverage was also novel in another way—it was the first mass 
shooting of its kind to be covered live on national television, and in terms of sheer 
volume, it garnered a level of coverage that has so far been unmatched by any mass 
shooting before or since. This coverage sparked new ethical concerns about the degree 
and tone of coverage of mass shootings. As Bob Steele of the Poynter Institute noted 
shortly after the shooting: 
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The story reaffirmed for us the great danger of certain elements of live coverage 
of a breaking crisis. When [student] Patrick was seen falling out of that window, 
my concern was not its gruesomeness, but the danger that the gunmen could be 
watching television and use that information to shoot at escaping students.144  
Other concerns about news media coverage of the Columbine tragedy included the 
seemingly intrusive nature of some coverage—from Ted Koppel’s televised town-hall-
style meeting with the residents of Littleton to Dateline’s 15-month-long special on the 
survivors of the shooting. Some criticized the coverage as creepy and exploitative, 
intruding on the privacy of grieving families.145  
A final problematic element in coverage of Columbine (an element that has extended 
in subsequent years to coverage of other mass shootings) is the over-reduction of 
explanatory variables to simplistic explanations like bullying. It bears repeating that boys 
and men who commit mass shootings are simply not ordinary people who were pushed to 
“snap”—they are disturbed individuals, and in almost every case there were signs of 
serious mental illness long before the shooting(s) took place.  
When news media—as they did in coverage of the Columbine tragedy—reduce 
explanations of why shootings occur to storylines that rely on simplistic surface-level 
factors like bullying, social alienation and impulsive revenge, they are essentially 
offering readers and viewers red herrings, avoiding the two overwhelmingly most 
common factors that underlie most mass shootings—namely, untreated mental illness and 
unimpeded (often legal) access to deadly weapons.  
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Race and coverage of crime 
Race-based inequalities have always existed in coverage of crime and violence in the 
United States.146 In coverage of mass shootings, these inequalities often involve marked 
differences in the coverage of urban violence versus suburban violence (the category in 
which mass shootings almost always fall). Gun violence is often framed as being an 
innate and inextricable part of an “inner city” way of life—shootings in urban 
neighborhoods, for example, where the majority of residents are black, are often framed 
as “black-on-black” violence that is to be expected in these environments, and 
consequently, violence is therefore seen as unsurprising and unworthy of serious soul-
searching to identify explanatory variables.147 Indeed, as many scholars have pointed out, 
the only reason many mass shootings have generated the attention they did in mass media 
was that the shooters and most of the victims were white. Had the majority of the 
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shooters (or their victims) been black, the attention would likely have been more 
minimal, and the need to explain their pathology less pronounced.148  
As a whole, news media tend to overrepresent or misrepresent nonwhite Americans 
(and specifically, black Americans) as perpetrators of crime, while whites are 
disproportionately framed as victims or defenders against lawbreaking, priming 
consumers of media to conflate black and Latino identities with criminality and violence 
in general.149 A considerable body of media research has established that these patterns in 
journalistic story framing have palpable consequences in terms of social reality—heavy 
television viewers, and in particular, those who consume a great deal of news content that 
overrepresents nonwhite criminality, for example, are far more likely to perceive black 
subjects as violent and to assume criminal culpability for darker-skinned subjects.150 
Other studies have found that the choices journalists make in terms of particular news 
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frames can also significantly affect audience decision making about public policy in 
general.151 
Race and nationality often clearly come into play in coverage of mass shootings in 
particular. For example, in their study comparing media coverage of the Columbine and 
Red Lake school shootings, two events that were very analogous both in terms of venue 
and number of victims, Patricia Leavy and Katherine Maloney found that coverage of the 
Red Lake school shooting—the culprit of which, Jeff Weise, was Native American—
overwhelmingly featured a much more pronounced focus on race and class than the 
Columbine shooting. Additionally, despite the similar number of victims and the 
analogous nature of the two events, Columbine garnered far more national coverage than 
Red Lake, which remained a primarily local story. Explanatory variables for the 
Columbine shooting were most often identified as external elements that corrupted the 
two shooters—video games, bullying, “Goth” culture—while in coverage of the Red 
Lake shooting, coverage focused in much more tightly on “American Indian culture,” 
extending perceived social deficiencies in reservation family life to the crimes committed 
by Weise, the Native American shooter.152  
Unlike Red Lake, the shooting at Columbine, which took place in an affluent suburb 
and involved two white shooters, was immediately constructed as a significant and 
traumatic national event that permanently shifted American collective memory and 
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demanded soul-searching and explanation, reflecting a dominant media approach that 
privileges both white subjects and the middle class.153 
These findings were echoed in Cynthia Willis-Chun’s later comparison of media 
coverage of the shootings at Columbine and Virginia Tech—an apt comparison both 
because of the similar scale of both shootings, as well as the fact that Seung-Hui Cho, the 
Virginia Tech shooter, explicitly professed admiration for Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, 
the Columbine shooters. Although in many ways mass media depicted culprits 
similarly—as troubled loners bent on destroying those people who contributed to their 
alienation—Cho was a legal permanent American resident of South Korean descent, and 
his race and nationality often came into play in coverage of the Virginia Tech shooting in 
ways that the (largely invisible) white racial identity of the Columbine shooters simply 
did not. Specifically, the Columbine shooters were framed in coverage as “all-American 
boys gone wrong,” while Cho was consistently positioned as an outsider to American 
culture, both within the smaller environment of Virginia Tech and in the United States in 
general.154 These findings echo broader media trends of ascribing internal motivations to 
nonwhite shooters, who are presented as fundamentally, personally deficient, and 
external motivations to white shooters (a frame driven largely by Columbine coverage, 
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which offered up everything from violent video games to Marilyn Manson’s music as 
explanations for the violence of the two white shooters in that attack).155  
 
Nationality, the military, and “us” vs. “them” 
Mass shootings that take place on military bases—the category of shootings that 
this study explores—are particularly wrapped up in issues of identity, including 
categories such as masculinity, nationality, and race.  
Almost all mass shooters are male, with only one exception in the past 30 years. 
This is noteworthy because, as scholars like Sut Jhally and Jackson Katz have spent 
decades underlining, American masculinity is consistently and inextricably linked to 
violence, particularly in terms of the “cultural scripts” that many mass shooters look to 
when they plan their attacks.156 For years, American media have glamorized increasingly 
regressive and violent masculine ideals, creating a cultural definition of manhood in 
which violence by boys and men is naturalized and even expected in ways that would be 
shocking or unexpected from girls and women.157 
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Shifting understandings of “American-ness”—the ways in which American 
national identity are understood and deployed—also come prominently into play in 
shootings that take place on military bases.  
Although, as Paul Wong pointed out in Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the 
United States, nationality is often neglected in scholarly research on identity, any analysis 
that takes up identity as an object of study must take into account the role of 
nation/nationality—a category that is particularly crucial to examine in a heterogeneous 
culture like the United States, in which immigration makes up a large portion of our 
population growth.158  
Wong presciently raised these concerns in 1999, just before the attacks of 
September 11 made nation and nationality an even more pressing and salient issue for 
those who study identity in media. Many scholars have identified the ways in which the 
terror of September 11—as well as other factors that have emerged since the turn of the 
century, such as increasing ethnic diversity in the U.S., and rancor over immigration—
have refigured American conceptions of who we are and how we think about our national 
identity.  
One of the clearest ways that the events of September 11 have affected American 
notions of national identity have often had to do with the exclusion of Middle Eastern, 
Arab, or Muslim subjects from an implicitly binary definition of American nationality. 
Drawing upon decades of scholarship on what Edward Said, in 1978, called 
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“Orientalism,”159 many media scholars in the years since September 11 have found that 
Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim subjects are consistently positioned in media coverage 
as being diametrically opposed to American national identity.160 
In 2003, for example, Andrew Padgett and Beatrice Allen argued that media 
coverage after September 11 replicated an old “Evil Empire” model from the Cold War—
positioning Muslims as the new “other” that the Soviets filled during the Cold War era. In 
this coverage, they argued, a simplistic “good versus evil” binary arose that afforded 
viewers and readers no shades of gray—a view that equated an attack on the Twin 
Towers and the Pentagon with an attack on Western free markets and democracy and 
vilified a homogeneous Muslim “other” in the simplistic terms of the Red Scares.161 In an 
analysis of media discourse on the “war on terror” after September 11, George 
Kassimeris and Leonie Jackson also found a marked reduction of Muslim subjects to 
simple binaries to offset the heroic leadership of an American-led West, in a return by 
media to tropes of Islam and Muslims that cast these players in a simplified light.162 And 
in her analysis of Public Service Announcements aimed at stemming the tide of hate 
crimes against Muslims and Arabs after September 11, Evelyn Alsultany found that even 
in ostensibly well-meaning media products—PSAs whose authors described their vision 
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as intending to promote diversity, tolerance and mutual respect—these conceptions of 
American identity and Muslim/Arab identity were often framed as being at odds with 
each other, reinforcing existing Orientalist representations by self-consciously 
highlighting the extreme patriotism of individual Muslim individuals and families, 
seemingly requiring them to “prove” their patriotism to overcome an implied “us versus 
them” binary.163 
These trends in coverage extend further even than unconscious reproductions of 
centuries-old hostilities between a stereotypical Muslim “East” and a Christian “West.” 
In an August 2011 report, the Center for American Progress detailed the rise of what it 
called “Islamophobia” in the United States, arguing that a consistent group of 
foundations, politicians, pundits and advocacy groups actually compose a propagandistic 
network of anti-Muslim that consistently pop up to position Islam and Muslims as being 
an imminent threat to American ideals. In the report, the center outlined the ways in 
which the consolidated ownership structure of several media organizations—most 
notably, News Corporation—allowed messages demonizing Arabs, Middle Easterners, 
and Muslims and promoting fear of these groups to proliferate well beyond the partisan 
media, in coverage that bore all the hallmarks of a propaganda campaign.164 
Other scholars have taken up the broader question of what American national 
identity looks like in the 20th century, taking into account pressing current issues like 
immigration and growing ethnic diversity in the United States.  
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In particular, the issue of immigration (and especially undocumented 
immigration) has had a marked effect on notions of American national identity, 
especially in the years since September 11, during which heightened concerns about 
national security and porous borders raised the public salience of the issue of immigration 
and immigration policy. An increased focus on immigration (particularly undocumented 
immigration) also helped fuel the formation of nativist groups like the Tea Party and 
various militia groups, which made combating undocumented immigration central foci of 
their political agendas.165 In Michelle Holling’s analysis of one of these umbrella 
organizations, the “Minutemen Project,” which styles itself as a “citizens’ group” that 
patrols the U.S./Mexico border, Holling found that legitimate American national identity 
is consistently framed as patriotic, masculine, and multicultural—but that these self-
descriptions mask fundamentally white supremacist values, framing immigrants as 
colonizers, and as “dehumanized, externalized, and criminalized subjects.”166 These 
findings support Kent Ono and John Sloop’s earlier work in their book Shifting Borders: 
Rhetoric, Immigration and California’s Prop 187, in which they argue that the nature of 
who we conceive of as the “enemy” in the U.S. has shifted from “an integrated, coherent 
enemy” to a “disintegrated, incoherent enemy”—representing the uncertainty of 
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immigrants and immigration—resulting not only in a lack of clarity about who “we” are 
as a nation but also in the construction of an enemy that is multiplied, racialized, and 
feminized.167  
Indeed, many commentators and pundits have expressed alarm about recent trends 
in American immigration, arguing that immigrants threaten the cultural, economic and 
legal norms of the United States.168 But as Deborah Schildkraut found in 2011, new 
waves of immigration to the United States—and the ethnic changes to the demography of 
the American landscape that have accompanied them—have not led to substantial 
changes in American values (specifically in terms of how Americans articulate what 
being American signifies), nor have they led to a multiculturalist diffusion of identity in 
which nonwhite or immigrant ethnic groups are less likely to think of themselves as 
“American” than others. Indeed, in a study that oversampled traditionally understudied 
ethnic groups, and in a finding markedly at odds with critics’ warnings about the dangers 
of immigration, Schildkraut found that immigrants overwhelmingly identify themselves 
primarily as Americans, and uphold traditional American ideals such as “freedom” and 
“opportunity.” Significant sectors of U.S. public opinion, however, continue to indicate 
that many Americans resent immigrants and immigration, consistently respond to survey 
questions by saying there should be a decrease in immigration to the U.S., and view 
American identity as being fundamentally white, native-born and ethnically European. In 
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this way, lingering ascriptivist views were reawaked by September 11, challenging a 
more inclusive incorpirationalist viewpoint.169  
Intriguingly, another scholar of American national identity, Colin Woodward, 
argues that, particularly when it comes to attitudes toward violence (mass shootings, for 
example, or high-profile violent crimes in general) American national identity has never 
been a single discrete object of study. Instead, Woodward argues, there are multiple 
“Americas” that cross state and regional borders, battle lines that were determined long 
ago by different groups of early American settlers and that determine dominant regional 
cultural attitudes toward everything from stand-your-ground laws, to gun control, 
immigration and violence. The Deep South, for example, has its roots in a caste system 
based in slavery and a focus on classical Republicanism, while what Woodward calls 
“Yankeedom,” founded on the shores of the Massachusetts Bay by Calvinists and 
extending across much of the Northern U.S., puts more of an emphasis on civilization 
through social engineering, communal empowerment, intellectual achievement, and the 
assimilation, rather than alienation, of outsiders.170 
 
Conclusion  
 
 When it comes to thinking about large-scale episodes of gun violence in the 21st 
century—both in terms of the way they are viewed by Americans and covered by mass 
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media—several factors must be considered. The foundational role of the 1999 Columbine 
shooting was integral both in establishing the concept of a “mass shooting” as a unique 
descriptive term and in setting the stage for frames in coverage of similar subsequent 
events that would persist for years to come. And while there is disagreement among 
experts as to whether mass shootings are increasing in the United States (a conflict that 
arises largely in definitional disputes surrounding the term “mass shooting” itself) one 
thing is clear: the United States indisputably faces a unique environment of gun violence 
that is wholly unparalleled by other developed nations. Further, it is clear that the way we 
approach and attempt to make sense of mass shootings in the United States is inextricably 
tied to issues of identity—specifically, nationality, masculinity and race.  
Consequently, the way mass media construct and the way individual Americans 
think about mass shootings—and about the identities of the individuals who perpetrate 
them, especially on politically and nationally fraught environments like military bases—
touch on some of our most deeply held conceptions of American identity itself. 
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Chapter 3: The 1995 Fort Bragg Shooting 
 
 
 In this chapter I will review the facts of the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting, describe 
the primary frames that emerged in broadcast media coverage of the event, compare 
media coverage of the shooting to the facts that we now know about the event—
omissions, inclusions and other choices made by broadcast newsmakers, and finally 
discuss where this shooting and its coverage fits into broader cultural narratives of the 
time period about issues like gun control, masculinity, patriotism and nationality.  
 
Gun violence and national identity in the mid-1990s 
 The mid-1990s saw a sharp successive decrease in single-victim firearm incidents 
and deaths—a drop from 1.2 million incidents in 1993 to 523,613 in 1999.171 But at the 
same time, the average number of people killed in mass shootings (per the FBI definition, 
shootings that claimed the lives of four or more victims) continued to slightly climb172—
although single-victim gun killings dropped more than 40 percent in the years between 
1980 and 2010, the average number of people dying each year in mass shootings climbed 
from 161 to 163 during the same period.173  
In the meantime, the focus among American mass media on the issue of gun 
violence and gun control in the 1990s largely followed episodes of what the press and 
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public officials considered “epidemics” of gun violence—first, following the unusually 
deadly period of firearms violence that spanned from 1988 to 1994, and second, the 
largely unprecedented (but ultimately ineffective) galvanization of gun control voices and 
advocacy that followed the Columbine shooting and subsequent mass shootings in 1999, 
from increased donations to national gun control organizations to President Clinton’s 
attempts at passing renewed gun control measures.174 
In the years prior to the Fort Bragg shooting, there were also several high-profile 
events that highlighted issues of nationality, American identity, violence and the far right. 
In 1992 and 1993, deadly confrontations between the U.S. government and separatist 
groups—involving suspected white supremacists at Ruby Ridge and the Brand Davidian 
religious sect in Waco, Texas—galvanized an increasingly vocal and violent right-wing 
militia movement in the U.S. that became increasingly wary of the U.S. government. Just 
six months before the Fort Bragg shooting, in an attack designed to coincide with the 
two-year anniversary of the Waco siege, Timothy McVeigh, a militia sympathizer with 
ties to the Christian Identity Movement, carried out a bombing in Oklahoma City that 
killed 168 people and injured nearly 700 others. Indeed, the so-called “Patriot” 
movement—composed of conspiracy-minded groups that viewed the federal government 
as their primary enemy—reached a peak in the mid-1990s, with 858 antigovernment 
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“Patriot” groups listed by the Southern Poverty Law Center in 1996, the year after the 
Oklahoma City bombing.175176  
It was in this context that the Fort Bragg shooting captured national attention—at 
the tail end of a period of increased gun violence in the United States, and coming 
immediately on the heels of the deadliest terrorist attack yet to occur on American soil.  
 
The shooting 
In the foggy predawn darkness of October 27, 1995, 1,300 soldiers gathered in a 
floodlit stadium to begin their daily morning exercises at the Fort Bragg military base in 
North Carolina. All the soldiers were paratroopers, members of the elite 82nd Airborne 
Division. The division, a contingency force of the Army historically deployed at short 
notice—as little as two hours—to areas of extreme global conflict, was headquartered at 
the base.177 The assembling soldiers were unarmed, dressed only in white T-shirts, 
running shorts, and reflective belts.178  
At 6:30 a.m., as the paratroopers stretched and got into formation for their usual 
four-mile run—beginning a six-week assignment at their highest alert level, during which 
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the force could be sent anywhere in the world on two hours notice in the event of war or 
military emergencies—shots rang out from a nearby wooded area.179 The first shot 
shattered the spine of Chief Warrant Officer Abraham Castillo, and a second shot pierced 
the lung of Staff Sergeant Matthew Lewis, who was standing near Castillo. At first, as 
several soldiers later described in statements about the shooting, the paratroopers didn’t 
think it was live fire. But as bullets continued to fly, the assembling soldiers scattered in 
panic. A soldier who heard the shots in a nearby barracks grabbed a video camera and 
began taping the scene from his window overlooking the stadium, footage that was later 
broadcast widely on CNN and other broadcast outlets. 180  
Crouching in the dark woods about 150 yards away from the floodlights of the 
stadium was William Kreutzer, a 26-year-old sergeant and fellow member of the 82nd 
Airborne division who served as a weapons squad leader and had experience in long-
range surveillance and reconnaissance. Kreutzer had been scheduled to be on the field 
that morning, exercising with the other members of his division. Instead, he armed 
himself with three civilian firearms purchased separately off-base—a 9-millimeter Glock 
pistol, a .22-caliber Ruger, and an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, the civilian version of the 
military M-16.181 In the wee hours of the morning, Kreutzer drove to a wooded knoll 
overlooking the stadium, took up a position near his car, which he parked on a wide path 
in the wooded area, and began firing upon his fellow soldiers as they took their positions 
for the morning run.  
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Near the woods, four unarmed Special Forces troopers happened to be jogging by 
when they heard the shots. One ran to flag down a passing car, while the others ran 
toward Kreutzer in what they later described as a “flanking maneuver,” tackling him and 
forcibly disarming him. During the ensuing fight, one of the troopers broke his hand, 
while another was shot in the foot as he ran toward Kreutzer. 182 The last soldier to be 
shot was 38-year-old Major Stephen Badger, a career military intelligence officer, who 
rushed within 25 feet of Kreutzer before being shot in the head. As the Special Forces 
troops descended upon the gunman, Kreutzer begged them to kill him.183 
Kreutzer was apprehended by military police and taken to a local Criminal 
Investigation Command office, where, according to court-martial documents, Kreutzer 
was described as “possibly delusional,” telling military police that the shooting was 
“God’s way,” and that God had made him do it.184 
 In the aftermath of the shooting, one soldier—Major Badger—was declared dead 
on the scene, while 18 other wounded soldiers (two injured critically) were rushed to 
nearby hospitals. As a result of the shooting, one soldier, Major Guy Lafaro, remained in 
a coma for 45 days, while Castillo was paralyzed from the neck down as a result of a 
bullet lodged in his spine.185 Later the same day, after the victims’ conditions were 
stabilized and Kreutzer was detained, military leadership on base held a press conference 
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featuring the four Special Forces soldiers who subdued Kreutzer, one of whom appeared 
on crutches. An ashen-faced Sergeant Anthony Minor, who broke his hand in the 
confrontation, described his efforts to subdue Kreutzer during the attack at the press 
conference. “We did what we were trained—what we were supposed to do,” Minor said. 
“Anybody in that field would have done the same thing in our situation.”186 
 Broadcast media coverage the day of the shooting—and next-day print 
coverage—described reports that the shooter was “emotionally disturbed,”187 but noted 
the military’s refusal to comment on the then-unnamed suspect’s mental state.188 It soon 
became clear, however, that Kreutzer had a long and well-documented history of mental 
illness.189 He was described as a loner, a soldier who reportedly felt alienated and 
mistreated by his fellow soldiers, who, unnerved by his frequent talk of killing, 
nicknamed him “Crazy Kreutzer” and “Silence of the Lambs.”190 He repeatedly sought 
help from his military superiors, but aside from a brief two-week period during which he 
was barred from accessing weapons (after telling a military social worker that he had 
specific plans to murder other soldiers in his squad), he did not receive it. 191 Fellow 
soldiers reported that Kreutzer would often cry after receiving negative feedback, that he 
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spoke nearly constantly about death and murder, and that he was target of frequent 
teasing and practical jokes from his squadmates.192 Kreutzer was never referred to a 
psychiatrist, and did not receive a mental evaluation before being given back his military 
weapon.193 The extent of Kreutzer’s mental health intervention was a series of 
conversations with Capt. Darren Fong, the 82nd Airborne's counselor and social worker, 
who reported that Kreutzer had detailed plans to kill himself and others, but ultimately 
concluded that he was not a serious threat.194 
Even after specifically warning a friend, Specialist Burl Mays, the night before the 
shooting, that he planned to open fire on his fellow soldiers the following morning, no 
steps were taken by military officials to intercede or intercept him prior to the 
shooting.195 In the court-martial proceedings, Mays testified that he first became alarmed 
when Kreutzer told him he had plans to “mow down” his squadmates, although Kreutzer 
had made similar threats before. “The last thing he told me,” Mays testified, “was [that] 
he had to go; he was loading magazines.”196 
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 Despite Kreutzer’s history of making similar statements and threats (another former 
sergeant in Kreutzer’s unit testified that Kreutzer once threatened to shoot soldiers at an 
observation post in the Sinai region of Egypt because they harassed him), when Mays 
arrived early the following morning and noticed that Kreutzer was missing, he alerted his 
superiors just before 5 a.m. and rushed to Kreutzer’s room, where he found a copy of 
Kreutzer’s will on the desk and discovered that his bed had not been slept in. Mays 
testified that he tried again to warn his superiors, but that his concerns were dismissed 
outright. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant laughed when the threat was brought to 
their attention197, with his first sergeant responding that Kreutzer was a “pussy” who 
“wouldn’t do anything like this.”198 Notably, none of this information—about Kreutzer’s 
specific history of making these kinds of threats, or of Kreutzer’s clear preexisting signs 
of mental illness—were covered in news media until several years after the shooting.  
After the shooting, military psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Kreutzer 
diagnosed him with paranoid “"schizotypal personality disorder," of which his obsession 
with guns, social isolation, and anger were classic symptoms. 199 Army regulations call 
for soldiers with even mild personality disorders to be discharged. Had the diagnosis been 
made before the shooting, it is likely that Kreutzer would have been discharged 
immediately. 
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Nine months later, Kreutzer was convicted of one count of premeditated murder and 
18 counts of attempted murder by a court-martial jury. In court proceedings, Kreutzer did 
not deny carrying out the shootings, but said that his actions were intended as a message 
that his military unit did not care about its men.200 In the early weeks and months 
preceding the trial, Kreutzer was offered a plea deal by prosecutor—if he pled guilty to 
murder, they would not seek the death penalty. But Kreutzer insisted he wanted to die, 
having already attempted suicide in his prison cell.201 By March 1996, however, 
Kreutzer, having been on medication for his depression and other mental illnesses, 
changed his mind and attempted to accept the deal. By then it was too late; military 
prosecutors had decided to pursue the death penalty. Major Gen. George Crocker, 
commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, chose 11 men and one woman for the court-
martial jury—six of whom were in a direct line of command of other jurors, stacking the 
jury toward a preference for the death penalty.202 
On June 12, 1996, after a 19-hour trial, the military jury sentenced Kreutzer to death, 
making him one of only eight military service members at the time serving a death 
sentence. At the time—and to this day—the last execution by the U.S. military was on 
April 13, 1961, when the Army hanged a private convicted of rape and attempted 
murder.203 
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Nearly a decade later, however, in 2005, in a four-to-one decision, the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed a previous 2004 decision by the Army Court of 
Criminal Appeals, overturning the death sentence and commuting it instead to a sentence 
of life in prison.204205 In the 2005 majority opinion, the court found that Kreutzer had 
received inadequate legal representation, and that in particular, he had erroneously been 
denied the services of a “mitigation specialist,” an expert specifically trained to provide 
the court with psychological or other mitigating evidence for sentencing authorities in 
capital cases206—a role designed to provide the court with a fuller view of the social and 
psychological factors present in capital cases.207 At the time of the trial itself, the judge, 
Colonel Peter Brownback, rejected a motion by defense attorneys to spend $3,000 for an 
expert to document mitigating circumstances that called for sparing Kreutzer's life.208 
In the ensuing years at Fort Bragg, other high-profile cases of violence on and around 
the Army base made the national news—the December, 1995 murder of a black couple 
by three white Fort Bragg soldiers in what was described as a skinhead initiation rite, the 
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slaying of four wives of Army soldiers by their husbands in 2002,209 and the 2012 
shooting by a Fort Bragg soldier of his commanding officer.210  
 
Broadcast media coverage of the shooting 
 On the evening of the day of the shooting, all three major evening network news 
channels—ABC, NBC and CBS—led their newscasts with the story of the shooting, and 
CNN aired segments about the shooting during the midday period. Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive clips and Lexis Nexis transcript searches confirmed that 15 separate 
segments were devoted to the shooting (comprising 18 minutes and five seconds of 
coverage), spanning a period ranging from the day of the shooting itself to August, 1997, 
when NBC continued extensive follow-up coverage on the Army’s handling of mental 
illness in Kreutzer’s case. In the year following the shooting, The New York Times 
published 10 articles about the shooting, the Washington Post published 10, while USA 
Today published 6.  
 
 Frames 
 Broadcast coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting largely kept to three major themes, 
with some slight variations—first, a broad characterization of the shooting within the 
bounds of a clearly nationalistic/patriotic frame of reference that held up the military as 
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an extension of American identity; second, a sustained focus on the guns Kreutzer used—
both where and how he obtained the weapons as well as the environment of gun 
restriction/availability on-base at Fort Bragg; and third, considerable criticism of the 
military’s failure to recognize and address Kreutzer’s (many) preexisting warning signs 
of severe mental illness, including his own explicit pleas for help.  
  
 Nationalism and patriotism 
 One of the most common themes in broadcast coverage of the Fort Bragg attack 
involved a focus by media on the military as a sort of stand-in for American national 
identity, positioning the attack as a uniquely menacing (and unexpected) assault on 
American soil and its victims as heroes suffering and dying in the service of a noble 
cause.  
Within this frame, one specific element that emerged again and again was the fact 
that the shooter was “one of [the military’s] own”—a soldier firing upon his squadmates, 
his own comrades. In its initial coverage on the day of the attack, for example, NBC 
News described the members of the 82nd Airborne Division as being “under fire on 
American soil” by a “fellow soldier,” highlighting the irony that these elite paratroopers 
unexpectedly faced this kind of violence at home, rather than in a war zone abroad. A 
headline on-screen identified Kreutzer (in capital letters) as “THE ENEMY WITHIN”—
an ironic and unexpected threat that the military did not see coming.211 
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Much of the wording and imagery associated with the shooting, especially in the 
earliest days of coverage, emphasized the ties between the military and American 
patriotism and identity. Echoing a line in the Star-Spangled Banner, for example, CBS’s 
Dan Rather described the shooting as taking place “by the dawn’s early light.” And in 
clips covering the funeral of shooting victim Major Stephen Badger, Badger’s widow was 
quoted, in a phrase that called to mind the Gettysburg address, saying that her husband 
“was a true American hero” who “ultimately gave that last full measure of devotion.”212 
American flags were featured prominently, both in field clips and in-studio coverage, 
from flag-draped coffins at Badger’s funeral to the “icon” used to brand the shooting on 
CBS, which featured a stylized silhouette of a soldier wearing a combat helmet and 
wielding an assault rifle, dotted in some cases with stylized bullet holes, standing before a 
crosshairs, with a rippling American flag behind him. 
  
Figure 1: Sniper Icon. 
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Early coverage of the shooting was less critical of the military than later coverage, 
which exposed substantial problems with the military apparatus for identifying and 
mitigating mental illness in its ranks. Early coverage by CBS, for example, three days 
after the shooting, referred to Kreutzer as a soldier who was “nursing some as yet 
unknown grudge,”213 flirting with a problematic frame that would become far more 
prevalent in coverage of subsequent American mass shootings—the idea that the shooter 
“snapped.” In the same report, reporter David Martin speculated that perhaps the 
pressures of the military lifestyle were a factor that caused Kreutzer to suddenly become 
homicidal:  
Cases like this grab headlines, but behind the headlines lies an overall increase in 
reports of violence in the military, which some experts link to cutbacks in the size 
of the armed forces. Those cutbacks have cost many servicemen their jobs and 
placed greater demands on those who remain.214 
Martin went on to link the shooting to a recent increase in the rate of spousal and 
child abuse in the military, speculating that the additional stress of a military lifestyle—
repeat deployments, the strain caused by the demands of a smaller military thanks to cuts 
in funding—were at least partly to blame for the shooting. This frame of n overwhelmed 
military trying to grapple with the realities of spending cuts (which was, interestingly, 
repeated in the later 2009 Camp Liberty shooting, which took place on a military base in 
the midst of a war zone) suggested that the institution of the military itself had been 
undermined by these changes, rendering it less able to address problems like Kreutzer’s. 
 
Weapons  
                                                
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid. 
  90 
A second frame in broadcast coverage emerged later in media investigations, once 
it became clear that Kreutzer was mentally ill and had no single easily identified reason 
for targeting the soldiers who became victims in the attack. The fact that the shooting 
took place on a field for exercise where soldiers were, by custom, always unarmed, was 
highlighted repeatedly, as was the fact that the Special Forces soldiers who tackled 
Kreutzer to stop the attack were also unarmed. Most broadcast coverage in the initial 
days following the attack noted that the weapons Kreutzer used were civilian weapons, 
describing the specific types of guns found on the scene. 
A few days after the shooting, several broadcast segments began investigating the 
gun shop where Kreutzer obtained his weapons, a suburban Maryland store called 
“Freestate Arms.” In a November 1 segment on NBC Evening News, reporter Pete 
Williams detailed the many transgressions of Freestate Arms, which had recently been 
shut down by authorities from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) when 
it became clear that over 200 guns seized at crime scenes led investigators back to the 
tiny store and its owner, who made illegal sales. Williams also dug into the legal 
obstacles facing proponents of gun control:  
Authorities say there are hundreds of other shady gun dealers nationwide, a 
startling finding in a survey of over 180,000 licensed gun dealers. Only about 900 
of them—less than 1 percent—are responsible for selling more than half the guns 
traced in crimes. For years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms had no 
way to single out problem dealers; now, [the] ATF says a new computer system 
can flag them … But gun control advocates say a big loophole remains in the 
law—over half the states allow a legal gun buyer to resell to anyone … But after 
bruising fights over assault weapons and the Brady Law, neither party in 
Congress is pushing for any new gun control. 215 
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In this coverage, gun control was largely framed as a polarized fight in the 
legislature, divided along intractable party lines and unlikely to change.   
 
Mental illness in the military 
A final frame that was pervasive in the later waves of coverage of the shooting 
(after Kreutzer’s conviction and sentence of death) centered around the military’s failure 
to catch the many warning signs of Kreutzer’s mental illness (and impending turn to 
violence) that preceded the shooting. Much of this coverage was driven by Kreutzer’s 
father, who reached out to news media with his concerns about the military’s failures in 
his son’s case. Broadcast news media conducted interviews with Kreutzer’s parents, with 
mental health experts, and with Army attorneys.  
One of Kreutzer’s defense attorneys was quoted describing a military culture that 
overtly and explicitly discouraged soldiers from seeking help from psychiatrists and 
social workers. Todd Richissi, a print journalist for the Raleigh News and Observer who 
published an expose of the military’s failures in Kreutzer’s case, was interviewed on-air 
describing the case: “This was a guy that was waving big red flags, literally begging for 
help.  And he was basically told, ‘Go take a nap.'”216  
In August 1997, over a year after Kreutzer had been sentenced to death, NBC 
News aired an in-depth investigative segment examining the intricacies of the case, 
focusing on the charge levied by Kreutzer’s family that the military ignored clear 
warning signs of mental illness before the shooting. Reporter Fred Francis criticized 
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military commanders who failed to take Kreutzer’s warnings seriously, and interviewed 
both Kreutzer’s parents and Kreutzer himself at length about his mental state leading up 
to the shooting: 
FRANCIS: Kreutzer was sent to a counselor he says he thought was a doctor. 
 
Mr.  KREUTZER Jr.: (On phone) I told him I had feelings of hostility towards 
most of the members of my squad and I was seriously considering killing. 
 
FRANCIS: What follows, fellow soldiers say, was an extraordinary and deadly 
mistake that the Army refuses to acknowledge.  Kreutzer was disarmed for only a 
few weeks and months later, surprisingly promoted. Yet over a year later, 
Kreutzer again began talking openly about murder … The Army does not dispute 
that Kreutzer sought help.  Yet, at trial, that was ignored, even though this 
prosecutor's document called him, quote, "nuttier than a fruitcake." Defense 
lawyers say those seeking mental health care are often ignored and others don't 
ask for it since an Army psychiatrist's notes are not confidential.217 
According to court-martial documents, Francis’ point about the absence of mental 
health discussion at trial was apt. The subject of Kreutzer’s mental health—while 
remaining a clear unspoken subtext to the military’s case—barely came up at trial. 
Captain Darren Fong, the social worker who spoke to Kreutzer and documented his 
homicidal fantasies, did not testify. A minor witness, Staff Sergeant Roger Sweeney Jr., 
testified that over a year after the shooting, although scouts checked the woods for 
snipers during morning runs at the stadium where the shooting took place, no new 
systems or procedures had been enacted to help soldiers with mental health issues or to 
ease self-referral.218  
The NBC investigation went on to interview Kreutzer’s parents in-studio, splicing 
footage of his tearful mother and stoic father alongside footage of an unnamed man 
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shouting at Kreutzer as he entered the courthouse a year earlier to await his sentencing: 
“Are you ready to die?”219 
A wave of print coverage during the same period—from the Washington Post, the 
New York Times, and USA Today, among others—preceded much of the broadcast focus 
on the military’s failure to catch Kreutzer’s illness, with some newspapers reporting on 
the controversy even before the death penalty sentence was handed down. As early as 
May 1996, the Washington Post ran a story with the headline “Family Says Army Knew 
of Son’s Troubles,” quoting Kreutzer’s parents, who detailed their son’s struggles with 
suicidal depression and pointed the finger of culpability at the Army for failing to identify 
and treat mental illness in the ranks. 
"In the Army, there have been similar suicides and incidents similar to my son's," 
Kreutzer said. "We've learned there is no training for officers and enlisted men to 
search for people with mental problems. Hopefully, my son's case can be a wake-
up call to them to put in place procedures so this never happens again."220 
In 1997, Todd Richissi of the Raleigh News and Observer published a sweeping and 
influential report detailing the many opportunities the military had to intervene before 
Kreutzer’s illness turned to violence. Most notably, Richissi documented the military’s 
failure to make changes to their mental health policy following the shooting, and a 
culture that explicitly discouraged soldiers from seeking help:  
Cpl. Jerry Hoyler, who has since left the Army, said that in the hours after 
Kreutzer's attack, mental health workers were sent to talk to the troops. In a 
meeting room, they invited the soldiers to come forward if they needed any help. 
"We don't need any outside help," one of the officers shouted. "We're the 
Airborne Infantry and we take care of our own." 
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 That, Hoyler said, sent a message: "Mental health wasn't looked upon as an 
option for dealing with this. We knew if we went we'd risk losing our jobs. 
Anyway, hell, if you saw this happen and knew Kreutzer went to mental health, 
would you have gone to mental health? Hell, no."221 
In 2000—just after Columbine—The New York Times published a 3500-word 
expose on mass shooters that delved into the Fort Bragg case, explicitly comparing 
Kreutzer to the Columbine shooters, and tying the event into the new umbrella term of 
“mass shootings” that emerged with the Columbine case. 
Fifteen months before his final ambush, when Sergeant Kreutzer had an outburst 
in which he threatened to kill soldiers, and it became common knowledge, his 
superiors sent him to a military social worker. 
"He told me that he had specific plans to kill the people in his squad," the 
counselor, Darren Fong, told military investigators, the court-martial documents 
show. But when he was returned to full duty, Sergeant Kreutzer was not referred 
to Army psychiatrists. He was barred from access to weapons for two weeks. 
The morning of Oct. 27, 1995, Sergeant Kreutzer hid in the woods and fired onto 
a field of American soldiers who thought they were at peace. He wounded 18 of 
them, and killed Maj. Stephen Mark Badger, an intelligence officer and a father 
and stepfather of eight children. 
Sergeant Kreutzer kept firing until he was tackled from behind by two comrades. 
Minutes later, he spoke to a military police officer, Bruce W. Hamrick. 
"He said he kept warning people that he was going to kill somebody," Mr. 
Hamrick testified, "but that nobody would listen."222 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Broadcast coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting largely focused on the unexpected 
nature of the event – in particular, the irony of the shooter being one of the military’s 
own. In later waves of coverage, journalists began to dig into the failures of the military 
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to catch what is now clear were explicit and repeated warning signs that Kreutzer may 
become violent – as well as the failure of the military to enact any meaningful changes to 
procedure or policy following the shooting. Overwhelmingly, broadcast coverage 
described the event as a “shooting,” “murder” or “sniper shooting/sniper attack.”  Only 
once was the shooting described as a “military tragedy.” The shooting was never 
described as a “spree” or “rampage” until after Columbine, when it was grouped along 
with other similar events in meta-coverage examining trends in rampage or mass 
shootings. Similarly, the shooting was never described as a “mass shooting” until after 
Columbine.  
The visuals that accompanied coverage were dominated in early days by the home 
video footage of the shooting: frenetic, jerky, dimly lit and intense. In later coverage, 
investigations expanded beyond the shooting itself and into broader factors that led to the 
event, digging into the role played by Freestate Arms, a notorious gun shop associated 
with the event, and into Kreutzer’s history, especially as told by his family and friends, 
who were afforded considerably primacy as sources—seated in-studio for extended 
interviews and presented sympathetically. After the first few days of coverage, B-roll 
footage accompanying spoken segments moved away from the frenetic imagery of the 
morning itself, and mostly involved slow pans of old portraits of Kreutzer or of 
documents or charts pertaining to the case.  
Unlike coverage of later shootings, interestingly, coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting 
continued long into the military court-martial process, continuing to cover events as they 
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unfolded within the military judicial process, even after Kreutzer’s conviction and 
sentencing.  
In terms of his motivations or reasons for the shooting, Kreutzer himself was initially 
framed as a stressed-out soldier who “snapped” (for as-yet-unclear reasons) and later as a 
largely sympathetic character, a deeply mentally ill soldier who was tormented by his 
peers, and whose many pleas for help fell on deaf ears. This frame of Kreutzer as a tragic, 
doomed figure was bolstered by the strong influence of his family as sources, whose 
relentless persistence in contacting news media and raising questions about the military’s 
mental health structures substantially shifted later news coverage of the event and its 
aftermath. This third frame in broadcast coverage—of the military’s failures to catch the 
many warning signs before the shooting—seems to have been driven in large part by 
preceding print media coverage on the subject. In one case, a broadcast segment included 
a shot slowly panning Todd Richissi’s in-depth News & Observer article about the 
shooting. 
One element that was notable in its absence from coverage was Kreutzer’s comments 
about God immediately after being arrested. Although these disturbing comments were 
present in publicly available court-martial documents, they never became a part of the 
story, and never came up in any print or broadcast coverage of the case. In the court 
martial documents themselves, these comments about “God’s will” were only presented 
as further (rather glib) evidence of Kreutzer’s “nuttiness.” 
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Chapter 4: The 2009 Camp Liberty Shooting 
 
 
 In this chapter I will review the facts of the 2009 mass shooting at Camp Liberty, 
a former American military installation located in Baghdad, Iraq. I will discuss the 
frames that emerged in American broadcast coverage of the shooting, contextualize the 
event in its cultural, social and political context, and compare media coverage of the 
shooting—frames, omissions, inclusions, primary sources—to the facts of the event. 
Finally, I will consider where the coverage of this shooting fits into or contradicts cultural 
scripts and norms, and how this coverage reflects cultural norms of the Iraq War period: 
the primacy of the military, the invisibility of weaponry and gun control issues, and 
omnipresence of hyper-masculine and hyper-patriotic cultural scripts.  
 
Gun violence and the Iraq War 
In the 2000s, rates of gun violence in the United States continued to drop from 
their peak in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, although not nearly as sharply as in the 1990s. 
Compared with 1993 (the year when U.S. gun homicides peaked), the year 2010 saw a 
firearm homicide rate that had decreased by 49 percent, with nearly all of the decline 
taking place in the 1990s and a more moderate decline in the late 2000s.223   
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Mass shootings, however, did not slow down during this time period. Several 
high-profile and unprecedentedly deadly mass shootings captured the attention of the 
American public in the years preceding the Camp Liberty shooting—including the Red 
Lake school shooting in Minnesota (2005), the Amish school shooting in Lancaster 
County, Pennsylvania (2006), the Virginia Tech and Westroads Mall shootings (2007), 
and the Northern Illinois University shooting (2008). Moreover, the yearly number of 
dead and injured as a result of mass shootings actually climbed in the first decade the 21st 
century—from fewer than ten in the year 2000 to over 140 in 2012.224 
The 2009 shooting at Camp Liberty also came six years into the American 
occupation of Iraq. Largely as a result of the terror attacks of September 11, the decade 
that preceded the shooting marked by a sharp turn in American discourse toward hyper-
patriotism. Gallup polling in 2009 found that 56 percent of Americans reported that they 
felt the war was going “moderately well” or “very well.”225 The American mass media 
performed a powerful agenda-setting role in this context, bolstering “support the troops” 
rhetoric and echoing and reinforcing the arguments of political elites drumming up 
support for the war.226 These messages often resulted in reductionist, sensational 
discourse that relied on oversimplified notions of an inherently un- and anti-American 
enemy, the “them” to our “us”—drawing implicitly upon decades of media and cultural 
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scripts vilifying Arabs and Muslims as terrorists.227 This rhetoric was particularly notable 
in the political discourse put forth by President George W. Bush, who clearly identified 
the “enemy,” as well as the purported reasons that the enemy hates America in many of 
his addresses pertaining to the war:  
``Why do they hate us?''  
They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected 
government … They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of 
speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other … They 
want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and 
Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa …  
We have seen their kind before. They're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies 
of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by 
abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of 
fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism.228 
 With this speech, delivered on September 20, 2001, President Bush clearly 
delineated the parameters of the conflict in black-and-white terms, pitting the global West 
against forces in the Middle East and drawing upon famous relatively recent historical 
examples with enormous American cultural heft (Nazism and fascism). Most news media 
closely appropriated the “elite” framing of the building conflict in the Middle East, 
drawing primarily upon official sources, to the exclusion of others.229 
 Often this reliance upon official sources resulted in widespread media coverage 
that functioned to amplify and disseminate official accounts of the war and its effects, 
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marginalizing or downplaying dissent. In his work examining broadcast media coverage 
of the Iraq War, for example, DiMaggio (2010) found that the U.S. was more prone to 
overreliance on official sources than other countries, and that this overreliance resulted in 
the near-erasure of widespread protests and critics of the war, which had the further effect 
of both restricting Americans’ access to reliable and complete information about the war 
as well as creating categories of “worthy and unworthy victims” of the conflict.230 U.S. 
casualties were presented as major news, and coverage of American troop deaths was 
highly ritualized, emphasizing the sacrifice of military families and underlining the idea 
that their deaths functioned to keep Americans from “having to fight them at home.”231 
Coverage of other categories of victims varied wildly, from Iraqis killed as a result of 
“sectarian violence,” who received more abstract but prominent coverage, to Iraqis killed 
in non-combat environments by U.S. troops, who received very little coverage except 
where such events were framed as being carried out by “rogue soldiers.”232 
 In fact, many argued that the war’s legitimization in news media (the success of 
which relied upon preexisting negative stereotypes and an almost exclusive reliance upon 
official sources) constituted what Bonn, in particular, called an “elite-engineered moral 
panic,” pitting an American “us” on the side of good against a more nebulous “them,” 
delegitimizing dissent and overlooking and excusing the many errors and deceptions that 
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led to U.S. involvement in the war, which Chomsky described as an “unmitigated 
disaster.”233  
In this agenda-setting role, American mass media—and especially broadcast 
media—were very successful at drumming up support for the war (and, tangentially, for 
the U.S. military) via political rhetoric. One way this was often accomplished was by 
using what Stahl (2010) called “technofetishism,” focusing on the superior and high-tech 
weaponry of the American military. This focus on technological exhibitionism underlined 
the presentation of the war as what Der Derian (2009) called a “virtuous war”—
presenting the war in terms of gleaming, high-tech weaponry, obliterating images of the 
dead and dying, emphasizing the “surgical” or “precision” capabilities of new weapons, 
and transforming state violence into an object of pleasurable consumption.234 Indeed, 
however, outside of the echo chamber of broadcast media reporting in the early years of 
the Iraq War, so-called virtuous war is “anything but less destructive, deadly or bloody 
for those on the receiving end of the big technological stick” (p. xxxii)235 
 By the time Sergeant Russell, the shooter in the Camp Liberty incident, carried 
out his attack, at least 4,302 American soldiers had been killed in Iraq, and the support of 
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the American public was waning.236 The proportion of Americans who said that the 
decision to use military force in Iraq was the “wrong decision” had slowly gained a 
majority—54 percent of Americans, compared with just 22 percent of Americans in 
2003, when the war began.237 Meanwhile, estimates of the number of civilians killed by 
this point in the war vary widely. The Iraq Ministry of Human Rights estimated a total of 
85,694 civilian deaths from the period of 2004 to 2008.238 The organization Iraq Body 
Count, which collated civilian deaths using cross-checked media reports, estimated that 
there were between 97,461 and 106,348 civilian deaths as of July 2010.239 On the other 
end of the spectrum, a national cross-sectional sample survey carried out in 2006 by the 
British medical journal The Lancet estimated a total of 654,965 civilian deaths as a result 
of the war between March 2003 and June 2006—218 times more than the 2,996 who 
perished in the September 11 attacks.240 
 
The shooting 
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On Monday, May 11, 2009, Sergeant John M. Russell, 44, had a noon 
appointment at Camp Liberty’s on-base “combat stress clinic,” a center intended to be a 
psychological oasis for soldiers serving in Iraq.  
Russell, who lived in Sherman, Texas, a town just north of Dallas, was in the final 
weeks of his third tour in Iraq, having served previous deployments in Bosnia and 
Kosovo.241 He was a member of the 54th Engineering Battalion, based in Bamberg, 
Germany, and a career Army man, having joined the Army National Guard in 1988 and 
signed up for active duty Army in 1994.242 Russell was married, with one son from a 
previous marriage to a German woman he met while stationed in Bamberg. Before his 
career in the military, Russell, who struggled with learning disabilities, worked in 
restaurants, grocery stores, and in property management.243 
The May 11 visit to the stress clinic was not Russell’s first. The clinic was a place 
where soldiers could stay for up to four days, “recharging” and receiving group and 
individual therapy in the midst of the war. Russell reportedly visited the clinic four times 
prior to the day of the shooting.244  
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Russell had a long history of psychological problems leading up to the shooting—
he had been behaving erratically for weeks, threatening to commit suicide. Two days 
prior to the shooting, Russell’s First Lieutenant, Mark Natale, removed the firing pin 
from Russell’s weapon, concerned about his increasingly combative mental state, 
referring Russell again to counseling. Later, another officer, unaware of Natale’s actions, 
confiscated Russell’s weapon entirely.245  
On May 10, the day before the shooting, Russell had an appointment at the stress 
center with Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jones, one of the 14 Army psychiatrists in Iraq at 
the time. According to Army prosecutors in the later court-martial proceedings, Russell 
asked Jones to advocate for his retirement on mental disability grounds—allegedly 
because of his concern that a threatened sexual harassment suit could derail his career. 
Jones refused.246 After an hour-long appointment, Jones diagnosed Russell with anxiety, 
concluded that he did not pose a danger to himself or others, and prescribed Russell an 
antidepressant.247 According to his escort, First Lieutenant David Vasquez, Russell’s 
mood, which had been deteriorating over the last several days, seemed to lift temporarily 
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after the appointment. By 5 a.m. the following day, however, Russell got out of bed 
crying and shaking, utterly despondent, rousing Vasquez.  
In the early predawn hours of May 11, Vasquez took Russell to the battalion’s 
chaplain, Captain Peter Keough, where Russell expressed suicidal thoughts. “He said he 
just wished someone would put a bullet in his head,” Keough told 
investigators.248Alarmed, Keough called Jones, the psychiatrist, at 7:50 a.m. In a follow 
up email the morning of the shooting, Keough expressed alarm about Russell’s 
psychological state. “I believe he is deteriorating,” Keough wrote. “He does not trust 
anyone, does not think any of us care for him, including me … and believes he is better 
off dead.” Keough went on to request in-patient care for Russell, urging the Army to 
provide him round-the-close psychiatric care. “I know when something is outside my 
lane,” Keough concluded. “[T]his case is beyond my skill set.”249 Jones responded by 
setting an appointment for Russell at the stress clinic for that day at noon, writing that it 
was acceptable for Russell to have his weapon as long as the firing pin had been 
removed. 
At 11:20, Russell entered the stress clinic, where he signed in for his appointment. 
A few minutes into his appointment with Jones, however, he angrily stormed out of the 
office. Jones instructed Russell’s escort, Staff Sergeant Enos Richard, to call military 
police while he went after Russell. A shouting match ensued in the parking lot between 
Jones and Russell, during which Russell reportedly threatened again to kill himself. 
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Military police arrived, and Russell asked to be arrested. Instead, on the advice of Jones, 
the MPs decided to turn Russell over to his escort, Sergeant Richard, in a breach of 
military policy, which dictates that any soldier threatening suicide must be turned over 
only to his first sergeant or unit commander.250 Shortly thereafter Russell left, in the 
custody of Richard, while clinic staff attempted (and failed) to contact his commanding 
officers.251 
Alone, Sergeant Richard drove Russell back to his battalion. Once they arrived at 
the battalion offices, Russell grabbed an unsecured M-16 that was lying in the back seat 
of the Ford Explorer, and forced Richard at gunpoint to turn over the keys to the SUV. 
Panicked, Richard burst into the battalion offices and reported that Russell had taken the 
weapon and may have been on his way to the clinic. Around 2 p.m., after driving the 40 
minutes back to the clinic, Russell returned to the stress clinic (a weapon-free zone on 
base), and opened fire after slipping in a back door. Moving quickly through the single-
story building, Russell fired upon everyone he saw, including many soldiers pleading 
with him to put down his weapon.252 In the melee, during which frantic patients fled in all 
directions, bolting out of doors, jumping from windows and hiding under bunks, five 
soldiers were killed: Navy Commander Charles K. Springle, 52, a psychiatrist; Private 
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First Class Michael Edward Yates Jr., 19; Specialist Jacob D. Barton, 20; Sergeant 
Christian E. Bueno-Galdos, 25; and Major Matthew P. Houseal, 54. As military police—
who had managed to contact a Camp Stryker clinic to alert them that Russell was on the 
loose, but had not reached the Camp Liberty clinic in the time since Russell 
commandeered his escort’s SUV—converged on the doorway, Russell laid his weapon 
down.253 
Russell was promptly taken into custody and charged with five counts of murder 
and one count of aggravated assault. The day after the shooting, military officials 
announced that they were launching a probe to identify shortcomings in mental health 
treatment for troops deployed in war zones—just four days after the Army Surgeon 
General had issued a triumphant report touting “significantly lower” mental-health 
problems in Iraq than at any time since 2004.254 
In the early days after the shooting, Russell’s family was swift to reach out to the 
press with accounts that were sharply critical of the military’s dealings with Russell. 
William Russell, John Russell’s father, was quoted saying that the military “broke” his 
son, and that Russell had “snapped” from the pressures placed on him:255 
They overstressed him. They broke him. They ruined his life. They told him, 
"You're an idiot. You don't belong in here. We're going to break you. We're going 
to get you out of here."256 
Nearly four years after the shooting, in April 2013, Russell struck a plea deal with 
military prosecutors to avoid the death penalty, pleading guilty to the deaths of his five 
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victims. The plea deal followed years of court-martial proceedings to determine the level 
of his guilt and premeditation. Defense attorneys argued that Russell’s mental state was 
precarious, weakened by repeated combat tours and extreme stress. A forensic scientist 
testified that Russell suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and psychosis at the 
time of the shooting. But prosecutors argued that Russell’s actions—the theft of the 
vehicle, the long drive back to the clinic, the choice to enter through a back door—
indicated premeditation. Further, Army prosecutors alleged that the entire shooting was a 
premeditated attack on Jones specifically, in retribution for his perceived refusal to help 
Russell.257  
On May 16, 2013, Russell was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole. "You are not a monster," said Colonel David Conn, the judge who sentenced 
Russell. "But you have knowingly and deliberately done incredibly monstrous things."258 
 
Broadcast media coverage of the shooting 
 ABC, CBS and NBC News all prominently featured the Camp Liberty shooting in 
their evening broadcasts on May 11, the day of the shooting. ABC and CBS led their 
broadcast with the story, while NBC covered the story near the top of the hour. CNN 
Evening News also led its May 11 newscast with a five-minute segment covering the 
shooting. In-depth follow-up coverage continued for a few days after the shooting on all 
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four networks—comprising nine total segments that made up 18 minutes and 20 seconds 
of total coverage on broadcast networks—but swiftly tapered off by mid-week, with the 
final segment airing on May 14. The New York Times published a total of nine articles 
about the shooting, following the case through Russell’s plea deal with prosecutors in 
2013.259 USA Today published three articles about the shooting—the first two simply 
listing troop casualties, and the third referencing the Camp Liberty shooting within the 
context of the late Fort Hood shooting the same year. Meanwhile, the Washington Post 
published seven articles about the shooting, following the court-martial proceedings 
through 2011, when Russell faced a military hearing determining whether or not he 
should stand trial for the killings.260 
 
 Frames 
 Three consistent frames emerged in coverage of the Camp Liberty shooting. First, 
a focus on nationalism and patriotism was combined with the exceptional primacy of 
military sources to frame the event as an inevitable tragedy that could only be properly 
understood or parsed by those who had served in the “theater” of war (a term that 
recurred often in coverage). Second, “combat stress” was offered as the primary 
explanation for the shooting, bolstered in broadcast media by frenetic imagery. Third, 
there was a near-total absence of discussion regarding military policies on 
guns/weaponry, and very little criticism of the military itself—despite evidence of 
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multiple breaches of military policy that led to the shooting—representing a sharp turn 
from coverage of Fort Bragg.  
 
 Nationalism, patriotism, and the primacy of the military 
 By far the most consistent theme in broadcast coverage of the shooting involved 
an aggressive vein of nationalistic and patriotic imagery. American flags waved softly in 
the background behind nearly every anchor who delivered information about the 
shooting, B-roll footage featured uniformed troops engaged in frenetic missions in Iraq, 
and on-screen icons used to “brand” the shooting depicted stylized gun sights, bullet 
holes, and figures of uniformed soldiers in full combat gear, wielding rifles.261 
 This intense nationalistic focus was bolstered by the near-universal presence of 
military sources who were quoted and interviewed for broadcast segments. All but one of 
the broadcast segments covering the shooting prominently included interviews—many 
in-studio—with current or former, often high-ranking, members of the military. The 
expertise of these military sources was given primacy both in terms of parsing the reasons 
for the shooting and for offering possibilities for the meaning of the event. Often, this 
reliance on military sources was paired with the implication (both implicit and explicit) 
that only those who had served in the “theater of war,” a euphemism that recurred 
frequently, were qualified to weigh in on the shooting: 
PAUL RIECKHOFF, FOUNDER, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN VETERANS 
OF AMERICA: Well, it's tragic. I mean, it's deeply disturbing, but I don't think 
folks who have been in theater are surprised. I mean, our friends are over there 
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daily. They're facing a tremendously tough work environment, threats from the 
enemy and repeated tours.262 
These sources—especially current members of the military and high-ranking 
soldiers—also tended to use the opportunity to weigh in on the shooting to defend the 
military and its handling of the case, often suggesting a certain inevitability to the killings 
as a natural consequence of war:  
Brian Williams: [H]ow do you prevent a senseless murder [on a military base] 
any more than you would in civilian life? 
Colonel Jack Jacobs (Retired, NBC News Military Analyst): Well, you can't, 
actually. And the military establishment's done a lot to make sure that they keep 
eyes on people who are not doing well. There are support systems back in the 
States for them and their families when they return, and also support systems in 
country, just like this stress clinic. Troops are told to keep an eye out for those 
who are not doing well, to report them to the chain of command so that they can 
be helped. And this is just one that just didn't make it, fell through the cracks.263 
 Rather than a preventable phenomenon, the shooting was consistently framed by 
military sources as a tragic, but unavoidable side effect of the demands placed on 
soldiers—and of what they described as insufficient resources, too few military personnel 
and inadequate military funding. In a May 11 segment for CBS News, correspondent 
David Martin introduced an email “sent from Afghanistan last year,” which he described 
as “captur[ing] the strain of too much mission for too few soldiers.” The email, which 
appeared on-screen without any explanation as to its origin or recipient, read, "We are so 
short now over here that we are starting to see signs of some folks really stressing out. 
And in the end, it`s all due to our personnel shortages."264  
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 In the same segment, General Peter Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. 
Army, sat down for an in-studio interview.  
GEN. PETER CHIARELLI, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY: As long as 
the demand on forces stays what it is right now and the supply of forces remains 
the same, it will be very difficult for us to do anything with that stress. But we`ve 
got to help soldiers understand how they can cope with that stress.265 
 
 Combat stress 
 The most common explanation offered by broadcast media for the shooting—
often explicitly tied to the view that Russell “snapped”—was “combat stress.” In the nine 
segments devoted to covering the shooting, the phrase “combat stress” was used 21 
times. In contrast, “PTSD” or “post-traumatic stress disorder” was used a total of nine 
times, often in a context that suggested that the more nebulous and generic term “combat 
stress” was a less-serious, far more prevalent precursor to PTSD. This characterization of 
the underlying reasons for the shooting, which chalked up Russell’s motive for the 
shooting to the daily stress of military life and multiple deployments (rather than 
underlying severe mental illness) bolstered a narrative that presented the shooting as an 
unpreventable tragedy, simply another terrible cost of war.  
 Commander Carrie Kennedy, a neuropsychologist and aerospace experimental 
psychologist with Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, describes combat stress as “an 
expected and predictable reaction to combat experiences”—as opposed to PSTD, which 
represents a far more serious (and less prevalent) “psychological disorder [that] impairs 
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functioning.”266 Combat stress, which is considered a normal and expected human 
response to the psychological stressors of war, is thought to affect many or most soldiers 
experiencing combat or close proximity to the battlefield, and its existence (including 
symptoms such as hyperstartle reactions, hypervigilance, irritability, and bad dreams) has 
been documented throughout recent history. Indeed, descriptions of “shell shock,” “battle 
fatigue,” or “soldier’s heart” in medical and popular literature date back to the American 
Civil War.267  
Conversely, the more precise and clinical term for long-term psychological 
trauma, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, only first appeared in the American 
Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) in 1980. Since then it has undergone several revisions in terms of classification 
and diagnostic criteria.268 
Combat stress, however, as it was presented by broadcast media coverage of the 
Camp Liberty shooting, was uniformly presented as an unfortunate but widespread and 
unavoidable side effect of multiple deployments, the strain of military life, and the 
intensity of battle. In a press conference aired by ABC News on May 11, Admiral 
Michael Mullen said the shooting would be “investigated” to examine whether the stress 
of multiple deployments contributed to Russell’s decision to commit the shooting.  
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“It speaks to the issue of multiple deployments,” Mullen said,  “increasing dwell 
time, all of those things that we're focused on to try to improve to relieve that stress.”269 
In a May 11 segment on CBS News, correspondent David Martin described the many 
stressors that soldiers have to grapple with, contextualizing the shooting with data on 
military suicide rates, which he described as “one of the most extreme consequences of 
stress.” 
MARTIN: This was not suicide, of course, but murder. We don`t know the motive 
of the Army sergeant who pulled the trigger, but it seems safe to say that both he 
and the five mental health workers who were supposed to help him were all 
victims of combat stress.270 
This focus on the daily stressors of life on the battlefield was reinforced by the 
near-ubiquitous presence of frenetic, quick-cut, shaky, B-roll footage accompanying most 
broadcast segments. This footage, which was usually spliced together from multiple shots 
and angles, showed American soldiers in full combat gear in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
wielding rifles, rushing through streets, engaging in gunfights, ducking, running from 
explosions, shouting, and storming into buildings. Some of this background footage 
included sound (such as a commanding officer shouting “Go! Go! Go!” as his troops 
stormed a building or engaged in a gunfight), but most appeared in the background as a 
sort of overlaid subtext that reinforced the stressful environment of the war zone, 
emphasizing the frenetic and panicked nature of battle. This video imagery also 
occasionally included locals, but usually in the background—Arab men in sweeping 
robes, and black-clad women wearing hijabs.  
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  This consistent focus on “combat stress”—and the military sources who 
emphasized its prevalence—led to teasers like this one from Katie Couric, in a CBS 
News broadcast on May 12: 
Also tonight, did stress push a soldier over the edge? A sergeant on his third tour 
in Iraq is charged with murdering five other U.S. soldiers.271 
  
 The question of whether combat stress pushed Russell over the edge was repeated 
by many anchors and sources, including Russell’s son and father, who asserted that the 
stress of military life—and the cruelty of his squadmates—caused Russell to simply 
“snap,” killing his fellow soldiers in the clinic. 
 The terminology used to describe the shooting underlined the focus on combat 
stress. The shooting was described repeatedly as a “tragic accident” or a “tragic incident,” 
highlighting a sort of fatalistic attitude toward the military’s role in preventing similar 
shootings. One thing most coverage consistently agreed upon, however, was the senseless 
nature of these deaths in contrast to ordinary combat casualties at the hands of a known 
enemy. “After more than seven years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq,” said Katie Couric, 
at the beginning of the May 11 CBS News segment devoted to the shootings, “it`s easy to 
become numb to the mounting U.S. death toll; and then something so terrible happens it 
simply stuns us.”272 
 
 Absence of military policy/weaponry 
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 Finally, elements that were most notable in their absence from broadcast coverage 
were any in-depth discussion of two pertinent breaches of military policy in this shooting: 
(1) how Russell was able to obtain a loaded firearm after being disarmed (and the many 
lapses in established military policy that led to the chain of events that enabled him to 
obtain the rifle he used in the weapons-free zone of the clinic) and (2) how Russell’s clear 
and disturbing recent history of mental illness failed to trigger red flags that should have 
prevented the shooting. These questions regarding weaponry, accessibility, mental illness 
and military policy were replaced by a narrative upholding the primacy (and the 
progressive efforts) of the military, and reducing Russell’s rationale for the shooting to 
“combat stress” or the considerably more problematic idea that he simply “snapped.”  
 In fact, the only sources who appeared in broadcast coverage of the shooting 
overtly criticizing military policy in Russell’s case were Russell’s family members. 
Unlike coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting, however, interviews with these family 
members—most notably, Russell’s son and father—were not taped as in-studio close-ups 
but rather as impromptu on-the-spot interviews, filmed in casual (camouflage-patterned) 
clothing and squinting in the sunlight on the lawn of Russell’s family home.  
WILBURN RUSSELL (FATHER OF SERGEANT JOHN RUSSELL): 
[T]hey broke him. They told him, you're out of here, man. You know just any one 
of us can sign a piece of paper and you're - you're washed up. And his whole life 
was the military. He, he was so proud of that military.273 
 Military sources largely avoided the topic of Russell’s specific history mental of 
illness, although many decried, in general, the stigma associated with seeking help for 
mental or psychological illness in the military. Most, however, packaged these concerns 
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with reassurances that the military had made great strides in recent years in terms of 
attempting to address and adequately treat mental illness among service members, 
especially PTSD: 
ANDERSON COOPER: The fact that there is a stress clinic, for lack of a better 
word in theater, is actually a good sign. I mean, that's a new -- that's a relatively 
new development. 
PAUL RIECKHOFF, FOUNDER, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN VETERANS 
OF AMERICA: It is. It's huge progress. We didn't have that when I was in 
theater.  
COOPER: But there's still such stigma about seeking help. I mean, in society, in 
general, but in the military, in particular. 
RIECKHOFF: Tremendous stigma. I mean, that's why we launched a massive 
public service announcement campaign to address that stigma, to talk about what 
veterans face when they come home. And we set up a Web site too, 
communityofveterans.org, veterans can go there and get support from other 
veterans. They can get mental health resources and look for the warning signs.274 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The Camp Liberty shooting, which took place ten years after the Columbine 
shooting, was frequently described as a “spree” or a “rampage shooting” in broadcast 
coverage immediately following the event. One segment referred to it as a “mass 
shooting.” Most often, however, it was described as a “tragedy,” a “tragic incident,” or a 
“tragic accident,” underlining both the unusual and surprising senselessness of this 
soldier-on-soldier shooting, as well as a sense of fatalistic inevitability—the shooting was 
tragic, but it was an “accident” or an “incident,” a (perhaps) unforeseen but largely 
unpreventable cost of war.  
                                                
274 “Reickhoff Interview,” CNN Evening News, May 11, 2009. 
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 These frames stand in marked contrast to earlier coverage of the Fort Bragg 
shooting, which did not frame that shooting as inevitable. Fort Bragg coverage was 
explicitly critical of military policy in the run-up to the 1995 shooting, picking apart 
everything from prosecutors’ notes in court-martial documents to the many warning signs 
of mental illness—including Kreutzer’s own explicit pleas for help—prior to the 
shooting. No similar level of critical evaluation of military protocol occurred in the Camp 
Liberty case, aside from a few off-the-cuff remarks from Russell’s family members. 
Despite the fact that the breaches to military policy leading to the shooting were 
numerous and well-documented—Russell, for example, should not have been allowed to 
leave the clinic after threatening suicide in the company of a lone chaperone, nor should 
any loaded weapons have been allowed in the clinic, a policy without any actual 
measures for enforcement—broadcast coverage failed to raise these issues. One factor 
that may account for some of these differences in coverage is the fact that the Fort Bragg 
shooting took place on an American military base in peacetime, while the Camp Liberty 
shooting, for all its similarities, occurred in the “theater of war” in the midst of a bitter 
and ongoing conflict far from American soil.   
 The narrative of “combat stress” replaced most other explanations for the event in 
broadcast coverage, often extending—both explicitly and implicitly—to the conclusion 
that the stressors of military life led Russell to simply “snap.” This frame is problematic 
for two reasons. First, it disregards Russell’s considerable and well-documented descent 
into mental illness and despair that preceded the shooting. Second, it reproduces a 
prominent (but inaccurate) trope about violence and mental health. People do not simply 
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“snap.”275 The road to extreme and indiscriminate violence is almost always marked by 
clear warning signs, mental illness, substance abuse, or some combination of the three. 
People who commit mass shootings do not “snap”—they consistently and fairly 
predictably move down a path toward violence.276 As such, “combat stress” alone is a 
woefully inadequate explanation for what happened at Camp Liberty. A constellation of 
factors led to this shooting, of which the stress of battle may have been one—but it alone 
does not account for the shooting.  
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Policy,” Mother Jones, November 9, 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/ 
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Chapter 5: The 2009 Fort Hood Shooting 
 
In this chapter I will review the facts of the 2009 mass shooting on the Fort Hood 
military base. I will discuss the social, political and cultural climate that preceded the 
shooting—the most deadly mass shooting to date to take place on an American military 
base.  I will also examine the frames that emerged in broadcast media coverage of the 
shooting, comparing the choices made by these media (inclusions, omissions, primary 
sources) to what we now know about the facts of the event, and the personal history of 
the shooter, Army Major Nidal Hasan. Finally, I will discuss the role this coverage 
played in upholding norms and cultural scripts of the Iraq War period in the first decade 
of the 21st century—the infallibility of the military (and its role in the aftermath of this 
shooting as a stand-in for the American people), the framing of the event as an act of 
“terror” closely akin to the Oklahoma City bombings or September 11, and the 
reinforcement and repetition of latently Orientalist “East vs. West” tropes in coverage 
that firmly positioned Hasan as an un-American other.  
In sum, across the entire population of broadcast media segments that covered the 
Fort Hood shooting, the words “terror,” “terrorist” or “terrorism” were used 1,258 times 
in coverage. Nearly half of these terms (556) appeared in Fox coverage alone. In contrast, 
the terms “mass shooting,” “spree” or “lone gunman” appeared a total of 82 times across 
all segments, typically appearing early on in coverage and in on-screen headlines (See 
Table 2).  
 
  121 
Media outlet “terror”/”terrorism” “mass shooting” “spree” or “lone 
gunman” 
FOX 556 2 14 
MSNBC 198 5 5 
CNN 326 19 10 
NBC 13 2 2 
ABC 49 1 0 
CBS 165 12 10 
Table 2: the prevalence of descriptive terms for the Fort Hood shooting, by media 
outlet 
 
Violence and mass shootings in Killeen and Fort Hood 
The 2009 shooting at Fort Hood took place nearly six months to the day after the 
Camp Liberty shooting, six years into the American occupation of Iraq and near the very 
end of the first decade of the 21st century. 
The shooting was not the first incident of large-scale violence to afflict the town 
of Killeen, which is home to Fort Hood, a sprawling complex with 45,000 soldiers and 
airmen and nearly 9,000 civilian employees.277 Eighteen years prior, in 1991, George 
Hennard, a resident of Belton, Texas, crashed his pickup truck into a busy Killeen 
restaurant, Luby’s Cafeteria, and opened fire on the customers within. Hennard killed 23 
people and injured 20, exchanging gunfire with police before committing suicide.278 The 
                                                
277 Fort Hood Public Affairs Office, Fort Hood Fact Sheet No. 0703, 
http://www.hood.army.mil/facts/FS%200703%20-%20Fort%20Hood%20Overview.pdf. 
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1991 Killeen shooting remained the deadliest American mass shooting until it was 
surpassed by the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting and later by the 2012 Sandy Hook 
Elementary shooting in Newtown, Connecticut. The shooting at Luby’s Cafeteria remains 
the deadliest American mass shooting to date that did not take place at a school.  
Fort Hood has seen other high-profile incidents of violence in recent years. In 
September 2008, a 21-year-old 1st Cavalry Division soldier shot his lieutenant to death 
and then killed himself. Specialist Jody Wirawan, of Alaska, shot himself to death after 
killing his lieutenant, Robert Fletcher, 24, of Florida.279  
In 2014, another mass shooting, carried out by 34-year-old Specialist Ivan Lopez, 
claimed the lives of three soldiers and wounded 16 more. Lopez reportedly moved 
throughout the base in his own car throughout the rampage, shooting individuals at three 
separate buildings on base before killing himself, just one mile away from the building 
where the 2009 shooting took place.280  
In 2015, two murder-suicides shook the base: the first, in January, involved two 
deaths—the shooter, Franklin Aguilar, and his victim, Christina McDaniel. The second, 
                                                                                                                                            
Revisiting Grief,” The Houston Chronicle, November 7, 2009, http://www.chron.com/ 
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in February, involved 30-year-old Specialist Ata-se Giffa, who fatally shot himself and 
three others, injuring one non-fatally, in Killeen.281 
 
The shooting 
Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who was 39 at the time of the Fort Hood shooting,  
was a single, childless American-born son of immigrant parents.  He was born in 
Arlington County, Virginia, where he lived with his two brothers and parents, who had 
emigrated to the U.S. from a Palestinian town near Jerusalem. Hasan joined the Army 
directly out of high school, against his parents’ wishes.282 The Army put him through 
medical school, where he trained to be a psychiatrist. He received his undergraduate 
degree in biochemistry at Virginia Tech and went to medical school at the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Md.283  
Hasan’s introduction to the military came during a period of consistently lowered 
recruitment standards—the proportion of new Army recruits with high school diplomas 
plunged nearly 25 percent between 2003 (the beginning of the Iraq War) and 2007, from 
94 percent to 70.7 percent.284 Other loosened measures (which some attributed to 
attempts to grow the Army during wartime in the midst of a particularly unpopular war) 
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included waivers for criminal and medical problems that previously would have rendered 
applicants unfit for service.285 
Hasan spent six years, beginning in 2003, practicing as a psychiatrist during his 
residency at what was then the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.286 During his time at 
Walter Reed, Hasan’s practice and training included a fellowship in disaster and 
preventive psychiatry.  
His behavior and comportment at Walter Reed reportedly raised concerns among 
his peers and superiors, who later described his behavior as “disconnected, aloof, 
paranoid, belligerent, and schizoid,” antagonizing fellow students during his training, and 
espousing extremist Islamic views.287 Hasan’s worrisome behavior sparked a series of 
discussions in the spring of 2009 among psychiatrists and other officials at Walter Reed, 
seriously examining whether Hasan was mentally unstable and unfit to serve as an Army 
psychiatrist.288 Ultimately, however, both because of the protracted and difficult process 
associated with dismissing Army doctors, the dearth of soldiers with medical credentials 
amid lowered recruitment requirements, and the lack of specific evidence at the time, 
Army officials at Walter Reed declined to pursue his dismissal, assuming his superiors at 
                                                
285 S. Inskeep and T. Bowman, “Army Documents Show Lower Recruiting Standards,” 
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Fort Hood, where he was due to be transferred after his residency, would follow up with 
support and monitoring.289 
 Federal law enforcement officials later reported that nearly a year prior to the Fort 
Hood shooting, in December 2008, Hasan had come to the attention of a joint terrorism 
task force overseen by the FBI because of his internet activity – alleged posts on Islamic 
extremist websites discussing suicide bombings and making threats.290 The FBI also 
became aware of communications between Hasan and a well-known radical Yemeni 
cleric, Anwar, al-Awlaki. However, the task force concluded that Hasan’s 
communications with al-Awlaki were “fairly benign” and consistent with his research on 
post-traumatic stress.291 Hasan’s supervisors at Walter Reed were not aware of this 
investigation. 
 In July, 2009, Hasan was transferred to Fort Hood. He moved to a small 
apartment near base, in a low-income neighborhood. He worshipped at the Islamic 
Community of Greater Killeen, where his fellow worshippers described him as a quiet, 
shy man who usually left the mosque directly after prayers. He occasionally wore his 
Army uniform to the mosque, on days when he was set to report to duty.292 Cousins and 
family members interviewed after the shootings said that although they perceived Hasan 
as becoming more devout after the deaths of his parents, he was a sensitive introvert, and 
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they couldn’t remember him ever specifically espousing anti-American views, although 
he told relatives in Virginia that other soldiers harassed him because he was a Muslim, 
calling him insulting names and scraping an Islamic bumper sticker off his car. Primarily, 
they said, he was interested in finding a wife.293 
 According to military prosecutors, Hasan purchased the weapons used in the Fort 
Hood shooting in late July 2009, at a gun shop in Killeen called “Guns Galore.” Hasan 
entered the store on July 31 and asked the manager to show him the most technologically 
advanced weapon they carried that had the highest magazine capacity. According to 
eyewitnesses (including Fort Hood resident Army Specialist William Gilbert, a regular 
visitor to the store, who reportedly took an hour to explain the weapon’s capabilities to 
Hasan), he took a cell phone video of the manager showing him how to clean, 
disassemble and operate the gun he recommended, an FN 5.7 semiautomatic pistol. In the 
weeks prior to the shooting, Hasan also reportedly visited Stan’s Outdoor Shooting 
Range, south of Killeen, several times, practicing his marksmanship on a rifle range with 
silhouette targets.294 
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 On Wednesday, the day before the shooting, Hasan began emptying his apartment 
of his belongings, telling his neighbors he was about to be deployed to either Iraq or 
Afghanistan. He gave away most of his belongings, including furniture, an alarm clock, 
bags of vegetables, and copies of the Qur’an, to his neighbors in his apartment complex. 
295 
 In the early morning hours of the day of the shooting, November 5, 2009, Hasan 
telephoned another neighbor, William Bell, whose wireless internet he sometimes used, 
and asked him to switch on his internet system, bidding Bell goodbye. He then attended 
predawn prayers at the mosque, where fellow worshippers described him as calm and 
relaxed.296 
 Around 1:30 p.m., Central Time, Hasan entered the waiting room of his 
workplace, the Soldier Readiness Processing Center, a medical center on base where 
soldiers who were deploying overseas—or newly returning—visited to complete their 
medical paperwork, and to receive immunizations and screenings. 297 Hasan was armed 
with both the FN 5.7 semiautomatic pistol, to which he had affixed two laser sights, and a 
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.357 Magnum revolver.298 In his pockets, he carried 16 magazines loaded with rounds of 
ammunition, some containing as many as 30 rounds.299  
 According to accounts from eyewitnesses, Hasan first sat down, as if to begin 
helping soldiers with their paperwork, then stood on a desk, shouting “Allahu Akhbar!” 
(“God is Great!”) before opening fire on nearby soldiers, all of whom were unarmed, in 
keeping with base policies.300 Witnesses who testified at Hasan’s later court-martial 
proceedings described Hasan opening fire in a “fanlike motion” across the waiting area, 
hunting down wounded soldiers in an attempt to finish them off.301 Capt. John Gaffaney, 
a 56-year-old reservist from Serra Mesa, California, charged at Hasan with a chair before 
being shot and killed; another soldier, Spc. Logan Burnett, tried to throw a table at Hasan, 
but was wounded in the hip before he was able to reach him. In the melee, 30-year-old 
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Johnny Kallon, a human resources specialist about to be deployed to Iraq, was among 
those who called 911.302  
 Testimony by eyewitnesses at Hasan’s court-martial proceedings suggested that 
Hasan passed up several opportunities to shoot civilians that he found hiding beneath 
desks, instead firing point-blank at uniformed soldiers.303 Witnesses described Hasan as 
calm and methodical, firing continuously upon his victims, who ran for cover amid 
slippery pools of blood.  
As Hasan ran outside the processing center, he encountered Fort Hood civilian 
police officers Kimberly Munley and Mark Todd, who ordered him to halt and exchanged 
gunfire with Hasan. Hasan opened fire first on Munley, striking her in the hand, thigh and 
knee. Hasan walked up to Munley and kicked her pistol out of reach, at which point Todd 
returned fire, shooting Hasan five times. Hasan, who was handcuffed by Todd and lost 
consciousness shortly thereafter, was eventually paralyzed from the waist down as a 
result of his injuries.  
 The entire shooting, which lasted about ten minutes, resulted in the deaths of 13 
people—12 soldiers and one civilian. The victims ranged in age from 19 to 62; ten men 
and three women, including a pregnant private, Francheska Velez.304 There are some 
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discrepancies in the Army’s reports of the number of people injured non-fatally in the 
attack, ranging from 32305 to 42306; ultimately, however, Hasan was formally charged 
with 13 specifications of murder and 32 specifications of attempted murder.307 
 In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, Hasan’s death—and the death of 
Sergeant Munley, who survived the shooting—was widely (and erroneously) reported.308 
Along with the other victims, Hasan was transported to a nearby hospital, where Fort 
Hood officials reported that he had lapsed into a coma. Investigator Kelly Jameson 
testified that 214 cartridge casings fired from Hasan’s pistol were recovered from the 
shooting scene. When Hasan was finally felled by Todd’s shots, he still had 177 rounds 
of unused ammunition on his person.309  
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Hasan was swiftly identified as the alleged shooter, and in the immediate 
aftermath of the shooting, amid conflicting reports of multiple gunmen and erroneous 
reports of Hasan’s death, many mass media–especially broadcast media—speculated 
widely about possible links to broader terrorist organizations.310 Eight hours after the 
shootings, however, Lieutenant General Robert W. Cone, a base spokesman, described 
Hasan as the “sole gunman,” and noted that the preliminary evidence suggested no link to 
terrorism.311 Ultimately, in a decision that raised criticism from politicians and victims of 
the shooting, the military declined to categorize the shooting as an act of “terrorism,” 
instead categorizing the shooting as an act of workplace violence.312  
In January, 2010, the Department of Defense (DoD) released an 86-page report 
titled “Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood.” The report included findings from 
an independent review conducted to investigate military and DoD policies and 
procedures aimed at identifying and mitigating threats of violence among service 
members. According to the final summary report based on the conclusions of the January 
DoD report, major holes in military procedure and policy existed that may have 
exacerbated the effects of the Fort Hood shooting: 
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The Independent Review found that DoD programs, policies, and procedures that 
address identification of indicators for violence and radicalization are outdated, 
incomplete and fail to include key indicators of potentially violent behaviors. 
There is no risk assessment system available to supervisors and commanders to 
help them identify and mitigate internal threats.313 
The report also found that background checks on civilians entering the military or 
DoD civilian workforce were incomplete, limited in scope, or not conducted at all. 
Guidelines for adjudicating security clearances were vague, and training on how and to 
whom significant information reports were made was described as insufficient. The 
report also recommended reviewing pre- and post-deployment screening procedures for 
identifying factors for post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injuries, substance abuse, 
depression, and other potential violence indicators. The existing policies for screening 
relied almost entirely on self-reporting, and devoted just one question to assessing 
whether service members had serious conflict with others.314  
 Before the formal court-martial proceedings began, Hasan’s decision to grow a 
long beard—in violation of military standards for grooming—became a major point of 
contention, leading the judge initially assigned to Hasan’s case to issue him six contempt 
citations, one for each appearance Hasan made in court with an unshaven face. The 
military judge, Gregory Gross, who served as the Chief Circuit Judge at Fort Hood, 
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ordered that Hasan be forcibly shaved. Gross described Hasan’s beard as “a disruption to 
this trial, and a violation of [military uniform].”315  
 Hasan filed an interlocutory appeal to both halt the order that he be forcibly 
shaved and to request the removal of Judge Gross on the basis of bias. His appeal was 
granted. The order to forcibly shave Hasan was vacated, and Gross was removed from the 
case on the basis of the appearance of bias.316 The opinion in the case cited a previous 
ruling that required a judge to recuse himself from the court proceedings following the 
Oklahoma City bombing for similar reasons—most notably his physical and social 
proximity to the bombing (a factor shared by Judge Gross, who was on-base with his 
family during the Fort Hood shootings). The opinion also noted that Gross had displayed 
considerable animus against Hasan during court proceedings, in one case accusing Hasan 
of smearing feces in the court bathroom (the substance turned out to be mud, tracked in 
by a guard).317  
The U.S. government spent nearly $5 million to court-martial Hasan, who served 
as his own attorney.318 At the opening of his court-martial proceedings, on August 6, 
2013, Hasan acknowledged that he was the shooter.  
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“On November 5, 2009, 13 U.S. soldiers were killed and many more injured,” 
Hasan said. “The evidence will clearly show that I am the shooter.”319 He went on to say 
that he had been on the wrong side of a war against Islam, and had “switched over.”320 
On August 23, 2013, after a short trial during which he called no witnesses and 
offered no testimony, Hasan was convicted on 13 charges of premeditated murder and 32 
of attempted murder by a panel of senior officers.321 Three weeks later, on August 28, 
Hasan was sentenced to death.322 
 Following years of pressure from the families of victims and an expansion of 
eligibility by Congress changing the criteria for recognition, Army Secretary John 
McHugh announced on February 6, 2015, that victims of the 2009 shooting would be 
eligible to receive the Purple Heart, and its civilian counterpart, the Defense of Freedom 
medal.323 
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Broadcast media coverage of the shooting 
 MSNBC, CNN and Fox News all broke from their regular programming to cover 
the shooting as it unfolded, and ABC, CBS and NBC all led their 30-minute evening 
nightly news programs with extended coverage of the event—over 13 minutes on NBC, 
10 minutes on ABC (The ABC program Nightline also devoted 25 of their 30-minute 
broadcast on November 5 to covering the shooting), and 13 minutes on CBS.  
 Intense coverage continued the following day, with all three major evening 
network news broadcasts again devoting over half of their 30-minute broadcasts to 
coverage of the Fort Hood shooting.  
 On November 10, when a large memorial service—at which President Obama 
spoke—was held to commemorate the shooting and recognize the victims, all three major 
cable networks (Fox, MSNBC, and CNN) covered the memorial service live and nearly 
in its entirety, comprising close to an hour of coverage on each network devoted to the 
service. CBS and ABC also covered the memorial service live, but covered shorter 
portions—18 and 22 minutes of the program, respectively.  
 Altogether, broadcast coverage of the Fort Hood shooting comprised 91 segments, 
representing a total of 12 hours and 31 minutes of coverage—over 20 times more 
coverage than the Fort Bragg and Camp Liberty shootings combined.  
 There was also considerably more print coverage of the Fort Hood shooting than 
there had been of the Fort Bragg or Camp Liberty shootings. In the years following the 
shooting, the Washington Post published 35 articles covering the shooting, The New York 
Times published 34, and USA Today published 23. The majority of print coverage was 
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devoted to the legal aftermath of the shooting, charting the minutiae of the court-martial 
process: the contention over Hasan’s beard, his decision to represent himself, the removal 
of the initial judge in the case, problems with the jury, and a lawsuit filed by several 
victims against military officials at Fort Hood.  
 
Frames  
 One of the largest differences between the broadcast coverage of the Fort Hood 
shooting and the Fort Bragg and Camp Liberty shootings was the sheer volume of 
coverage—20 times more coverage than the other two shootings combined. Some of the 
differences between coverage of Fort Hood and the other two shootings can be attributed 
to the scope of the event. The Fort Hood shooting was more deadly than previous 
shootings, and it took place on a military base in a community with a rather long history 
of high-profile incidents of indiscriminate violence.  But there were several other marked 
departures from coverage of previous shootings in broadcast media. Among the most 
prevalent frames that were represented in this coverage, the most common were the 
following. First, a sustained focus on the preeminence and nobility of the American 
military as an institution, and its role as a stand-in for the American people in the 
aftermath of the shooting—a role that was bolstered by the extremely public nature of the 
grieving process after the shooting, including a widely televised memorial at which the 
president himself eulogized each victim at length. Second, there were considerable 
divisions and questions raised in coverage about the framing of the shooting as an act of 
“terror” vs. a mass shooting or “killing spree,” often drawing upon Hasan’s history of 
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interest in extremist Islam to bolster the argument for the former, despite officials’ refusal 
to categorize the shooting as an act of terror. Third, much broadcast coverage lapsed into 
(or, in a few cases, pushed back against the perception of) the reinforcement and 
repetition of latently Orientalist and Islamophobic tropes that positioned Hasan squarely 
as an outsider to American culture and society (and contextualized his identity foremost 
as an Arab Muslim).  
 
 The preeminence and nobility of the American military  
 One of the most visible frames in broadcast media, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Fort Hood shooting, was a consistent focus on the legacy and cultural 
prominence of the institution of the American military, with a particular emphasis on its 
history of multiculturalism, progressivism, inclusivity, volunteerism and heroism. The 
Fort Hood shooting led to an outpouring of nationalistic and patriotic frames that were far 
more pervasive and prominent than in the aftermath of the Fort Bragg or Camp Liberty 
shootings, and the American military (particularly in the context of the memorial service, 
or high-ranking officials’ comments about the shooting) was frequently held up as a 
stand-in for the American people.  
Military sources, particularly highly ranking current and former military officials, 
were particularly visible in broadcast coverage of the shooting, called upon to emphasize 
American soldiers’ spirit of service and sacrifice, the unflagging patriotism of military 
service members, and their consistent reflection of uniquely American values.  
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 At the televised memorial service, for example, General George Casey, the Army 
Chief of Staff, described the victims—and the soldiers in the Army in general—as 
uniquely emblematic of American values: 
Our soldiers and Army civilians lived the warrior ethos that day just as our 
soldiers and civilians live it every day in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world. 
"I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. 
And I will never leave a fallen comrade." Our ethos and values are woven into the 
very fabric of our Army. Our soldiers are cut from the cloth of this great 
country—a country they love and serve in a time of war.324  
In an internet address the week of the shooting, President Obama also emphasized 
the multiculturalism of the U.S. military, reflecting upon how the diversity of military 
service members reflects the diversity of America as a whole: 
They're Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers. They are 
descendants of immigrants and immigrants themselves. They reflect the diversity 
that makes this America, but what they share is a patriotism.325 
The live-streaming of the memorial service, at which President Obama spoke 
before a solemn array of the combat boots, rifles and portraits of each fallen victim, 
further solidified the position of the military as a uniquely American institution standing 
in for the broader U.S. population in the aftermath of the shooting. In several segments, 
journalists and commentators explicitly compared Obama’s reassuring leadership role in 
the wake of the shooting to previous moments of presidential comfort and national unity 
following events like September 11 or the Oklahoma City bombings—Fox News anchor 
Bret Baier even described Obama’s role as “comforter-in-chief.”326 These comparisons 
positioned the Fort Hood shootings as a tragedy that happened not just to the victims at 
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Fort Hood (whose deaths represented a final measure of heroism in service to a country 
they loved) but to all Americans. Consequently, the many examples of outpourings of 
support featured by broadcast media—Killeen residents holding signs indicating their 
support of the troops, civilians proudly waving American flags, massive Veteran’s Day 
parades—illustrated the degree to which individual Americans unaffiliated with the 
military were presented as grieving the shooting as a particular moment of American 
communal loss and tragedy, an opportunity to rally around the troops. At a Veteran’s Day 
parade a few days after the shooting, for example, NBC Evening News interviewed a 
parade-goer named April, who explained that her presence at the parade was intended to 
show support for military members in the wake of the Fort Hood shooting. “After what 
happened, going through [the shooting], you really realize what they go through, and it 
feels more important to show your support and that you appreciate them.”327 
Interestingly, much of this coverage of the military explicitly coded it as a 
Christian institution. Many segments on CNN featured footage of Killeen residents 
waving large signs of military support by the highway outside the base, signs that usually 
also contained Bible verses and assurances that the residents were praying for Fort Hood. 
At the televised memorial service, the commanding general of Fort Hood quoted from the 
book of Isaiah, a soldier sang a Christian hymn, and a Christian chaplain led the 
assembled attendees in prayer.  
A handful of media segments, primarily on CBS, did offer clear and explicit 
criticism of the military, beyond a perceived failure of political correctness. In a 
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November 8 broadcast of Face the Nation, for example, journalist Bob Schieffer offered 
an editorial comment about the shooting at the very end of the broadcast, weighing in on 
the many opportunities military officials had to identify Hasan’s troubling pattern of 
behavior:  
SCHIEFFER: Finally today, the president has asked the nation not to jump to 
conclusions about what happened at Fort Hood, which is usually good advice, but 
it`s also what government officials generally say when the government fouls up. 
Good advice or not, I am jumping to an obvious conclusion. This should not have 
happened. That doctor should not have been at Fort Hood. I don`t care how hard-
up the Army is for mental health professionals. A government psychiatrist with 
bad performance ratings who has been trying to get out of the Army and who had 
been saying what Dr. Hasan had been saying about the war on terrorism should 
not have been shipped off to Fort Hood to give grief counseling …  
Certainly no officer with his record would have been allowed to lead soldiers into 
combat. But sadly, this shows the Army still does not take protecting soldiers` 
mental health as seriously as it does training them to shoot. 
And then there is the other part that often happens in government. Don`t deal with 
the problem, shuffle it off to somewhere else. When he had problems at Walter 
Reed hospital, the doctor was just packed off to Fort Hood.328 
 
The straitjacket of “political correctness”: a pervasive sub-frame  
Overall, in broadcast coverage, there was very little overt criticism of the military 
as an institution. A few segments did raise the question of whether the military should 
have caught the many red flags that were present in Hasan’s military history—a problem 
that military officials argued was impossible to address adequately because of widespread 
“political correctness” in the military—but very few thoroughly dug into specific policy 
or organizational failures that led to Hasan’s descent into violence. Instead, this narrative 
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of a stifling culture of “political correctness” that impeded the military’s ability to catch 
extremists like Hasan was repeatedly emphasized. 
Fox News, in particular, presented some criticism of the military’s failures to 
catch the warning sings present in Hasan’s military history. But these criticisms were 
primarily focused on what Fox commentators described as the military’s inability to 
overcome endemic political correctness, a position that they argued (rather than gun 
policy or other breaches of military policy) reflected a refusal to take terrorism seriously 
and led directly to the shooting. On the November 6 O’Reilly Factor, for example, the 
day after the shooting, Bill O’Reilly invited Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters to weigh in 
on the shooting:  
LT. COL. RALPH PETERS, FOX NEWS STRATEGIC ANALYST: Bill, we 
just need to get a grip on this and put it in perspective … What happened 
yesterday at Fort Hood was the worst terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. 
It was committed by a Muslim fanatic, who shouted `Allah is great' and gunned 
down 44 unarmed innocent soldiers and civilians. And our president tells us not to 
rush to judgment, to wait until all the facts are in. 
What facts are we waiting for? This was an Islamist terrorist act. And I'm sorry if 
it's inconvenient for Washington to face the facts. But there is no question about 
it. It was a terrorist act. It was committed by an Islamist. We knew he was an 
Islamist. The military did nothing about it out of political correctness. So, Bill, 
what am I missing?329 
When O’Reilly responded that it was still unclear whether Hasan was mentally ill, 
part of a larger conspiracy, or simply “snapped,” Peters responded:  
PETERS: Yeah, well, first of all, the charge. You know, he was harassed and he 
broke. Good God. You know, every soldier goes through a little harassment. But 
let me tell from personal experience, if there's harassment toward a minority or a 
religious minority in our military, man, your career is over for harassing him. And 
this guy filed a charge that was found there was no foundation to the charge. He's 
been a troublemaker and a sad sack for a long time. But because he was part of a 
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protected species, a protected minority, the Army let him slide, just reassigned 
him. And what happens, 13 soldiers, well, 12 soldiers and civilian dead. 28 
seriously wounded. A few more lightly wounded. And what do we say? Oops. 
No, it's time to get rid of the PC culture in the Army, in society, in the media. And 
Bill, I believe your viewers understand that this was an act of Islamist terror. And 
the media is not going to fool them. And President Obama's not going to fool 
them. And at some point, we need to stop focusing on how tormented this poor 
Major Hasan was. And remember, how many of the names do we know of the 
dead? What about the names of the wounded? Have the media covered the family 
lives that have been destroyed? The lives that have been destroyed? No, it's all 
about poor Major Hasan. And I am ready to puke.330 
In other words, the military—held up in most broadcast coverage as a uniquely 
American institution with a strong history of inclusivity and multiculturalism, was 
presented as having been too tolerant and inclusive in the case of Hasan—its “political 
correctness” was presented as a weakness that blinded military officials to the impending 
radicalization and violence that Hasan had apparently grown to embrace. This sub-frame 
is particularly ironic in light of the many deeply troubling realities that continue to plague 
the U.S. military—disproportionately high rates of sexual assault faced by female 
soldiers, for example, as well as the many horrific examples of very un-politically-correct 
abuses that have come to light in places like Abu Ghraib and other American detention 
centers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
Often, former and current politicians and policymakers drove this argument. 
Arizona Senator John McCain, Michigan Representative Peter Hoekstra, former New 
York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and former Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman were 
among the prominent political figures who were quoted saying that that shooting resulted 
from political correctness in the military. On the CBS Evening News, for example, 
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Senator McCain was quoted saying that the military “ought to make sure that political 
correctness never impedes national security.”331 
In a November 12 conversation with CNN’s Anderson Cooper (in a broader 
conversation about political correctness in the military), retired JAG officer Tom Kenniff 
conflated “political correctness” with what he described as the military’s forward-
thinking history of inclusion and multiculturalism:  
KENNIFF: Yes, there's a wonderful side to [political correctness]. And look, in a 
lot of ways the military has been on the forefront of civil rights in this issue. I 
mean, African-Americans served admirably in the U.S. Army during the Civil 
War, during the 1940s and 1950s. The military really integrated well before the 
rest of society. 
COOPER: Right. 
KENNIFF: And that was a very courageous move because the military has always 
been heavily Southern Army. So at the time when, you know, areas of the south 
had Jim Crow laws and so forth, it was a desegregated military. So there's no 
question that political correctness can be a very good thing.332333 
 
“Terrorism” or “mass shooting?” 
 Beginning with the earliest coverage of the shooting, as news began to break out 
of Killeen, the question of how to categorize the shooting swiftly arose. As MSNBC 
reporter Pete Williams said on the afternoon of the shooting, as news began to break: 
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“You know, the question on everybody`s mind when this first happened was, is this an 
act of terrorism?”334 
At the very first news conference following the shooting, General Bob Cone, who 
was then the commander of Fort Hood, was asked if the military was treating the 
shooting as an act of terrorism, or as a concerted effort involving multiple individuals. 
Cone noted that while three people (who were never identified) were initially held as 
suspects and interviewed, all evidence pointed to a single shooter being responsible for 
the shooting (which he described in the initial press conference as a “tragic incident”), 
indicating that the evidence they had did not support categorizing the shooting as a 
terrorist attack.335 Despite pressure and criticism from victims, commentators and 
policymakers, the U.S. Department of Defense and federal law enforcement officials 
repeatedly declined to characterize the shooting as an act of terrorism, categorizing it 
instead as an act of workplace violence. 336337  
 In broadcast media coverage, however, the question of how to characterize the 
shooting was far more contentious and less clearly defined.  While the White House and 
                                                
334 Hardball, November 5, 2009. 
335 “On the Record with Greta Van Susteren,” Fox News, November 5, 2009.  
336 C. Burton, “Terror Act or Workplace Violence? Hasan Trial Raises Sensitive Issue,” 
Associated Press, August 11, 2013, http://tucson.com/news/national/terror-act-or-
workplace-violence-hasan-trial-raises-sensitive-issue/article_be513c51-a35d-5b4f-b3a0-
13654f019ea6.html. 
337 Notably, however, both the National Counterterrorism Center and the State 
Department count Fort Hood among their lists of terror attacks that took place in 2009. 
Neither source lists the Fort Bragg or Camp Liberty attacks as an act of terror. Further, 
the decision to award Purple Hearts to victims of the Fort Hood shooting (an honor that 
has traditionally been restricted to soldiers injured in battle) underlines the idea that this 
shooting represented a battle in the “War on Terror”—and the domestic presence of that 
war in the United States.  
  145 
military officials avoided the “terror” label, journalists and commentators wrestled with 
the correct way to describe the shooting, often grappling over which elements signified 
“terror.” On the evening of the shooting, CNN’s Anderson Cooper raised the question of 
how to categorize the shooting based on what they knew at the time about the case: 
TOM FUENTES, FORMER FBI ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: The motivation in a 
case like this is what separates, you know, all of the things that we're concerned 
about. Was it an act of terror in his mind? You know, we've had other present, 
former military officers do such things. The McVeigh bombing, for example. He 
had been trained in the military. 
So if you want to know, did he commits these acts as an act, in his mind, of 
terrorism against the United States and his fellow soldiers, or is it a case of being 
mentally disturbed and something triggered him to act in a violent manner, and it 
wasn't based on hatred of the United States or the U.S. Army or wanting to kill 
fellow soldiers? So that's going to be the most difficult thing to determine, 
because he's the one that is in a position to answer that definitively. 
COOPER: That's -- that's a really good point to bring up. I mean, that difference 
in his mind. How did he see what he was doing? Did he see it as a rational act of 
political theater, of terrorism, or did he see it as -- or was it some sort of impulsive 
acting out or anger?338 
Broadly, most sources and commentators in these broadcast media texts identified 
several consistent elements that triggered the use of the word “terror” to describe the 
event: Hasan’s premeditation, the visible and symbolic nature of a the venue—an 
American military base—and a personal history that pointed to a clear descent into a 
specific genre of Islamic extremism. In particular, Hasan’s reported link to the Yemeni 
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki was often invoked as clear evidence that Hasan himself should be 
categorized as a terrorist. Some broadcasts even referred to al-Awlaki as Hasan’s 
“spiritual adviser.” Other broadcasts noted that Hasan did not seem to be a part of any 
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broader plot, and that the 2008 FBI investigation into his contact with al-Awlaki 
concluded that their interactions were innocuous.  
In many broadcasts, journalists attempted to dig into Hasan’s past links to al-
Awlaki and other individuals and groups who may have been extremists. On CNN, in a 
segment featuring the on-screen headline “TERROR TIES?” investigative reporter Drew 
Griffin looked into Hasan’s past attendance at an area mosque that may have been visited 
by al-Awlaki, trying to parse what that history meant for the larger question of whether 
Hasan himself was a terrorist: 
GRIFFIN: The Army says their major was in contact or trying to reach out to a 
radical Islamic cleric in Yemen, or at least thought to be hiding in Yemen, and 
most definitely linked to radical Islamic ideology. 
Senior investigative officials say there have been as many as 10 to 20 
communications that took place. But, in the end, this is what they determined. The 
conversations were consistent with the Army major's work as a psychiatrist. In 
other words, the terror investigators thought Nidal Hasan was strictly doing 
research for his work with soldiers.   
So, the investigation just ended. And, while they won't name names, it turns out 
Nidal Hasan may have been in contact with this same radical cleric eight years 
ago, when the cleric and Nidal Hasan worshipped at the same mosque just outside 
Washington. 
GRIFFIN: It was inside this suburban Washington mosque that Nidal Hasan may 
have first heard radical anti-American views. It is a mosque identified in this, the 
9/11 Commission report on the attacks of the morning of September 11, 2001. 
Now, eight years on, the FBI is looking at whose paths may have crossed here at 
the Dar al Hijrah Islamic Center. It was in early 2001 a cleric named Anwar al-
Awlaki, a U.S. citizen, arrives at the mosque. He had already been the subject of 
several terrorism investigations, but was never arrested or charged.  
By April of that year, the 9/11 Commission reports two of the 9/11 hijackers were 
attending services here. And, just weeks later, Nidal Hasan chose to hold his 
mother's funeral services at this same mosque. There is no evidence Nidal Hasan 
attended the mosque regularly at that time, nor that he ever met with or was 
influenced by the cleric al-Awlaki, who left the United States a year later. … 
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ANDERSON COOPER: So, Drew, if the FBI, as of right now, is find nothing no 
co-conspirators, in fact, no real motive or any connection to a broader terrorist 
plot, what do they have? 
GRIFFIN: You know, Anderson, as strange as this may sound, a federal law 
enforcement source very close to the investigation says, don't discount the idea 
this may be a disgruntled employee, a person who may have had some kind of 
jihadist views. 
But just because he went to Web sites or looked at jihadist Web sites doesn't mean 
anybody directed him or steered him or influenced him to do this act. He may 
have just acted alone. And the motive may have been just frustration at work or 
his own personal problems.339 
Several broadcast texts raised the question of whether Hasan was a “homegrown” 
terrorist—a headline that often appeared on-screen in CNN broadcasts, and a descriptor 
that appeared often on Fox as well, although it did not appear on other channels. There 
were also clear channel-specific distinctions in coverage of the “terror” question—
MSNBC was careful to offer caveats in early coverage that any assertions about terror 
ties were still speculative, while Fox pursued the terror angle early and often, usually 
referring to the shooting as an act of “Islamic” or “Islamist” terror, and to Hasan as an 
“Islamic,” “Islamist” or “Muslim” terrorist—invoking a particular kind of vision of terror 
that explicitly drew upon a post-September 11 communal American history. Packaging 
coverage of the shooting, and of the memorial service, with references to large-scale 
domestic and international terrorist attacks (such as September 11, the London subway 
bombings, and the Oklahoma City bombings) further underlined the implied 
categorization of the shooting as an act of terror aimed at the United States itself.  
CNN and MSNBC, in particular, argued that Hasan’s characterization as a 
“terrorist” vs. a “mass shooter” or “lone gunman” came down to his motives—what he 
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intended, and how he thought of himself. In one CNN segment, headlined on-screen as 
“Lone Gunman or Jihad Soldier?” Drew Griffin argued that if Hasan really was a 
“jihadist” following orders to kill U.S. troops, he would have been more inconspicuous 
about his beliefs: 
According to a federal source familiar with the investigation, had Nidal Hasan 
been a classic terrorist like the 9/11 hijackers or the London subway bombers, he 
would have hid his religion, masked his beliefs, blended in, followed the guidance 
in the al Qaeda terrorist handbooks, which directs [sic] would-be Jihadists to keep 
secrets and conceal information even with the closest people where deceiving the 
enemies is not easy.  
 
Instead, Hasan made no attempt to hide his religion or his conservative Muslim 
ideology which is exactly why some experts are convinced Nidal Hasan is not a 
terrorist.340 
In the same segment, Griffin interviewed Pat Brown, a criminal profiler, who 
argued that rather than viewing Hasan through the prism of September 11, he and his 
actions could be more appropriately viewed as belonging to the type of mass shooting 
event typified by Columbine:  
BROWN: He was simply a lone guy who had issues, problems, psychopathic 
behaviors that then escalated to the point where he wanted to get back at society. 
And he took it out on his workmates like most of them do. 
GRIFFIN: The profile of a loser, a loner, seems to fit the life Nidal Hasan was 
leading. And Washington local Imams who knew him say Hasan had few if any 
friends, called him isolated and at two separate mosques was having no luck 
finding a wife.341 
This interpretation—Hasan-as-mass-shooter, rather than Hasan-as-terrorist—was 
prevalent on CBS, which featured the following description by Dr. Alan Lipman, a 
clinical psychologist, who explicitly compared the shooting to Columbine:  
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DR. ALAN LIPMAN: You know, I think that there has been over the course of 
these many years, when we`ve seen these events—Columbine, Virginia Tech, just 
for two examples and now of course Fort Hood and Orlando. There`s the idea that 
people snap because we don`t see what`s building up beforehand. 
What actually happens, though, when there was a Secret Service study that was 
done back in, I believe `85 that showed this across a large number of cases that I 
was a part of that-- that shows that these people are building anger for a very long 
time, Chris …  
They become more and more enraged, more and more persecuted. And finally, it 
becomes too much and there`s a triggering event. 
CHRIS WRAGGE: Yeah. 
DR. ALAN LIPMAN: A crisis, a loss of a job … the deployment, and that raises 
the anger to the point where the trigger is fired and they explode.342 
Fox News coverage, on the other hand, came down firmly on the side of “Hasan-
as-terrorist,” and savagely condemned the Obama administration’s decision not to refer to 
Hasan as such:  
GLENN BECK: I may have -- I may have missed this, so if I have, call me. Has 
anybody over at the White House labeled Nidal Malik Hasan, you know, the 
terrorist who killed 13 and wounded 30 more at Fort Hood an extremist? I mean, 
I've heard him referred to as a shooter, which implies there was a gun. Better yet, 
I've heard him referred to several times as a gunman -- oh, those evil guns. 
He's been called troubled, harassed. Did you hear the story of about a bumper 
sticker scratched off his car? 
I know he didn't want to be deployed. His cousin, on this network, called him a 
good American. 
But extremist -- I can't say that I've heard that from the White House. Of course, 
you wouldn't want to offend anybody. 
America, are we this politically correct? Is this who we are? I mean, the ship is 
sailing. Is this where you want to go? …  
This is what the political arm of Obama said, quote, "Across the country, 
members of Congress who support reform are being shouted down, physically 
assaulted." Where? "Hung in effigy, receiving death threats." You want to see my 
mail? "We can't let extremists hijack this debate or confuse Congress about where 
the people stand," end quote. 
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That is extremist. Yes, extremism in America today. But killing 13 people? No, 
no, no. Hey, don't get hasty. Don't you jump to any conclusions here. 
If there was anyone who could be labeled extremist, you would think it might be 
somebody who spoke of Islamic jihad to his fellow soldiers and then acted on 
those feelings by picking up a weapon and then killing his fellow soldiers with 
that weapon. But, no, no, no -- real extremists pick up signs. They make these 
signs with their kids at night. They're nutjobs. They're protesting the government. 
I'm an extremist because I dare expose what no one else will, that there are anti-
free market officials, yes, admirers of Mao, Marxists and socialists. …  
But Nidal Malik Hasan? No, no, no. He was just picked on. Yes, he's 
misunderstood. He's quite. He was a good American. He just snapped.343 
This viewpoint was ubiquitous on Fox. On November 11, Bill O’Reilly echoed 
Beck’s vision of Hasan’s motivation for the attack:  
O’REILLY: As "Talking Points" strongly stated last night, the massacre at Fort 
Hood is not a crime, not a tragedy, not the action of a man snapping. It is an act of 
war perpetrated by a Muslim terrorist, who believes that infidels should die. 
Now, we all know the Obama administration and many other Americans have 
trouble with that kind of definition. They don't want to be seen demonizing Islam. 
I understand that …  
It is important for America to teach the world that terrorism must be confronted, 
not misdefined. With all due respect to President Obama, you don't win hearts and 
minds by avoiding the problem. The problem is fanatical Muslims trying to kill 
innocent Americans and other so-called infidels. That's the problem.344 
On MSNBC, Keith Olbermann invited former FBI profiler Clint Van Zandt to 
help him parse Hasan’s motives, clearly arguing that Hasan’s motives—how he viewed 
himself and his actions—carried the most weight in determining whether he would be 
categorized as a terrorist or not.345 Several days later, Van Zandt offered his own 
definition of what constitutes a terrorist on MSNBC’s “The Ed Show”: 
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ED SCHULTZ: All right. Clint Van Zandt, it just seems to me that all of a sudden 
us Americans, we`re timid. We`re afraid to call it what it is. I think it`s terrorism. 
I`m sure other people see it differently. 
What`s the definition? Are we going to have this academic discussion in this 
country about what a terrorist attack is? 
CLINT VAN ZANDT, FORMER FBI PROFILER AND MSNBC ANALYST: 
Well, I don`t - I don`t think we should. As you say, the 9/11 hijackers, they were 
terrorists. Timothy McVeigh was a domestic terrorist. The DC Snipers were 
terrorists. 
When you are attacking a large group of people who - who have done you no 
wrong whatsoever and when you`re trying to instill terror into a body of people, 
that`s a terrorist. Ed, the challenge here was that - it wasn`t a case of connecting 
the dots, it was a lot of people have the dots, Ed, and they kept the dots in their 
pocket. They didn`t put them out on the table.346 
Author Dick Morris, a guest on Fox’s Hannity show, echoed this characterization 
of the elements that constitute an act of “terror” versus a mass shooting: 
HANNITY: So you're saying political correctness could have kept colleagues in 
our own government. 
DICK MORRIS: Yes. 
HANNITY: … from stopping somebody that they knew was dangerous because 
they didn't want to take on somebody because radical Islamic roots? 
MORRIS: Precisely. And I also think that the hoops that Obama has been 
jumping through to avoid you calling this terrorism, it's an act of violence, they're 
comparing it to the Columbine shooter. 
Look, you don't have to have a group to commit a terrorist act. A lone wolf can do 
it. The difference between murder and terrorism is motivation. And this guy 
obviously had a political motivation which makes it terrorism. It makes the first 
domestic occurrence on American soil since 9/11.347 
Policymakers also helped drive the debate over whether Hasan was a terrorist or a 
lone gunman. On NBC, in in-depth coverage that described the military review of the 
factors that led to the shooting, NBC’s Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski quoted 
several senators who called the shooting a “terrorist attack,” noting that leaders such as 
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Senator John McCain and General Jack Keane, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army, suspected that political correctness was behind the military’s failure to “connect 
the dots.”348  
 
Orientalist tropes in coverage 
A final theme that pervaded much broadcast coverage of the Fort Hood shooting 
was the repetition of latently (or, on some occasions, overtly) Orientalist tropes in 
coverage. This coverage often explicitly positioned Hasan as an outsider to American 
culture, an unambiguous “other” in American society.  
 
Hasan’s exclusion from the category of American identity 
In most broadcast coverage, Hasan was coded primarily according to his identity 
as an Arab Muslim, rather than by his identity as an American citizen and soldier. Several 
factors sustained this characterization. First, most coverage referred to Hasan using his 
full name, Nidal Malik Hasan, emphasizing its relative peculiarity and unambiguous 
Arabic roots.349 In an environment that clearly coded the American military as a Christian 
institution, Hasan’s name, and his identity as a Muslim soldier, stood in stark contrast. 
Second, Hasan’s religious identity was nearly ubiquitous in broadcast texts. Nearly every 
segment that took up the shooting mentioned (at least in passing) Islamic extremism in 
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general, or Hasan’s specific identity as a Muslim soldier. There were some channel-
specific variations in the degree to which Hasan’s religious identity was invoked as a 
prominent part of the story—Fox News contained the most references to Islam, or to 
Hasan’s identity as a Muslim (507 references). CBS contained the fewest references to 
Islam or Hasan’s Muslim identity (110 references). Many segments featured the mosque 
in Killeen where Hasan worshipped, interviewing imams and other attendees about the 
shooting, putting the “Muslim community” in a position to speak for Hasan. Third, when 
channels like CNN and Fox reached out to Hasan’s extended family, most of whom lived 
overseas, for comment about the shooting, family members went out of their way to 
emphasize their love and respect for America, suggesting that the family was already 
acutely aware of Hasan’s status as an implicit outsider. On CNN, for example, Hasan’s 
first cousin was quoted in the following statement:  
As Nidal Hasan's first cousin, and because his parents are no longer alive, I 
wanted to issue a statement on behalf of my family. We are shocked and saddened 
by the terrible events at Ford Hood today. We send the families of the victims our 
most heartfelt sympathies. We, like most of America, know very few details at 
this time. Here's what we do know about our cousin. Nidal was an American 
citizen. He was born in Arlington, Virginia, and raised here in America. He 
attended local high schools and eventually went on to attend Virginia Tech. We 
are filled with grief for the families of today's victims. Our family loves America. 
We are proud of our country, and saddened by today's tragedy.350 
 Interestingly, in several segments, CNN tried to offer some balance to the issue by 
interviewing individual Muslim leaders351, who offered a clear argument that Hasan’s 
ideology did not fit with their understanding of Islam. Accompanied by footage of a vast 
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array of multiethnic Muslim men at midday prayer, CNN investigative correspondent 
Drew Griffin interviewed a New York City imam:  
GRIFFIN: For 20 years, the Muslim faithful have been drawn to this gleaming 
mosque in the heart of New York. It is time for afternoon prayers; American 
Muslims and Muslims from overseas as many as 4,000 visit here every day. They 
come to praise Allah, give thanks, and to pray for peace.  
Imam Shamsi Ali preaches against terror here, against the violence that right now 
sweeps many Muslim countries. But just outside the gates to his mosque, radical 
Muslims are preaching a very different view. 
GRIFFIN: How big a threat are these people who come here, who may be here 
today, and trying to reach your congregation? 
IMAM SHAMSI ALI: Islam is about peace. Islam is about moderation. Islam is 
about friendship. Islam opposes any kind of hatred against anybody.352 
 Each time CNN aired footage of these positive remarks in the context of covering 
the Fort Hood shooting, however, the quotes were packaged with another segment 
featuring a radical American Muslim extremist group called “Revolution Muslim.” 
Although the link between this group (which appears to consist primarily, if not solely, of 
two men, a former Israeli Jew who converted to Islam and a white American convert to 
Islam) and the Fort Hood shooting was tertiary at best—the group briefly praised Hasan 
and his actions on its website—CNN aired an extended interview with these two 
members of the group on three separate occasions, highlighting their reverence for 
Osama bin Laden, their hatred of America, and their avowed support of terrorism:  
DREW GRIFFIN: In separate and disturbing interviews, both look to one man as 
the true living model of Islam, Osama bin Laden.  
YOUSEF AL-KHATTAB, REVOLUTION MUSLIM: love Osama Bin Laden. [I 
swear], I love him like I can't begin to tell you because I haven't seen that he's 
really done anything wrong from the Sharia. I love him like -- more than I love 
myself.  
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GRIFFIN: What they want is U.S. forces to be defeated. For a Muslim holy land 
stretching from China to Rome and yes, they yearn for the day Israel will vanish. 
So you would like Israel to be bombed, Jews to…  
AL-KHATTAB: Well, I think that -- do you think that's a rational comeback? 
GRIFFIN: I'm asking you. 
AL-KHATTAB: I would like to see Israel wiped off the map. I would like to see a 
mushroom cloud over it.353 
 CNN’s national security analyst, Peter Bergen, went on to argue that groups like 
Revolution Muslim can serve as a “precursor” to terrorism—implying that the Fort Hood 
attack fit the “terror” mold. In an in-studio interview where Bergen spoke in a small on-
screen box over footage of the two Revolution Muslim adherents screaming at passersby 
on a New York street, he tied their ideology to individuals like Hasan: 
BERGEN: Well, they remind me a little bit of these sort of al Qaeda support 
groups that exist in Britain, which also have tended to position themselves as 
groups that don't send people to fight. But, you know, some people misunderstand 
this message. And they hear an incitement to actually go and do terrorism. 
So, I mean, these sorts of groups are often a precursor for impressionable young 
men.354 
  
 
  “Balance” in coverage of Hasan’s Muslim identity 
On Fox News, many commentators, like Bill O’Reilly, were often careful to 
caveat some of the more egregiously offensive and sweeping statements about the evils 
of Islam from sources like Pamela Geller or Pat Robertson with assurances that many 
Muslim-Americans are good and peaceful people.355 Fox, however, consistently 
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presented a vision of Islam as an inherently dangerous religion, and of Muslim-
Americans in general (and Muslim-American soldiers specifically) as dangerous. 
Specifically, the threat of infiltration by “jihadi” Muslims was invoked repeatedly, often 
in the context of critiquing Obama administration or military failures to combat a lax 
culture of political correctness: 
ERIC BOLLING: All right, Michelle. What did we do wrong? How do we not 
stop this from happening? What did we miss? 
MICHELLE MALKIN, COLUMNIST: Well, I have said many times over the 
years, Eric, that political correctness in is the handmaiden of terror, and this is yet 
another case of that. Because apparently, even military officials seem to worship 
the false god of diversity over putting national security and the safety of their own 
officers first. 
I think the main agenda item should not be, as it seems to be from Department of 
Homeland Security officials, to prevent some sort of anti- Muslim backlash. The 
main agenda should be to figure out why nobody stopped this man from 
infiltrating the military and then slaughtering American soldiers on American soil. 
BOLLING: Michelle, the president, the day it happened last Thursday, came out 
and he made a speech. Some people are upset with him. He spent about a minute 
and a half - two minutes, shouting out some people before he went into the actual 
shooting and the deaths of the 13 people in Fort Hood. Is he doing enough? 
MALKIN: Well, it was bizarre. It was debilitating, obviously, for him. And of 
course, we're dealing with an administration that doesn't even want to say the 
words "jihad," "Islamic jihad." 
We've got an administration that thinks that the real threat is so- called right-wing 
terrorists and right-wing extremists and has never issued a report from DHS about 
the threat from Islamic jihad. 
The other day I listed case after case of Muslim soldiers with attitude - it's what I 
called them over the years - who have been able to infiltrate themselves and 
insinuate themselves in the Armed Forces despite all sorts of warning signs about 
their hatred for America and their jihadist intentions.356 
                                                                                                                                            
political system, bent on the overthrow of the governments of the world and world 
domination. That is the ultimate aim”—were aired without additional comment.  
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  157 
 Similarly, after airing footage from MSNBC in which unnamed Muslims were 
quoted on the street about their concerns and fears of backlash related to being lumped 
into a group with extremists like Hasan, whom they described as mentally ill, Fox’s Bill 
O’Reilly responded: 
O'REILLY: Amazing. Now here on "The Factor", we've reported the story 
straight. Hasan is a Muslim terrorist. Period. He killed out of blind hatred. He's a 
villain. And there's no excuse for his rampage … The evidence was there about 
Hasan, but political correctness prevented action. To a large extent, the media 
drives the PC insanity in this country. And it's appalling. You just heard it. 
Muslims are the source of much terrorism on this planet. There's no question 
about it. So when an American Muslim begins sympathizing with jihad as Hasan 
did, action must be taken. Let's stop the nonsense. People are dying.357 
In the same segment, O’Reilly’s guest, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, explicitly 
argued that Islam itself, not Hasan, was the problem:  
PETERS: And Bill, when you played those clips just now, where you had the 
rambling with Chris Matthews and the bit about , oh, well, every religion's got its 
nuts. Yeah, but where are the Southern Baptists suicide bombers? Where are the 
Methodist marketplace massacre types? It's clear that the problem is Islam. 
And the other thing that offended me in all of the speeches at Fort Hood today, 
not one mention of terror, terrorist, terrorism. I didn't expect them to mention 
Islamist terrorism. That'd be too far for Obama, but what does it take? What 
evidence does it take for our president to admit this was an act of terror? Good 
God. 
O'REILLY: That's a good question. It's a good question. And it was an act of 
terror.358 
This construction of Hasan as a “villain” (several Fox segments also described 
him as an “assassin,” a word with considerable historical Islamic roots) underscored 
Hasan’s position as an outsider in the military, an individual whose identity was primarily 
reflected in his religious and ethnic identity as an Arab Muslim.  
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A few broadcast media segments pushed back against the perception of 
Islamophobia or anti-Muslim sentiment in their coverage of the shooting. CBS and 
MSNBC were responsible for almost all of the coverage that took on the question of 
whether media coverage that relied on simplistic binaries between “Islam” and 
“America” could be harmful. MSNBC’s Chris Matthews, for example, invited Nihad 
Awad, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) to 
discuss the issue. Awad, who explicitly condemned the shooting, voiced his displeasure 
with President Obama’s decision to discuss Hasan’s religion at the memorial service, and 
opined that Hasan was mentally ill, an isolated outlier:   
AWAD: But I`m really not happy to see that his religion is becoming the subject, 
when we have crimes committed against our soldiers and against our civilians 
inside the United States and outside the United States, and hardly the religion, if it 
plays into the motives of those who are committing these acts, it does not become 
the story in the United States press, except when he or she is a Muslim. And this 
is unfortunate.359 
Awad went on to argue that even his invitation onto the program to discuss the 
shooting revealed underlying Islamophobic bias in media coverage:  
AWAD: Even if he was Christian and he said, "Jesus is lord..." 
MATTHEWS: And he began firing? 
AWAD: ... would -- would the -- a main Christian leader be brought to this 
program, or others, and be asked... 
MATTHEWS: Oh, no, no, no. We want -- look, you were invited because of the 
concern... 
AWAD: I know. 
MATTHEWS: ... our producers have that people will draw ... 
AWAD: Exactly. 
MATTHEWS: ... Which is, all Islamic people are terrorists.360 
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Conclusion 
 In the earliest hours of coverage, much like the Camp Liberty shooting, the Fort 
Hood shooting was described many times by officials and commentators as a “tragedy,” 
or a “tragic incident.” Once Hasan was identified as the shooter, however, coverage 
shifted markedly toward contention over how to correctly define the attack. Unlike the 
Fort Bragg or Camp Liberty shootings, the question of whether the shooting was an act of 
terrorism—and whether Hasan himself was a terrorist—was predominant.  
Ultimately, however, while most broadcast media presented a vision of “terror” 
that relied upon Hasan’s motives—trying to parse Hasan’s intent in carrying out the 
shooting—it is clear that Hasan’s identity as an Arab Muslim triggered much of the initial 
speculation about whether he was a terrorist. Long before journalists and commentators 
became aware of Hasan’s history of contact with al-Awlaki, his online comments, or 
other factors that may have pointed more clearly to a clear link to existing terror 
organizations or terrorist ideologies, the question was immediately raised both by on-air 
commentators covering the initial aftermath of the attack, and by journalists at the first 
press conference with General Cone: “Is this an act of terrorism?”  
Furthermore, many attempts at “balance” in coverage were problematic. CNN’s 
approach to balance, in particular, involved cursorily interviewing friendly and seemingly 
innocuous Muslim-Americans, then immediately interviewing two rabidly extremist 
American Muslims. This vision of journalistic “balance” brought a sense of two-
sidedness to an issue (the question of whether American-Muslims are friendly or 
threatening) that did not require it.  
  160 
Other issues that cried out for additional attention and true journalistic balance—
the question of whether the Army has sufficient mental health resources, or effective 
communication between departments (or, indeed, any communication between different 
branches of the American government), or the basic ability to ensure that gun-free zones 
on military bases remain gun-free—were conspicuously absent. Although some attention 
was paid to the gun shop at which Hasan purchased his weapons off base, the question of 
military policy surrounding gun safety on Fort Hood (a military installation in a 
community with a long and troubling history of precisely this kind of large-scale shooting 
event) was entirely absent from coverage. Many segments described the Fort Hood 
community as “peaceful,” but its history would suggest that it has considerable work to 
do toward the goal of creating truly safe and well-secured environment.   
The consistent focus among some broadcast texts on the “homegrown” nature of 
Hasan’s dangerous brand of violence positions this shooting as unusual—something we 
do not expect to happen in America. This frame is ironic, because the United States has 
the dubious distinction of the highest proportion of gun deaths and injuries of any 
developed nation in the world, as well as a uniquely violent history of mass shootings. 
The real irony here—unspoken—is that we seem to have bred a “homegrown” terrorist. 
Focusing on salacious and extreme groups “Revolution Muslim” also positions 
“homegrown terror” as a more pressing threat than gun violence, which it is not—not by 
any statistical empirical standard.  
The pervasive sub-frame of “political correctness” also inflected coverage in ways 
that steered explanatory narratives firmly away from Fort Hood’s own troubling history 
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of precisely this type of shooting. Instead, this sub-frame generated a whole different 
constellation of themes surrounding Hasan’s radicalism and the military’s ostensible 
helplessness to address the many warning signs that presented themselves in his case, 
driven by a culture of “political correctness” beyond their control. Had the shooting been 
framed in terms of the base’s long history of mass shooting events, coverage might have 
looked very different—journalists might have presented this shooting, for example, as yet 
another case of a mentally ill soldier (possibly suffering from some form of PTSD) who 
was missed (again) by egregious lapses in communication between governmental 
agencies that had repeatedly declared their public commitment to better communication 
in the wake of September 11. Instead, these broadcast media presented a passive vision of 
nebulous, unidentified forces of “political correctness,” at whose feet the blame for 
having missed Hasan’s descent into violence was placed, rather than at the feet of the 
officials who failed to learn the lessons of the many similar prior events on base. 
 Finally, Hasan’s identity as an American Muslim of Arab descent added an layer 
of complexity to the ways broadcast media described both the shooting itself and Hasan, 
who was described in some texts as a “classic terrorist,” drawing upon the recent 21st 
century history of events like September 11, or the London subway bombings. Unlike 
Kreutzer or Russell, whose crimes were viewed through a prism of military failure and 
mental illness/combat stress, respectively, Hasan was held up as a fundamentally evil 
individual, a villain who was inherently bent on anti-American destruction. Much of this 
frame was reflected in notable absences in coverage—the frenetic B-roll footage of 
combat, which accompanied coverage of the Camp Liberty, was not present in coverage 
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of Fort Hood, even though one often-raised potential explanation for Hasan’s motivations 
involved his reported fear of combat. Additionally, unlike the family members of the two 
other shooters, Hasan’s family members were held at a distance from coverage, appearing 
only in written statements or brief interviews conducted over the phone. 
In addition to the scope of the event, which may have been one factor that led to an 
exponentially higher amount of coverage of this shooting, the potential link to the 
looming specter of “terror,” and the fact that the case fit an existing narrative, seems to be 
the primary factor that made this shooting substantially more newsworthy than the other 
two cases.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Fort Bragg shooting, on October 27, 1995, 
William Kreutzer, visibly distraught, was escorted by military police to the local United 
States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) office for interrogation. Shortly 
thereafter, in his car—parked in the darkened wooded area from which he had fired upon 
his fellow soldiers—investigators found a suicide note. The note was dated October 21, 
1995. 
The bad dreams just won’t end. I don’t care where I go as long as its [sic] away 
from here. I’m a loser who just keeps on losing. I have nothing to look forward to. 
Fuck the world! 
 
Suicide is the ultimate test of faith. It shows one is ready to risk all to see if his 
God will accept him. I love my parents, my sisters, my brother, and my closest 
friends, but I must leave them. I don’t want to hurt them, but there is no other 
way. 
 
AA Self-Storage – sell the contents of unit A-130 to pay for the funeral – sell my 
car too.361 
 En route to the CID office, Kreutzer was clear: he believed God had told him to 
commit the shooting, and he was ready to die in the pursuit of his divine obedience. “It 
was God’s way,” Kreutzer insisted. Shortly thereafter, at the CID office, Kreutzer was 
interviewed by Dr. Wendi Diamond, the psychiatrist for the 82nd Airborne Division. In 
her recorded notes, Diamond wrote: “Never in my life had I ever seen someone in so 
much psychic distress.” She described Kreutzer’s anguish, his clarity of purpose, and his 
proffered explanations for the shooting. Kreutzer was insistent that the shooting was 
God’s will, stating repeatedly that if the shooting had not been a preordained act of divine 
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will, God would have stepped in to stop him.362 In fact, he added, he had asked God to 
stop him, or to give him a sign, if committing mass homicide was not the right thing to 
do. Because God did not stop him, he had decided it was the right thing to do—to send a 
message to an organization (the military) that he felt had mistreated him, and 
“brainwashed him to be an assassin.”363 He told the psychiatrist that he felt he was doing 
his fellow soldiers a favor by “freeing” them of the shackles of the military, and, at the 
same time, sending a message to the broader world that the military did not care about its 
men.  
 Fourteen years later, on a different domestic American military base, a Muslim-
American Army major—Nidal Hasan—bowed his head briefly in prayer, then leapt upon 
a desk, shouting “Allahu Akbar!” before opening fire upon a waiting room full of 
unsuspecting soldiers. In his later court-martial proceedings, where he represented 
himself, Hasan was clear about his motives: he believed he had been on the wrong side of 
a global religious war against Islam, and told the court he had chosen to switch over, to 
defend the interests of Muslims—whom he felt had been targeted by the U.S. in an unjust 
and immoral war, particularly with regard (paralleling Kreutzer’s concerns about the 
military’s unjust treatment of its men) to the military’s treatment of Muslim civilians in 
the Middle East .364 Hasan offered no defense, and even tried to plead guilty before the 
                                                
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid., p. 26. 
364 B. Kenber, “Nidal Hasan Sentenced to Death for Fort Hood Shooting Rampage,” 
Washington Post, August 28, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-
security/nidal-hasan-sentenced-to-death-for-fort-hood-shooting-
rampage/2013/08/28/aad28de2-0ffa-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html; “Fort Hood 
Shooting Suspect Nidal Hasan to Represent Himself at Trial,” Associated Press, June 3, 
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proceedings began, but was prohibited from doing so by military law because the case 
involved the death penalty. 
 A week after having been sentenced, from his cell on death row, Hasan addressed 
a hand-written letter to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi, requesting to join ISIL. 
“It would be an honor for any believer to be an obedient citizen soldier,” Hasan wrote, in 
a letter that provoked widespread outrage from his surviving victims.  
Alonzo Lunsford, who was shot and injured in the Fort Hood attack, called the 
letter “further proof that this man was a terrorist … How much more does this 
administration have to let this man do before they see that if it walks like a duck and 
quacks like a duck, then it’s a duck?”365 This response reflected the most common 
reaction to the Fort Hood shooting, and to Hasan’s specific twisted form of religious 
fervor—an unambiguous and unanimous certainty that Hasan’s actions were those of a 
terrorist. He could be nothing else. He could not be, for example, a mentally ill man with 
religious delusions, driven to make a point about an unjust war. 
These two men—and these two shootings—were covered very differently by 
American broadcast media, despite the many similarities between them. There is no 
question, for example, that both men suffered from severe preexisting mental illness 
(manifesting itself in the form of psychosis and obsession). Both men were loners who 
                                                                                                                                            
2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/03/fort-hood-nidal-hasan-
trial?guni=Network%20front:network-front%20main-
3%20Main%20trailblock:Network%20front%20-%20main%20trailblock:Position6. 
365 “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Nidal Hasan to Represent Himself at Trial,” Associated 
Press, June 3, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2013/jun/03/fort-hood-nidal-
hasan-trial?guni=Network%20front:network-front%20main-
3%20Main%20trailblock:Network%20front%20-%20main%20trailblock:Position6. 
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felt alienated by their military peers. Both men offered similar motivations for their 
respective attacks: a deluded vision that their shocking violence dutifully served what 
they perceived to be “God’s will,” and an understanding of themselves as foot soldiers in 
a divine war, ready and willing to die for their beliefs.   
So what accounts for the differences in coverage? Why did journalists, 
commentators and other media-makers frame these two events so differently? Why did 
the Fort Hood shooting garner 40 times more coverage than the shooting at Fort Bragg? 
What triggered the association with religious terrorism (and the fear that his shooting 
somehow represented a larger, looming threat to the U.S. Armed Forces) in Hasan’s case, 
but not Kreutzer’s?  
 
The September 11 effect 
 One element that clearly sets the Fort Hood case apart from the Fort Bragg 
shooting is the fact that the Fort Hood shooting occurred in a post-September 11 
environment of hyper-vigilance and fear, in an immersive context of intense, uncritical 
nationalism. The specter of “terror” is a powerful signifier in the post-September 11 
world, and narratives of fear and danger pervade almost all mass media messages on the 
subject of national security.366 Hasan’s name and identity, as a Muslim-American, 
triggered existing frames about Islamic identity and terror that had intensified on and 
                                                
366 B. Nacos, “Terrorism as Breaking News: Attack on America,” Political Science 
Quarterly 118 (2003): 23–52; B. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of 
the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2007); D. Altheide, “Terrorism and the politics of fear,” Cultural Studies <-> Critical 
Methodologies 6, no. 4 (2006): 415-439. 
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after September 11 (explored in greater length in the “Hasan’s Identity as a Muslim-
American” section of this chapter). But many other differences in coverage pre- and post-
September 11 were evident as well.  
 
 Covering the Shootings: Causes and Consequences 
 In coverage of the 1995 Fort Bragg shooting, for example, the journalistic 
approach to the military (and military sources) was markedly different than in coverage 
of the Camp Liberty and Fort Hood shootings. Broadcast media featured far fewer 
military sources, and journalists asked more probing, difficult questions about the 
military and military policy. Only the Fort Bragg shooting prompted any meaningful, 
explicit and sustained journalistic critique of the military policies (and the many policy 
breaches) that led to the shooting.367  
Fort Bragg was also the only shooting that broadcast media covered in its 
entirety—all the way through the court-martial process and to Kreutzer’s ultimate 
sentence of death.368 Broadcast journalists carefully picked over the military prosecutors’ 
notes in the court-martial case, highlighting problematic phrases or inconsistencies. They 
also gave a platform to Kreutzer’s friends and relatives to contextualize his mental state 
and history. These were not afterthoughts or brief asides: relatives were invited to speak 
in-studio, with professional lighting and makeup that presented these subjects as capable 
and informed sources.  
                                                
367 With the notable exception of CBS’s coverage of Fort Hood.  
368 Although broadcast media did not continue coverage of the appeals process over the 
next several years—only print media reported on the ultimate reversal of Kreutzer’s death 
sentence. 
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In the post-September 11 Camp Liberty and Fort Hood shootings, in contrast, 
broadcast coverage, while intense in the first few days (or weeks, in the Fort Hood case) 
petered out fairly quickly after the shooting. Broadcast coverage followed neither Russell 
nor Hasan’s court-martial proceedings—this task fell almost entirely upon print media. 
Interestingly, the largest volume of print coverage of both the Camp Liberty and Fort 
Hood attacks was skewed heavily toward events that occurred during the shooters’ 
respective legal cases, covering the minutiae of the appeals processes and court hearings. 
Broadcast coverage, on the other hand, was skewed heavily toward coverage of the 
shootings incidents, with subsequent coverage simply proffering explanations or 
speculation about the shooters’ motives, rather than following the military procedures 
that led to the court-martial proceedings and sentences for each man. These patterns in 
broadcast reporting underline the uncritical, shallow approach that the 24-hour news 
cycle can produce. In broadcast coverage of these events, emphasis is given to sound 
bites, shocking imagery and “breaking” news, often to the detriment of factual reporting 
(erroneous or inaccurate early reports of the number of deaths, or the identity and number 
of culprits, plague reporting on mass shootings, for example) and the larger, 
contextualized truth about an event. 
 
Questioning Weapons Procedures on Military Bases 
Another difference between coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting and the post-
September 11 shootings emerged in the way in which the shooters’ access to weapons 
was addressed by broadcast media. All three shootings took place in spaces on-base that 
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were explicitly designated as weapons-free, and in all three cases, the many clear signs of 
the shooters’ mental illness before each shooting should, according to existing military 
policy, have resulted in (at least) the removal of each man’s weapon, if not dismissal 
from the military entirely. But only Fort Bragg shooting coverage delved into policy-
level issues around weaponry. Journalists dug into the history of the gun shop at which 
Kreutzer purchased his weapons, including the history of its shady dealings, its legal past, 
and the effect that this shooting may have on future gun policy. Broadcast coverage also 
carefully noted the specific types of weapons Kreutzer chose, although it did not, 
interestingly, speculate about how Kreutzer was able to bring weapons, unchecked, into a 
weapon-free space on-base (or the policies in place for keeping weapons-free spaces 
actually weapons-free).  
This focus on weaponry simply was not present in the 2009 shootings. Although 
there were many journalistically salient questions to be asked about the weapons that 
both shooters procured in the 2009 shootings (according to base policy, for example, 
Russell never should have been alone in a Jeep in the company of a single escort with an 
unsecured rifle in the backseat after his outburst, and there are many legitimate questions 
to be raised about the permissive Texas gun laws that contributed to the existence of gun 
superstores like the one at which Hasan easily and legally purchased his weapons), 
broadcast coverage never examined any of the legal or policy-level elements that enabled 
both Russell and Hasan to easily access the deadly semi-automatic weapons they used in 
each attack; nor did any broadcast coverage even address the question of base security. 
When these issues were raised (cursorily), they were often dismissed with a sense of 
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fatalism about the enactment of any more stringent gun control legislation—surely, the 
argument went, the NRA and the powerful gun lobby made such changes impossible, and 
therefore any debate over gun policy was moot.  
 
One of Us, Gone Astray, or Not One of Us at All: Outliers in the Military 
Many of these differences in coverage point to one interesting and consistent 
frame that pervaded the two post-September 11 shootings: the sense that the two men 
who were responsible for these 2009 attacks were not representative of the military. 
Russell and Hasan were presented as outliers, and their violence was framed as 
unfortunate but unavoidable. Kreutzer, on the other hand, was consistently framed as 
“one of the military’s own,” a soldier who could be anyone. Indeed, much of what was 
presented as surprising about the Fort Bragg case was the fact that a soldier would choose 
to fire upon his fellow soldiers. The media’s humanization of Kreutzer through 
interviews with and commentary by family members and friends constructed him as “one 
of us.” This frame was also reinforced by the on-screen icons used by broadcast coverage 
to “brand” each attack: in coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting, both CBS and ABC 
featured on-screen icons that accompanied coverage of the shooting, while coverage of 
the 2009 Camp Liberty and Fort Hood shootings featured no such icons. These icons 
featured a silhouetted (male) soldier, holding a rifle, with cross-hairs or stylized bullet 
holes superimposed over the figure. As Roderick noted in his analysis of the use of 
silhouettes in military training materials, this vision of a “shadow warrior” positions the 
soldier as an “everyman,” and represented the soldier’s body as the literal “esprit de 
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corps.”369 In this sense, Kreutzer was presented as a soldier who could have been anyone. 
Indeed, broadcast coverage clearly suggested, any soldier, confronted with the kind of 
untreated (and trivialized) mental illness that Kreutzer suffered from, could have 
conceivably been in his position, especially in a military environment that was 
consistently unresponsive to the many preexisting red flags and explicit cries for help that 
preceded the shooting.  
In coverage of Camp Liberty and Fort Hood, on the other hand, neither Russell 
nor Hasan were afforded the humanizing presence of in-studio interviews with those who 
knew them and loved them before the shooting. Interviews with friends and family 
members were haphazard and cursory, appearing only by phone or in out-of-studio 
contexts where the subjects seemed unprepared and taken aback by the presence of news 
media. The friends and family of Russell and Hasan were simply not afforded a 
comparable platform to present a prepared and cogent pre-shooting representation of their 
son, sibling, father, cousin or friend.  This sourcing decision further reinforced Hasan and 
Russell’s exceptional status—the fact that these two men were not representative of 
soldiers, or the American military, as a whole (although Russell’s violence was attributed 
to external factors, such as the stress of deployment, while Hasan’s was largely attributed 
to personal internal failings, i.e. his religious beliefs).  
The near-omnipresent role of high-ranking military brass as sources in post-
September 11 broadcast coverage was largely responsible for highlighting this frame of 
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exceptionalism. Military sources (of whom there were considerably more post-September 
11 than in coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting—almost every broadcast segment on both 
the Camp Liberty and Fort Hood shootings featured at least one military source) were 
quick to defend military policies as thorough and effective, quick to praise the military as 
a just, equitable and successful American institution, and equally quick to dismiss Russell 
and Hasan as tragic but unavoidable outliers who had fallen victim to combat stress and 
religious extremism.  
 
Supporting Our Troops: The Military Media Complex and Scrutiny of Policy 
Lapses 
The aforementioned military sources affirmed and emphasized a final key 
difference in framing between the Fort Bragg shooting and the attacks that took place 
after September 11: a far more pervasive and overt focus on nationalism and patriotism 
that informed the coverage of these post-September 11 shootings. Unlike coverage of 
Fort Bragg, which featured fewer military sources and represented the shooting as a 
preventable incident at the hands of a flawed but human shooter370, broadcast coverage of 
Camp Liberty and Fort Hood interpellated audiences as Americans first, encouraging 
viewers to think about these shootings in reference to American identity and (in the case 
of Fort Hood) national security. This interpellation was accomplished in several ways. 
One way audiences were hailed as Americans in reference to these two shootings was 
                                                
370 Although the Fort Bragg shooting was certainly presented within the bounds of a 
discourse of national identity and American patriotism as well—to a lesser degree, 
however, than the Camp Liberty or Fort Hood shootings.  
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reflected in the pervasive flag imagery that accompanied most broadcast coverage, 
exemplified by B-roll footage of waving flags, or softly rippling American flags 
appearing behind news anchors in-studio. In coverage of the Camp Liberty shooting, this 
focus was highlighted by footage of uniformed American soldiers in the “theater of war” 
in Iraq—footage that accompanied nearly all coverage of the Camp Liberty shooting. 
Another way this was accomplished was in terms of the ways in which the Fort Hood 
shooting was memorialized—with a nationally televised and highly choreographed 
service at which the commander-in-chief himself personally eulogized each victim. This 
meme of “nation-in-mourning” clearly (and often explicitly) reflected back to September 
11, presenting a sense that the Fort Hood shooting was an attack that had happened to all 
of us as Americans, not just to the victims of the shooting itself.  
 
Hasan’s identity as a Muslim-American  
 
 A second factor that had a powerful effect upon the ways these shootings were 
framed was Hasan’s identity as a second-generation Muslim American with an 
unambiguously Arabic name. Long before the full context of Hasan’s mental illness and 
history of religious fundamentalism came to light, when only his name and rank had been 
released, the question journalists were asking, early and often, was: is this an act of 
terrorism?371 These terminological choices (and the specter of the broader scope of the 
                                                
371 Before Hasan’s name and identity were released to the press, the shooting was 
described in very different terms—for example, NBC news described the shooting as an 
act of “mass murder,” while CNN described it as a “rampage.” The earliest comments 
from President Obama, who was asked about the shooting shortly after it took place at an 
unrelated press conference at the Department of the Interior, described the attack as a 
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sign of “terror” that accompanied them) are one factor that led the Fort Hood shooting to 
garner over 20 times more coverage than the Fort Bragg and Camp Liberty shootings 
combined. While Camp Liberty was framed primarily through the prism of Columbine, 
as a mass shooting featuring a bullied/alienated shooter (broadcast coverage described the 
shooting as a “rampage,” a “mass murder,” or a “killing spree,” in addition to occasional 
references to it as a “tragic incident” or “tragic accident”) coverage of Fort Hood was far 
more focused on the question of finding the correct prism through which to understand 
the shooting: mass murder or terror?  
 Although Hasan’s personal and religious beliefs certainly aligned with a twisted 
form of religious fundamentalism that he believed justified, and even required, 
indiscriminate violence, Hasan did not belong to any larger terrorist organization; nor did 
he have a network of associates beyond himself in the pursuit of his premeditated attack. 
He was also mentally ill. Many broadcast segments dismissed these elements as 
irrelevant, however, arguing that Hasan’s intent—his internal motivation—was enough to 
qualify him as a terrorist.372  
The many debates that followed in broadcast media segments parsing the 
definition of “terror” or “terrorist” underline the powerful signifying role of these media. 
Policy and scholarly definitions of terrorism did not drive this debate. Despite the fact 
that journalists and commentators featured in these broadcasts could reasonably access 
                                                                                                                                            
“tragic shooting,” and in his first press conference about the shooting, General Cone, then 
the commander of Fort Hood, described the shooting as a “tragic incident.”  
372 “Ft. Hood, Texas Shootings,” CNN Evening News, November 5, 2009; “Ft. Hood, 
Texas, Shootings / Tribute,” CNN Evening News, November 10, 2009; “Terrorism / Plane 
Bomb Plot / Awlaki,” CNN Evening News, January 1, 2010; Hannity, November 9, 2009; 
“Was Fort Hood Massacre Terrorism?” Hannity, November 11, 2009. 
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these policy definitions—and although the American government has offered a handful 
of clear definitions for terrorism—the meaning of these words are still bitterly contested 
in media. Further, simply the introduction of the specter of “terror” to coverage of this 
event was enough to raise the newsworthiness of and salience of the shooting 
considerably. The invocation of this “terror” frame tied the shooting to a broader 
narrative of fear, nationalism and potential victimhood that recalled fraught environment 
of the U.S. immediately after September 11. In fact, in one CNN segment a few days 
after the shooting (rather inexplicably featuring a very small but vocal extremist Muslim 
sect based in New York) journalist Drew Griffin referred to the September 11 hijackers 
as “classic terrorists,” and then compared Hasan to the standard and definition embodied 
by these men to answer the question of how to properly categorize the shooting.  
 
Redefining Terrorism 
The idea that the September 11 hijackers represent a now-“classic” vision of 
terrorism represents a somewhat different definition of “terror” than those that pervaded 
the pre-September 11 landscape, and represents a shift in how journalists define 
“terrorism” in the popular American imagination. This considerable shift is based in the 
powerful iconography that accompanied media coverage of the September 11 attacks, 
reinvigorating and transforming old Orientalist tropes. Hasan’s “otherness” in media 
coverage that clearly and unambiguously framed him as an outsider (both in the military 
and in the American public in general), upheld a long history of Orientalist 
representations that set Arab and Muslim bodies apart as uniquely menacing and 
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dangerous—a reductive and binary characterization that positions these identities as 
diametrically opposed to (and incompatible with) American identity (See Chapter 6). The 
other side of this coin—the latitude and external justifications, such as stress or mental 
illness, that are proffered to explain away the violence of white male subjects—is evident 
in coverage of the Fort Bragg and Camp Liberty shootings, where the (white male) 
culprits were primarily framed through the prism of external stressors that caused them to 
“snap” (See Chapters 4 and 5).  
Indeed, Hasan’s identity as a Muslim was remarkably predominant in broadcast 
media descriptions—he was most often introduced using his full name (Nidal Malik 
Hasan), emphasizing its Arabic roots and relative peculiarity in America, and descriptors 
of his religious identity (most often as a “Muslim-American”) were pervasive. In all, 
these broadcast segments contained 937 references to “Islam” or “Muslim,” underlining 
the central role this identity category played in framing the attack. Additionally, although 
many broadcast outlets attempted to present a sense of “balance” in coverage—
MSNBC’s repeated cautions against rushing to judgment, or Bill O’Reilly’s frequent 
caveats that many American Muslims were good and productive and peaceful people—
these attempts at “balance” largely cleaved to the same set of problematic Orientalist 
assumptions. For example, in many segments, when journalists highlighted extremist or 
“jihadi” elements within Islam, they also pointedly included interviews with imams or 
nearby mosque attendees describing Islam as a religion of peace. This sense of balance 
positioned journalistic diligence as a matter of presenting some “good” Muslims 
alongside the “bad” Muslims—a deeply problematic frame that further emphasized the 
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deep divide between the categories of “Muslim” and “American” in these media 
accounts.  When Hasan’s extended family was reached for comment about the shooting, 
they revealed their understanding of this implicit binary by strenuously emphasizing the 
devotion and admiration their family felt for the United States. Notably, other, seemingly 
more salient, elements of journalistic balance—such as “balancing” the near-omnipresent 
voice of high-ranking military sources with timely questions about the myriad policy 
failures, miscommunications and inefficiencies that led to the Fort Hood shooting—were 
wholly absent.  
 
Homegrown (Muslim) Terrorism in America 
Two final elements that were pervasive in broadcast coverage firmly positioned 
the Fort Hood shooting (and Hasan himself) as belonging to the September 11 and 
“terrorist”/”terrorism” category rather than the Columbine-inflected category of “mass 
shootings”/”rampage shootings”/“shooting sprees.”  
First, the frequent invocation of Hasan’s identity as a “homegrown” 
extremist/fanatic positioned the shooting as the direct result of dangerously infectious 
theology and a specific vision of fundamentalist Islam373, rather than alternate 
interpretations surrounding cultural scripts of masculinity, for example, or mental illness. 
Indeed, the use of the adjective “homegrown” in broadcast coverage describing Hasan (a 
term that appeared 10 times in spoken segments and in 12 on-screen headlines) positions 
                                                
373 The frequent use of “radicalize” as a verb in this coverage also underlines this frame 
of imminent threat and “terror within”—as if violent extremism is a communicable 
disease one could inadvertently “catch.” 
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the shooting clearly as belonging to the “terror” category, crowding out explanations that 
might focus on issues or elements more traditionally associated with the question of how 
to mitigate the American problem of “mass shootings.” The term “homegrown” clearly 
signifies the broader threat of terror in a post-September 11 environment. As Alsultany 
noted, even ostensibly well-meaning media accounts that featured Arab and Muslim 
identities during this period often include references to an underlying sense that terror 
cells or “sleeper cells” operating within America (often embodied by Americans of Arab 
descent) pose an imminent threat to the country. Further, this “threat” is often framed as 
justifying extrajudicial or racially problematic measures (like profiling, or extralegal 
detention) that would not be perceived as tolerable in other circumstances.374 
 
P.C. Excess Fosters Terrorism 
The second element, the sub-frame of “political correctness” (and the myth of the 
American military as a hyper-progressive, politically correct cultural space) further 
emphasized Hasan’s descent into radicalism as a predictable result linked to his identity 
as an Arab as a Muslim. Indeed, according to many sources quoted in broadcast 
segments, only a paralyzing culture of “political correctness” (and the implicit fear of 
offending Muslims or Muslim groups) prevented the military from thwarting a shooting 
that was positively replete with red flags and warning signs preceding the event. Military 
sources and policymakers primarily drove this particular sub-frame, which pervaded 
much of the debate over whether Hasan could have been stopped.  
                                                
374 E. Alsultany, Arabs & Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11 
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Camp Liberty and the “theater of war” 
 A final element that influenced the coverage of these three events was the 
environment in which the Camp Liberty shooting took place, an fraught context of 
violence and instability that affected reporting (and the slate of possible explanations 
offered for the event) in interesting ways.  
 First, every broadcast segment but one covering the Camp Liberty shooting 
included interviews with high-ranking military (or former military) officials—colonels, 
commanders and generals. These military officials, none of whom were present during 
the attack, were granted primacy by broadcast journalists to define and frame the event 
on their own terms. This ubiquitous presence of high-ranking military officials as sources 
crowded out the serious examination of other contextual information that may have been 
salient in the coverage of this event—rising military suicide rates, for example, or the 
lack of responsiveness on the part of the military to reforms suggested by policymakers to 
mitigate the endemic problem of untreated mental illness and post-deployment PTSD 
from which soldiers like Russell suffered. Unlike coverage of the Fort Bragg shooting, in 
which some broadcast journalists enjoyed the leeway to question military policy and to 
highlight the negligence or communication failures that led to that attack, the 
omnipresence of military officials (as well as the prevalence of a sort of zero-sum form of 
patriotism that required universal support of the troops and the war) in Camp Liberty 
coverage seems to have had a chilling effect on the lines of questioning and potential 
schema that were offered to explain this shooting.   
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 Second, although Russell’s precarious mental state was highlighted repeatedly by 
media in coverage of the shooting—the term “mental health” appeared 17 times in 
broadcast coverage of the Camp Liberty case (compared to three references in Fort Bragg 
coverage and four in the much more expansive coverage of Fort Hood)— this focus was 
presented inextricably hand-in-hand with a “support-the-troops” frame that shunted 
responsibility firmly away from the military’s existing policies and safety nets for 
identifying these kind of troubled soldiers. Indeed, much of this coverage featured 
fatalistic narratives that suggested these kinds of outbreaks of mass violence were wholly 
unpreventable, in part because the military (despite a 2009 federal defense budget of 
$698 billion), simply did not have the resources to commit to addressing the problems 
that led to Russell’s violence.   
In a May 11, 2009 CBS News broadcast covering the shooting, for example, CBS 
National Security Correspondent David Martin featured an email on-screen that he 
described as being “sent last year from Afghanistan,” (offering no other information 
about its specific origins) that read: “We are so short now over here that we are starting to 
see signs of some folks really stressing out. And in the end, it`s all due to our personnel 
shortages."375 In a follow-up in-studio interview in the same segment, General Peter 
Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, restated this argument:  
As long as the demand on forces stays what it is right now and the supply of 
forces remains the same, it will be very difficult for us to do anything with that 
stress. But we`ve got to help soldiers understand how they can cope with that 
stress.376 
                                                
375 “Iraq War / Soldiers’ Murder / Stress,” CBS Evening News, May 11, 2009.  
376 Ibid. 
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This focus on the military as an overextended but well-intentioned institution 
simply doing its best deflected focus away from the many egregious policy violations that 
preceded the shooting—Russell, who had had his weapon removed from him prior to the 
shooting, should, according to existing base policy, have been immediately handed over 
to his commanding officer after threatening suicide in his therapist’s office. Instead, he 
was released to the custody of a single chaperone (another breach of military policy) who 
escorted him alone back to his barracks with an unsecured, loaded rifle in the back seat (a 
third breach of policy). Finally, there were no measures in place beyond an “honor 
system” to ensure that the weapons-free space of the stress clinic remained actually 
weapons-free. But because of a pervasive and overarching focus on the military as a 
noble and well-intentioned institution pushed beyond its limits by the strain of a just war 
with a small volunteer army (an argument bolstered considerably by the omnipresence of 
high-ranking military officials in news broadcasts), journalists failed to address these 
considerable violations of existing military policy, or to ask probing questions about how 
such policies could be strengthened or upheld in the future to prevent future attacks.  
The frenetic imagery that accompanied broadcast coverage of the Camp Liberty 
case further emphasized the enormous stress service members in Iraq had to grapple 
with—ubiquitous shaky handheld video footage featured marching uniformed soldiers 
shouting, running, bursting into buildings, and diving from explosions. But again, instead 
of using this footage as a pivot point to seriously discuss the military’s approach to 
dealing with combat stress and PTSD, coverage largely avoided asking pressing 
questions about how to prevent future attacks. Instead, military sources (and the 
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journalists who interviewed them), cursorily acknowledged the stigma attached to 
seeking help for mental illness, particularly for soldiers, but spent most of their time 
praising the military’s ostensible efforts to increase accessibility to mental health 
resources. The fact that the stress clinic (the site of the shooting) existed at all was even 
repeatedly lauded as admirable progress, despite the fact that staff members failed to 
follow basic procedures about monitoring unstable soldiers and keeping clinics free of 
weapons.   
 
Media coverage of violence, critical terrorism studies and future research  
 The results of this research strongly support the findings of many other scholars 
who study violence and media, such as Brigitte Nacos, who, in decades of research on the 
relationship between terrorism and the media, has consistently found that American mass 
media increasingly reject the coverage of broader realities and big-picture contextual 
information in favor of spectacle and “interesting” (as opposed to “important”) 
information.377 These findings also underline another undercurrent of Nacos’ work: the 
substantial effect the specter of “terror” has in terms of raising the relative salience and 
newsworthiness of a story.378 These trends also emphasize the powerful effect that 
“discourses of fear” have upon the post-September 11, 21st century media landscape, a 
                                                
377 B. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma 
City Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); B. Nacos, Mass Mediated 
Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 2nd ed. 
(Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 
378 Ibid.; also B. Nacos, “Terrorism as Breaking News: Attack on America,” Political 
Science Quarterly 118 (2003): 23–52. 
  183 
context in which narratives of fear, victimhood and risk increasingly pervade coverage, 
raising the profile of events like the Fort Hood shooting considerably.379  
The results described in this study also continue to find the widespread reliance of 
mass media upon official sources—in this case, most often military sources—and the 
ways these sources function to (and have a vested interest in) actively reproduce the 
existing social order, often stymying change and critical questioning.380 Further, this 
analysis continues to find many of the problematic trends that scholars like Travis Dixon, 
Carol Stabile and Evelyn Alsultany have delineated regarding the unique ways that 
nonwhite actors are framed far more negatively than white actors in media coverage of 
crime and violence—particularly, in a post-September 11 environment, identities that are 
coded as Arab or Muslim.381 In these case studies, these marked differences are most 
evident in the comparison of media coverage of the Fort Hood shooting to the Fort Bragg 
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and Camp Liberty shootings. Not only did the Fort Hood shooting garner far more 
extensive coverage than the other two incidents, it produced a narrative that assigned 
internal blame to the culprit (Hasan, allegedly motivated by Islamic, terrorist faith 
tradition), versus the narratives of external blame to the other two (white, non-Muslim) 
shooters (allegedly pushed to the brink by combat stress and mental illness).  
 Although very little research has been explicitly applied to mass media coverage 
of the American military (and military bases) in a domestic context, particularly in 
peacetime, many other scholars have outlined the ways in which the American news 
media have often (particularly in the run-up to the second Iraq War) failed their function 
as the “fourth estate,” granting the military uncritical and even sycophantic coverage that 
diminished the visibility of opposition voices and positioned the media as a supportive 
arm of the American military itself.382 Indeed, as early as 1993, Brigid Schulte found that, 
in their coverage of potential domestic military base closings, American news media 
adopted a “base-boosting” mentality that positioned the media as an entity that had an 
obligation to “help” the military.383 This study builds upon existing literature in this field 
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by charting the ways in which news media frame violence that takes place on American 
military installations—both during peacetime and in the context of an active war zone. 
 Finally, this study aligns neatly with the relatively new field of critical terrorism 
studies (CTS), which arose in response to criticisms of traditional or orthodox scholarship 
on terrorism. Primary among these criticisms were (1) an overly prescriptive “problem-
solving” policy focus, (2) the strong links between many influential scholars of terrorism 
and state entities that define terror policy, and (3) a lack of historicity. To combat these 
problems, CTS approaches the study of terrorism critically, with an eye toward the 
inherent ontological instability of the ‘terrorism’ category.384 Indeed, the fluidity, 
instability and subjectivity of terms like “mass shooting” and “terrorism” are key to this 
analysis, as is the critical approach with which this study was undertaken. 
 There are a few elements to these cases, and to this coverage, about which I still 
do not have complete information. I have been unable to secure, for example, the entire 
sum of the court-martial documents for the Camp Liberty and Fort Hood cases (although 
I have been able to access many pertinent materials and legal documents for both of these 
cases). In future iterations of this study, I plan to file FOIA requests for the full court-
martial records in each of these cases. In the future, I also plan to examine media 
coverage of the 1994 Fairchild Air Force Base shooting, as well as coverage of the 2013 
Navy Yard shooting, to further broaden the scope of the coverage this study analyzes.  
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Moving forward: covering mass shootings and large-scale violence 
 Broadcast coverage of all three of these shootings replicated longstanding 
problems and tropes evident in coverage of breaking broadcast news—inaccurate 
information (in these three cases, often regarding allegations of multiple shooters), 
erroneous reports of deaths, early allegations made by tertiary, anonymous or unqualified 
sources that turned out to be incorrect, and an obsession with up-to-the-minute minute 
breaking details that had little relevance to the larger context of the event.  
Another, more troubling, common element of coverage of mass shootings that 
these texts reproduced is a relentless focus on the search for a motive in each case. In a 
theme that strongly echoed Columbine coverage, these broadcast media (particularly in 
coverage of the two 2009 shootings) were zealously focused on discovering why each 
culprit carried out each shooting. What prompted each man to “snap?” What perceived 
slights or mistreatment pushed these men to engage in deadly violence against their own 
fellow soldiers? These broadcast media devoted considerable time to plumbing the depths 
of each man’s psyche, assessing the factors that they identified as having led to the anger 
and resentment that produced the conditions for each attack: alienation from colleagues, 
stress, fanaticism, or perhaps some combination of all three.  
 However, this tendency in coverage, this obsession with parsing the minute 
details of each man’s pre-shooting thought process, is not only misguided—it is a 
dangerous red herring. Examining the history of mass shootings in the United States, two 
factors are predominant in nearly every case: (1) severe, preexisting, untreated mental 
illness, and (2) easy (usually legal) access to high-powered weaponry, despite the fact 
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that the majority of mass shooters (as did all three mass shooters highlighted in this 
study) suffer from the type of mental illness that should have prevented them from 
accessing firearms. In the case of each of these severely disturbed men (and indeed, one 
must be severely disturbed to even seriously contemplate this type of violence—well men 
do not commit mass shootings) identifying the specific element or factor that ostensibly 
pushed each man to the “brink” of this violence is irrelevant. Mass shooters do not 
“snap”—they consistently and predictably move down a path toward these episodes of 
violence. For mass shooters like Kreutzer, Russell, and Hasan, it is often not a question of 
“if,” but “when.”385  
News media must thoughtfully and critically consider the substantial role that mental 
illness plays in these shootings—and they must be equally cautious of falling prey to the 
fatalism surrounding the role of the NRA that often pervades coverage. Too often, as 
evidenced by the texts examined in this project, journalists fall back on NRA talking 
points around mental illness and gun ownership (talking points that use mental illness as 
a point in favor of more lax gun laws, rather than pointing to the overwhelming and 
disturbing evidence that American mass shooters with severe preexisting mental illness 
are often easily and legally able to build up enormous arsenals of deadly weapons). 
Looking to the examples of the U.K. and Australia, which enacted much stricter 
legislation regarding gun ownership in the wake of two 1996 shootings, it is clear that 
                                                
385 D. Swink, “The Pentagon Shooting: They Don’t ‘Just Snap,’” Psychology Today, 
March 6, 2010, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/threat-management/201003/the-
pentagon-shooting-they-don-t-just-snap; K. Newman, Rampage: The Social Roots of 
School Shootings (New York: Basic Books, 2004).  
  188 
tightened gun legislation can be stunningly effective at dramatically lowering rates of gun 
violence, as well as nearly eliminating mass shootings entirely.  
Moreover, these trends in coverage tend to frame each case as an isolated 
incident, rather than a consistent and disturbing trend of uniquely American (and 
primarily white and masculine) violence. The fact that these shootings are almost solely 
committed by men—with only one exception in the last 30 years—has largely escaped 
examination by mass media, which tend to view these events as one-off cases that are not 
informed by any particular trends surrounding gender or identity.386 This facet of mass 
shootings (the role of masculinity, as well as masculine cultural scripts that often inform 
the men who commit these crimes) deserved considerable examination. The role of media 
themselves in replicating and endlessly reproducing the problematic frames (and cultural 
scripts that inform future mass shooters) surrounding these types of events has also 
largely escaped examination in the coverage of these shootings. As Carol Stabile noted in 
her examination of suicide-mass shootings: 
Instead of the usual pattern of news media coverage of suicide-mass shootings as 
isolated instances of non-gendered, non-raced individuals who “snap,” these 
events follow distinct social patterns. First, these were all men who committed 
explicit, physical forms of masculine domination prior to and as part of their 
suicides. Second, the most violent of these suicide-mass shootings came with 
posthumous new media press kits (Columbine, Virginia Tech, Newtown, and Isla 
Vista). These press kits explicitly documented their triumphs and failures in 
masculine domination, exploiting a hungry and unethical news cycle and 
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encouraging other “pathetic isolates” who might seek to imitate or top these acts 
of revenge.387 
 The role of mass media in helping to perpetuate the conditions that continue to 
lead to these shootings is considerable and inescapable. Rather than focusing on parsing 
minute and irrelevant information about the mental processes of clinically ill men, these 
media would be far better served to use their considerable resources and their national 
platforms to pursue the difficult questions regarding the two factors that we know 
contribute to almost every mass shooting: mental illness and permissive American gun 
legislation that often allows these men unfettered legal access to deadly weapons. If 
broadcast media continue to uncritically evade these two key components, they are 
simply contributing to an environment that ensures these types of mass shootings will 
continue.  
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